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Preface 
 
 
Research work in the AERU has covered the topic of innovation in a number of ways for 
many years. Recently, we have sharpened our focus on user innovation and reported New 
Zealand’s first empirical research on this topic in AERU Research Report No. 320. This 
discussion paper continues this theme by reporting the papers presented at an international 
conference on user innovation.  
This discussion paper should appeal to those interested in user innovation. The conference 
covered a wide variety of topics, including theoretical approaches to user innovation, 
innovation policy and the first-hand experiences of innovators. It also features results from a 
programme of research at Lincoln University on user innovation and draws the results of 
three years of research into a synthesis with policy implications. This discussion paper will 
therefore be of particular interest to policymakers wanting to know how best to support 
user innovation in New Zealand.  
 
 
 
Prof. Caroline Saunders 
Director 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Conference rationale and purpose 
 
 
The conference was based on challenging current thinking about innovation. Typically when 
people think about innovation they assume that it occurs in universities and other research 
agencies. These organisations are seen to produce R&D, and this is the key source of 
innovation for commercialisation and economic growth. Less recognised is the role of 
inventors outside formal organisations.  
 
People outside of universities and other research organisation also are inventive and 
develop innovations. Often they are using an item of technology and think of ways to 
improve it, thus making new inventions. When they then go on to commercialise the 
invention and it spreads to other users, by either markets processes or by open sharing, we 
call innovation.   
 
Technology users as inventors develop technology and engage in innovation, and are thus a 
source of R&D that can also be commercialised and contribute to economic growth. This 
source is less well studied and, typically, is not given sufficient recognition in innovation 
governance. Accordingly, there is a need for a better understanding of Technology Users 
who Innovate (TUI) and how best to support them to ensure that New Zealand capitalizes 
on their potential contribution to the economy. 
 
The conference was designed to address this need for more recognition and attention to be 
given to user innovation. The conference included people who practice invention and 
innovation, those who study inventors and innovators, those concerned with promoting 
commercialisation of invention, and those concerned with innovation policy. The focus was 
on integrating information and ideas from multiple perspectives in order to better 
recognise, understand, and promote the commercialisation of invention.  
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Chapter 2 
User innovation: Theory, Practice, and Policy  
 
Stephen Flowers 
 
Centre for Research in Innovation Management 
University of Brighton 
UK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
New ideas do not always emerge first from within a research and development lab - 
sometimes it is the users of a product (rather than its suppliers) who have the insights and 
ideas that lead to innovative products and services. Users are often best placed to identify 
what needs to be done and may also be able to design, build and distribute their own 
solutions. This is old news for many firms who invest huge resources in trying to better 
understand the needs of their users, analyse their behaviour, encourage their suggestions 
and monitor the user-led innovations that emerge. For some firms user-led innovation 
forms a key part of their strategy and they will actively encourage users to innovate – and 
may even give them the tools they require to do the job. In some cases new enterprises will 
emerge from this user-led activity, whilst in others their innovations will take a non-
commercial form. 
 
User innovation is now widely recognised as a potent force in many parts of the economy 
and society, with significant theoretical, practical and public policy implications. However, 
until recently, user-led innovation was largely invisible to a policy discussion preoccupied 
with a model of innovation that was dominated by a focus on formal R&D. This is slowly 
beginning to change as policy groups move to recognise a broader definition of innovation 
that includes the innovative user.   
 
The academic understanding of the role of the user within the processes of innovation 
tends to be fragmented, with different strands of literature focusing on particular aspects or 
perspectives. These strands of literature tend to be framed around a particular story or 
meta-narrative in which users are perceived as passive ‘customers’, active ‘shapers’ or 
useful ‘contributors’ to innovation processes. Innovation processes themselves may be 
located within market-based relationships in which organisations seek to ensure that 
customers buy their products (thereby becoming ‘users’), or they may take place within 
social or governmental contexts in which advocates of an innovation seek to ensure that 
users (actual or potential) ‘buy’ their ideas. Users can be both a market for products or 
ideas and a source of ideas and products in their own right. Users can also co-create 
products and ideas with firms or with other users. The involvement of users in innovation 
may be carefully managed, planned and ordered or it may be spontaneous and hard to 
control, with users creating their own rules of engagement. Certain forms of user 
innovation can lead to the most fundamental changes for organisations, markets and for 
public policy. 
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This paper will explore the ways in which user innovation has been examined in the 
academic literature and seek to reconnect the phenomenon with the long tradition of 
innovative user activity that can be traced back to the industrial revolution and beyond. It 
will also examine the results of recent attempts to measure user innovation and examine 
the policy issues that emerge from these findings. The paper will conclude with an agenda 
for further work in this area. 
 
2.2 Theoretical approaches to User Innovation 
The Innovation Studies literature has evolved from an initially overwhelmingly supply-side 
perspective in which users possessed needs (e.g., Rothwell, Freeman et al  1974), were 
‘tough customers’ (Gardiner and Rothwell, 1985), or ‘lead users’, (von Hippel, 1986), all of 
whom may be harnessed to benefit firm innovation processes. This literature has developed 
to explore many non-traditional sources of innovation, for example communities (Franke 
and Shah, 2003), hackers (Flowers, 2008), open-source (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003). It 
has also explored how firms can actively seek to prevent users from innovating (Braun and 
Herstatt, 2009). However, the literature has tended to retain its supply-side perspective. 
 
In contrast to the innovation studies literature, the Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
literature tends to adopt a more user-centric perspective, exploring how users actively 
shape technologies and are, in turn, shaped by them within the processes of innovation and 
diffusion. These processes are viewed as highly contested, with users, producers, 
policymakers and intermediary groups providing different meanings and uses to 
technologies (Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2003). The way in which design and other activities 
attempt to define and constrain the ways in which a product can be used have been viewed 
as an attempt to configure the user (Woolgar 1991). Within this literature, users are seen as 
having an active role in seeking to shape or re-shape their relationship with technology, 
developing an agenda or ‘antiprogram’ that conflicts with the designer, and going outside 
the scenario of use, or ‘script’, that is embodied in the product (Akrich and Latour, 1992). 
Users’ lack of compliance with designers and promoters of products and systems, far from 
being viewed as a deviant activity, is positioned as central to our understanding the 
processes of innovation and diffusion. 
 
Drawing on both of these bodies of literature, it is clear that users can play a series of 
important roles in the creation, development, implementation and diffusion of 
technologies. Arguably, the boundary between producers and consumers of technologies 
has become less distinct and users play important roles throughout the entire innovation 
process, potentially developing or extending technologies or applying them in entirely novel 
and unexpected ways. In this situation the boundary between consumer and producer, or 
between ‘users’ and ‘doers’ (Castells, 1996) becomes harder to discern. Innovation becomes 
far more open (Chesbrough, 2003), and democratized (von Hippel, 2005), as well as more 
complex. Users may be drawn into the traditional ‘linear’ model of innovation, but some 
forms of user activity may represent the emergence of a parallel or alternative system of 
innovation that does not share the same goals, drivers and boundaries of mainstream 
activity. The processes of innovation, diffusion and re-innovation are becoming increasingly 
complex and contested. This has potentially significant implications for our understanding 
of innovation as a whole. 
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More pragmatic and largely empirical approaches to user involvement in innovation may be 
found in the innovation management literature. This body of literature deals with the 
problems faced by organisations seeking to involve users in some aspect of innovation like 
design, usability or diffusion. Although this body of literature draws heavily on both 
Innovation Studies and Science and technology Studies, it is more concerned with the tools, 
techniques and methods by which users can be beneficially drawn into the processes of 
innovation. Examples of this literature include methods to enable firms to identify lead 
users and draw on their ideas (Herstatt et al, 1992), how firms may shift innovation to users 
via toolkits (Franke and Pillar, 2004), how the internet can be used to draw users into 
product innovation (Sawhney et al, 2005) and the role of user communities in the 
commercialisation of products (Hienerth, 2006). This body of work is an important 
contribution towards translating the theoretical and empirical insights made within the 
Innovation Studies and Science and Technology Studies literatures. 
 
2.3 User Innovation and Practice 
Prior to the emergence of innovation as a distinct area of enquiry within the literature, 
many writers had observed that the user of a product, rather than the producer, was often 
in a better position to assess its effectiveness and improve on its performance. For example, 
over two thousand years ago, Plato noted that in assessing the excellence of a device: ‘… 
the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the 
maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use; …; he will tell him how he 
ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions…’ (Plato, 360 BC). 
Although this echoes the user-supplier distinction later to be found in the linear model of 
innovation, subsequent authors were quite clear that users do not just possess the ‘greatest 
experience’ of a device, but can also take an active role in the creation of new goods.  
 
Adam Smith famously observed that ‘common workmen’ invented many of the machines 
employed in manufacturing (Smith, 1776), and some years later Babbage also noted that 
‘operative workmen’ were perhaps the most successful in ‘contriving tools and simplifying 
processes’ (Babbage, 1832). These observations have also been borne out by historians who 
have tried to describe the kind of knowledge upon which such users may draw. For 
example, in his work on the history of mechanical inventions Usher observes that: “At the 
lower levels, mechanical invention involves little more than some improvement in the skills 
required for the making of simple tools, and, as long as invention is essentially empirical, 
even the development of relatively complex mechanisms does not seem to involve abstract 
thought or organized scientific knowledge.’ (Usher, 1966: p56). Similarly Mokyr, in his 
exploration of the role of “Useful Knowledge’ has observed that many of the technological 
innovations made in the early part of the industrial revolution had little basis in scientific 
advance, and that ‘Tacit artisanal savoir faire, experience driven insights, trial and error, and 
serendipity’ were the basis for many inventions (Mokyr, 2009, p60). According to these 
authors, many inventions at that time were not science-based and did not emerge from an 
R&D system since, as we know, the science underlying many of the technologies in use at 
that time (e.g., steam) were not properly understood and formal R&D systems had 
themselves yet to be invented.  
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It has been argued that the enlightenment played a key role in building the foundations of 
the science-driven approaches to research that led to many of the advances made from the 
latter part of the industrial revolution (e.g., Mokyr, 2002), but it is not likely that ‘tacit, 
artisanal savoir faire’ simply disappeared. Rather, as industrial production developed and 
became more complex, innovation became a mix of science-based and non science-based 
‘artisanal’ processes. Although it is tempting to equate science-based approaches to 
research with formal R&D and ‘artisanal’ approaches with users, this is unwise and an over 
simplification. It is more likely that science-based approaches played a far larger role in 
certain industries (e.g., chemicals, pharmaceuticals), but as artisans became better 
educated and trained in scientific knowledge and methods, ’artisanal’ approaches 
continued to play an important role. This is particularly the case in certain forms of capital 
goods (e.g., scientific instruments), where the artisans are themselves likely to be scientists 
and high-technology consumer goods (e.g., computers) where spillover effects from other 
activities may play a part. 
 
Another perspective on the importance of users within the processes of invention and 
innovation can be obtained from the work on the role of invention and economic growth 
(e.g., Schmookler 1966). Schmookler’s research was designed to establish that the demand 
side played an important role the rate of technological change, and that supply-side issues 
were not the sole determinants. In this account of economic change the role of the user 
was key as it was only they who would recognise, and have to live with, the defects of a 
technology in the context of its intended application.  Linking this to the waves of 
investment and diffusion, he noted that:  ‘… one would expect that the new equipment 
introduced during expansion will exhibit defects under special, local circumstances, or 
otherwise evoke dissatisfaction in the breasts of inventive men. Thus  … relatively rapid 
technical change may stimulate invention among those who make, sell, use or service the 
new equipment.’ (Schmookler, 1962). 
 
A similar observation was made by Pavitt in his work on the sectoral patterns of technical 
change. He noted that firms in assembly and continuous process industries tend to 
concentrate relatively more of their innovative resources on process innovations (Pavitt, 
1984, p353) and, in an echo of Smith and Babbage observed that production and process 
engineers can: ‘ develop the capacity to identify technical imbalances and bottlenecks 
which, once corrected, enable improvements in productivity. Eventually they are able to 
specify or design new equipment that will improve productivity still further.’ (ibid p358-9). 
This observation had also been made by Richard Nelson, who noted that  “… most 
inventions are based on common practical experience and knowledge of persons well 
acquainted with a particular industry or a particular machine” (Nelson, 1959, p103). 
 
2.4 User Innovation and Policy 
The policy understanding of the processes, participants and dynamics of innovation is 
beginning to change. The narrow ‘linear’ model of innovation that has dominated 
innovation policy for many decades is beginning to be reappraised and a broader definition 
of innovation is emerging. The role of users is attracting considerable attention and 
research groups around the world are starting to collect the detailed evidence required to 
inform policy options and guide responses. User innovation is beginning to be drawn into 
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mainstream innovation policy - a significant shift in the understanding and framing of 
innovation. 
 
The measurement initiatives that are either underway or have been completed in many 
parts of the world are all aimed at providing the basis for informed policymaking: the 
development of reliable and robust mechanisms for measuring user innovation at the level 
of the firm. This collection of studies demonstrates that forms of user innovation are 
widespread and may be a highly significant source of innovative activity in modern 
developed economies. Making direct comparisons of the results of the various surveys that 
have taken place is difficult due to the differing samples and methodologies that have been 
applied. However, these surveys provide strong evidence that user innovation is a 
measurable phenomenon that occurs across many industrial sectors, but is more prevalent 
amongst larger, manufacturing and hi-technology firms. 
 
The metrics collected on the scale of firm-level user innovation, together with the costs, 
value, transfer of IP, and spillover effects can all be drawn upon by policymakers and 
collected together to become indicators of this activity. The need to engage with a wider 
definition of innovation that includes users has given existing research new relevance and 
created a demand for a new form of policy-focused research. Drawing user innovation into 
policy is important, but sits alongside the many complex and interconnected challenges 
faced by government, as this extract from a recent UK policy document illustrates: 
 
‘Innovation is essential to the UK’s future economic prosperity and quality 
of life … Science and technology are a vital source of innovation. Innovation 
happens across the private, public and third sectors. Businesses are 
increasingly engaging in ‘open innovation’, reaching outside their walls for 
ideas. Users are innovating independently and in partnership with 
organisations, creating the demand for new products and services… This 
changing face of innovation is challenging businesses, Government and 
wider society to think differently if we are to have a successful economy 
and society over the next decades. Harnessing all the different types of 
innovation across all sectors is essential if we wish to create the conditions 
in which our economy can prosper.’ 
(DIUS, 2008) 
 
User innovation is clearly an important part of this emerging policy agenda, and is likely to 
grow in importance as new research on metrics and indicators develops. But this recent 
recognition of user innovation’s policy relevance builds on a large body of research that 
shows that user activity is a significant, widespread and valuable source of innovation in 
both industrial and consumer goods. This collection of studies demonstrates that forms of 
user innovation are widespread and may be a highly significant source of innovative activity 
in modern developed economies. However, these surveys provide strong evidence that user 
innovation is a measurable phenomenon that occurs across many industrial sectors, but 
may be more prevalent amongst larger, manufacturing and high-technology firms. The 
metrics collected on the scale of firm-level user innovation, together with the costs, value, 
transfer of IP, and spillover effects can all be drawn upon by policymakers and collected 
together to become indicators of this activity.   
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Table 1:Summary of results from user innovation measurement studies  
Study Modifier 
% 
Creation 
% 
Overall 
% 
Sample 
Statistics Canada 
19981
26 
 
28 - 4,200  manufacturing firms, >10 
employees. 
Statistics Canada 
20072
21 
 
22 43 1,219 manufacturing firms, >10 
employees 
Netherlands SMEs , 
20073
18 
 
4 22 2,416 SMEs, 1-100 employees 
Netherlands Hi-tech 
firms, 20074
32 
 
41 54 498 Hi-tech SMEs, 1-100 
employees 
EU Firms, 20075 30  - - 5238 firms across 27 EU member 
states, 20+ employees 
UK Firms, 20096
 
 10 9 15 1004 firms across 156 sectors, 
10-250 employees 
UK Consumers, 20097 5  4 8 Structured sample of 2109 
consumers aged 15+   
2.5 Observations and conclusions 
This brief review has attempted to explore some of the features of User Innovation – a 
phenomenon that sometimes appears to be quite novel but is connected to a long tradition 
of industrial tinkering and experimentation. Although User Innovation remains largely 
‘hidden’ from policy and, until recently, largely absent in policy debates, recent studies have 
revealed it to be a valuable practice that is widespread amongst firms and consumers. This 
growing evidence presents both a challenge and an opportunity to both the academic and 
policy communities as they seek to examine (and optimize) the scale scope and value of 
User Innovation in modern developed economies.  
    
  
                                                     
1 Arundel and Sonntag, 1998 
2 Schaan and Uhrback, 2009 
3 de Jong and von Hippel, 2008a 
4 de Jong and von Hippel, 2008b 
5 Flowers, Sinozic, Patel, 2009 
6 Flowers, von Hippel, de Jong, Sinozic, 2009 
7 ibid 
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3.1 Introduction 
Research in technological innovation has primarily focused on manufacturers as innovators 
and users as customers that buy and use products. However, some scholars of innovation 
have demonstrated that sometimes users, not manufacturers, are the ones that innovate 
when they substantially modify the original product from manufacturers or develop a 
radically new one to meet their needs. While some early studies found that firms that were 
users of new or improved process technology were often the ones that developed those 
process innovations, it was von Hippel (1988) who explicitly showed that users of, for 
example, scientific instruments or semi-conductor equipment were often the sources of 
innovation. His work set off a substantial amount of predominantly empirical research that 
showed that innovations were often developed by users—both intermediate users, such as 
firms, and consumer users (Bogers, Afuah, and Bastian, 2010).  
This attention to researching users as innovators raises an interesting question: Why do 
users innovate? Several reasons have been offered for why users innovate. One reason is 
that users innovate because they stand to benefit the most from innovating (von Hippel, 
1988). Another explanation is that the users with sticky information are likely to innovate 
since they know their needs better than manufacturers (Ogawa, 1998; von Hippel, 1994). A 
third reason given for why users innovate is that the agency costs of a user outsourcing the 
innovation process to a manufacturer are so high that the user is better off innovating by 
itself (von Hippel, 2005). However, these reasons lack some of the necessary ingredients to 
make them a coherent theory of why users innovate—they miss the relevant variables and 
the causal logic that connects them. Besides, it is not clear what the basic underlying 
assumptions are. 
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In this paper, we present an integrative framework and relevant theory for exploring why 
users innovate.1
This paper potentially makes several contributions to strategic management literature. First, 
since innovation is a critical source of competitive advantage for many firms, understanding 
the fundamentals of why users innovate can help us better understand the sources of 
resource heterogeneity and why performance differences exist (cf. Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 
1984). Second, although there has been a lot of research on users as innovators, very little 
of it is grounded in theory (Bogers et al., 2010). By presenting an integrative theory of why 
users innovate and focusing on TCE and RBV as primary theoretical perspectives, we hope 
to provoke more theory-grounded research in this important area. Third, the paper adds to 
the debate about what we really mean by boundaries of the firm in the face of innovation 
(cf. Chesbrough, 2003; Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Laursen and Salter, 2006; von Hippel and 
Katz, 2002)—are firm boundaries those for “making” things or “knowing” what it takes to 
make them (Brusoni, Prencipe, and Pavitt, 2001)? This is particularly important because, as 
argued by Wolter and Veloso (2008: 586), “most studies of vertical structure incorporating 
TCE and firm competences have neglected innovation, a phenomenon that is at the core of 
the Schumpeterian view of economic change and life-cycle theories (Afuah, 2001; Cacciatori 
and Jacobides, 2005; Teece, 1996).” Finally, the paper offers an example of how much more 
we can understand about firm boundaries in the face of innovation when an integrative 
TCE/RBV approach is used, while also addressing some limitations of these perspectives (cf. 
Hoetker, 2005; Leiblein, 2003; Silverman, 1999; Williamson, 1999).   
 We draw on transaction cost economics (TCE), the resource-based view 
(RBV) and the literature in management of technology to derive the primary variables and 
causal logic that drive the likelihood of a user innovating to meet its needs rather than 
depending on a manufacturer to innovate. Our theory is rooted in: (1) the observation that 
boundedly rational individuals and organizations are heterogeneous and therefore 
inherently have heterogeneous needs and capabilities (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Peteraf, 
1993; Simon, 1965), (2) the fact that knowledge is often difficult to locate, evaluate, value, 
transfer and transform into products/services (Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1958), and (3) the 
fact that history, that is, past experiences, agreements and relationships matter in the face 
of innovation (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
3.2 Assumptions 
Since innovation is about individuals and organizations using new knowledge to offer new 
products that customers want, we start with basic assumptions about the characteristics of 
the individuals and organizations that undertake innovations, and of the knowledge that 
they must re/combine or transform during innovation. We assume that manufacturers and 
users are boundedly rational (Williamson, 1985), and that capabilities are heterogeneously 
distributed across both users and manufacturers (Barney and Arikan, 2001; Carroll, 1994; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982). We also assume that knowledge has both explicit and tacit 
components (Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1958). 
 
                                                     
1 Our definition of theory follows Sutton and Staw (1995: 378) when they say: “We agree with scholars like Kaplan (1964) 
and Merton (1967) who assert that theory is the answer to queries of why. Theory is about connections among 
phenomena, a story about why acts, events, structure, and thoughts occur.”  
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3.2.1 Determinants of a user’s innovation decision 
Consider a user whose needs are not being met by standard products from manufacturers 
and who must decide whether to use its resources and capabilities to innovate in order to 
meet its unique needs, or to have a manufacturer perform the innovation activities. By 
innovation, we mean the modification of an original product from a manufacturer or the 
development of a radically new one to meet a user’s needs—what some would call 
invention (Roberts, 1988). This user can be a firm that uses equipment from manufacturers 
to make its own products, or a consumer who buys a product to satisfy a personal need 
(Bogers et al., 2010). If the user innovates, it is effectively integrating vertically backwards 
since, in innovating, it is performing activities that would ordinarily be performed by its 
supplier. Thus, asking why users, rather than manufacturers, would innovate is tantamount 
to asking why users would vertically integrate backwards to perform innovation activities 
internally rather than having the manufacturer perform them. The question can therefore 
be explored using TCE and RBV. Since our theory is rooted in both theoretical perspectives, 
it is essential that we recap some familiar but important points about both perspectives.1
3.2.2 Transaction cost economics 
 
In the context of the relationship between a user and manufacturer, the TCE story goes 
somewhat like this: If a user were to have a manufacturer innovate to meet its needs, the 
user and manufacturer might have to enter some kind of a contract. However, because 
innovation entails lots of uncertainty and both actors are boundedly rational (cognitively 
limited), they cannot foresee all the future contingencies that drafting a complete contract 
to cover all the eventualities of an innovation would entail. Thus, since writing, monitoring 
and enforcing complete contracts for the innovation would be exorbitantly costly, the user 
and manufacturer are likely to settle for an incomplete contract, which they can renegotiate 
as the innovation proceeds and uncertainty unravels. Settling for an incomplete contract 
leaves room for opportunistic behavior, which can result in costly disputes. The higher the 
uncertainty and frequency of transactions2
                                                     
1 We refer to elsewhere for a more complete review of TCE and RBV (e.g., David and Han, 2004; Kraaijenbrink, Spender, 
and Groen, 2010; Newbert, 2007; Shelanski and Klein, 1995). 
 (or interactions in the face of innovation) 
between the user and manufacturer, the more opportunities to be opportunistic and the 
higher the transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). As Williamson (1985) argued, these 
transaction costs would not be that much of a problem if any assets that a user or 
manufacturer acquired to use in this relationship were equally valuable in other uses. That 
is, transaction costs would not be a problem if there were no asset specificity—with site 
specificity, human asset specificity, physical asset specificity, and dedicated assets and the 
four original types of asset specificity, while brand names and temporal specificity were 
added later. The specificity of an asset to a transaction is said to be high if the asset is only 
valuable (or much more valuable) when used in the specific transaction. Effectively, the 
higher the asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transactions, the higher the 
transaction costs, given that actors are boundedly rational and there is opportunism.  
2 It could be noted that Williamson (1985) generally assumes high frequency of transactions when discussing the drivers of 
transaction costs (cf. Williamson, 1979: 246-254). However, in the face of innovation, the frequency of transactions can 
vary considerably as innovation is highly uncertain and based on experimentation and trial-and-error in which there are 
more or less frequent knowledge exchanges or interactions among various actors (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; 
Monteverde, 1995; von Hippel, 2005).  
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However, as argued by Conner and Prahalad (1996), cognitive limitations can lead to 
increased transaction costs even when there is no opportunism. That is, assuming bounded 
rationality, economic actors’ (irreducible) knowledge differences can cause frictions within 
their relationships or interactions, thus raising transaction costs (Conner and Prahalad, 
1996). Accordingly, besides behavioral assumptions and attributes, a theory of the locus of 
innovation should consider the role of knowledge and relationships among its building 
blocks—particularly given that innovation entails knowledge recombination (Galunic and 
Rodan, 1998; Nonaka, 1994). There have also been other critiques of the transaction cost 
view based on the premise that opportunistic behavior can be controlled by other 
mechanisms. For example, Dyer (1997) describes different safeguards that control 
opportunism, even in the presence of high asset specificity. Most notably, trust has been 
put forward as a way to govern relationships as a moderator or in lieu of transaction cost 
arguments (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, 
2003). Moreover, Langlois (1992) sees transaction costs during innovation as the cost of 
bringing partners’ capabilities up to the level where they need to be for the partner to be 
able to participate effectively in the innovation. 
3.2.3 Production costs and the resource-based view 
Transaction costs are just one component of the costs that a user would take into 
consideration in its decision to innovate or not; the other component is production costs. 
TCE suggests that a user would innovate if the production and transaction costs of having a 
manufacturer innovate are high compared to the production and internal coordination 
costs of the user innovating.1
                                                     
1 There is some confusion in the literature as to the definitions of production costs, transaction costs and agency costs. We 
define “production costs” as the cost of materials, labor, and time that go into an invention that meets the user’s needs. 
The transaction costs of having a manufacturer innovate for the user are the direct costs of (1) writing, monitoring and 
enforcing contracts; (2) negotiating the exchange; (3) holdups and underinvestment in relationship-specific assets, (4) 
breakdowns in coordination, and (5) leakage in private information (Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley, 2000: 172). Internal 
coordination (internal transaction costs) for the user when it decides to innovate by itself include (1) the costs of politics of 
having the innovating unit within the user organization; and (2) agency costs or the cost associated with employees 
slackening off and the cost of administrative measures put in place to deter such slackening off (Besanko et al., 2000). 
 The Williamson version of TCE, which is based on the 
competitive model of neoclassical economics, assumes that all firms have equal access to 
the resources that they want (cf. Foss and Foss, 2005). However, we know from RBV that 
resources can be scarce, idiosyncratic and difficult-to-imitate, thereby giving rise to 
(sustained) competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). More precisely, RBV and 
related approaches (Helfat et al., 2007; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982) 
effectively argue that there is heterogeneity in the production costs of innovating. These 
approaches—which usually neglect the effects of transaction costs—thus suggest that 
actors vertically integrate activities for which they possess capabilities that are superior to 
those of potential suppliers. Differences in resource endowments and capabilities therefore 
determine whether a particular activity is likely to be performed in-house or be outsourced 
(Argyres, 1996; Barney, 1999; Leiblein and Miller, 2003). In the context of the relationship 
between a user and manufacturer, RBV would thus suggest that a user is more likely to 
innovate when its resources and capabilities required for innovating are associated with 
lower (production) costs compared to when an upstream manufacturer would innovate.  
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3.2.4 Toward an integrative framework 
Despite their differences, TCE and RBV perspectives can be usefully integrated to provide a 
theory of firm boundaries or governance choices (Jacobides and Winter, 2005; Leiblein, 
2003; Mayer and Salomon, 2006; Poppo and Zenger, 1998). We therefore draw on both 
perspectives to build the causal logic that connects the primary variables of our theory in 
which we explain what determines the likelihood of a user innovating rather than a 
manufacturer. Effectively, the user will innovate when the production and internal 
coordination costs of innovating are lower than the production and transaction costs of 
outsourcing the innovation to a manufacturer.  
Following the underlying assumptions and argumentation of TCE and TBV, as presented 
above, we posit that the logic of TCE and RBV provides the arguments for whether a user or 
manufacturer is likely to innovate, based on the relative transaction (or internal 
coordination) and production costs, respectively. While transaction costs are caused by 
frictions in the user-manufacturer relationship, internal coordination costs are caused by, 
for example, costs of politics or agency costs within the user organization, such as a user 
firm or user community, or other coordination and administration related costs, which 
might also apply to individual users. Production costs, on the other hand, are driven by 
resources and capabilities as detailed by RBV and consist of either the costs of innovating 
(e.g., developing, prototyping and testing the innovation) for the user or manufacturer, or 
the costs of interacting with an upstream manufacturer (e.g., communication costs and 
costs to transfer relevant knowledge) if it outsources the innovation to a manufacturer. 
3.3 A theory of why users innovate 
The elements of our integrative framework for exploring why users innovate are shown in 
Figure 1 and Table 1. In the framework, the likelihood of a user—rather than a 
manufacturer—innovating depends on the production and transaction costs of innovating. 
These costs depend on three key drivers: the uniqueness of user needs and capabilities, the 
characteristics of the knowledge that underpins user needs, and previous manufacturers’ 
commitments and user-manufacturer relationships.  
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Table 1: Impact of drivers of user innovation on transaction and production costs 
 
Variable Impact on: Propositions 
relative 
production 
costs 
relative 
transaction 
costs 
Uniqueness of user 
needs and 
capabilities 
P1 
Deviation of user 
needs from 
standard 
 • 
The higher (lower) the deviation of a user’s 
needs from the standard needs, the higher 
(lower) the transaction costs are likely to be, 
and thus the more (less) likely it is that the 
user will innovate rather than a 
manufacturer. 
P2 Distinctiveness of capabilities •  
The more (less) a user possesses the relevant 
superior distinctive capabilities to innovate, 
the lower (higher) its production costs are 
likely to be, and thus the more (less) likely it 
is that the user will innovate rather than a 
manufacturer. 
Characteristics of 
the knowledge that 
underpins the 
innovation 
P3 Tacitness of knowledge • • 
The higher (lower) the tacitness of user 
knowledge, the lower (higher) a user’s 
production and transaction costs are likely to 
be, and thus the more (less) likely it is that 
the user will innovate rather than a 
manufacturer. 
P4 Newness of knowledge • • 
The higher (lower) the degree of newness of 
the knowledge that underpins a user’s needs, 
the higher (lower) the production and 
transaction costs of having a manufacturer 
innovate, and thus the more (less) likely it is 
that a user will innovate rather than a 
manufacturer. 
Previous 
Commitments and 
Relationships 
P5 Prior commitments • • 
The more (less) prior commitments that a 
manufacturer has, the higher (lower) the 
production and transaction costs of having a 
manufacturer innovate, and thus the more 
(less) likely it is that a user will innovate 
rather than a manufacturer.  
P6 
Previous user-
manufacturer 
relationship 
 • 
The more (less) that a user and manufacturer 
have engaged in a previous relationship, the 
lower (higher) the transaction costs of having 
the manufacturer innovate, and thus the less 
(more) likely it is that a user will innovate 
rather than a manufacturer. 
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Figure 1. Determinants of the likelihood of a user innovating 
 
 
3.3.1 Uniqueness of user needs and capabilities 
We explore how the uniqueness of users’ needs and capabilities influences the relative 
production and transaction costs of innovating and thus determines the likelihood of a user 
innovating, rather than a manufacturer (Figure 1).  
Deviation of user needs from standard. If a user’s needs are unique, understanding and 
meeting them requires skills that are highly specific to the unique needs. Thus, the more 
that a user’s needs deviate from the standard needs being satisfied by incumbent 
manufacturers, the more that specialized knowledge, equipment, relationships or other 
specialized assets may be required to understand and meet the unique needs of this one 
customer—in other words, high asset specificity is more likely to be required. For example, 
human asset specificity is likely to be high since understanding unique user needs requires 
skills or know-how that is specific to the needs. Since, at high asset specificity, the effect of 
transaction costs is much higher than that of production costs (Besanko et al., 2000; 
Williamson, 1985), a user’s choice of innovating to meet its unique needs or asking a 
manufacturer to do so depends largely on transaction costs, not production costs. That is, in 
the face of unique user needs, the decision as to whether the user is better off innovating or 
having a manufacturer innovate boils down to whether the transaction costs of having the 
manufacturer innovate are higher than the internal coordination costs of the user 
innovating. Since no one has produced products that meet these unique user needs before, 
there is also uncertainty about whether the manufacturer or anyone else can innovate to 
meet these unique needs. Besides, understanding unique user needs and incorporating 
them in an innovation is likely to involve frequent interactions between the user and 
manufacturer since the actors are boundedly rational and their cognitive limitations make it 
difficult to instantaneously transfer knowledge (Afuah, 2001). Effectively, performing the 
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innovation activities to meet the unique needs of a user entails high asset specificity, high 
uncertainty and high frequency of interactions—the conditions which would suggest that 
the user is better off performing the innovation activities internally rather than having a 
manufacturer do so. 
Proposition 1: The higher (lower) the deviation of a user’s needs from the standard 
needs, the higher (lower) the transaction costs are likely to be, and thus the more 
(less) likely it is that the user will innovate rather than a manufacturer. 
Distinctiveness user capabilities. An underlying assumption in TCE is that capabilities are 
available to any agent that invests in them. In RBV, this assumption does not hold since 
resources are heterogeneously distributed among agents, and can be so scarce and difficult-
to-imitate that agents that are willing to acquire them cannot (Barney and Arikan, 2001; 
Peteraf, 1993). Therefore, whether a user innovates to meet its needs or asks a 
manufacturer to innovate depends on who has the scarce distinctive capabilities to 
innovate. More generally, users with the difficult-to-imitate resources, relevant to the 
innovation, would be more efficient in innovating than manufacturers (or any other user) 
without such capabilities. For example, by virtue of its position and reputation within a 
network of users, such as in an open source software project, a user may be able to interact 
with other users better than manufacturers and therefore be in a better position to 
understand user needs and find better solutions for such needs than a manufacturer (cf. 
Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006; Lüthje, Herstatt, and von Hippel, 2005; von Hippel and von 
Krogh, 2003). Effectively, if a user has superior scarce capabilities, its production costs of 
innovating would be lower than those of a manufacturer. We can therefore expect a user 
with superior scarce distinctive capabilities to be more likely to innovate.  
Proposition 2: The more (less) a user possesses the relevant superior distinctive 
capabilities to innovate, the lower (higher) its production costs are likely to be, and 
thus the more (less) likely it is that the user will innovate rather than a manufacturer. 
3.3.2 Characteristics of the knowledge that underpins the innovation 
Innovating to meet user needs entails acquiring knowledge about the user’s needs and 
combining it with relevant technological knowledge, and translating the combination into 
new products that the user wants. Performing such activities successfully depends on the 
quality and quantity of information (cf. Kogut and Zander, 1992). In particular, the tacitness 
and the newness of the user’s knowledge that must be moved and transformed, play a 
critical role in whether users innovate or outsource the innovation process to a 
manufacturer (Figure 1).  
Tacitness of user need knowledge. Tacit knowledge is highly personal and not easily 
expressed or made visible, and is therefore difficult to articulate or valuate (Polanyi, 1958). 
Therefore, if a user’s knowledge about its needs is tacit, the user cannot easily articulate its 
needs, making it difficult for a manufacturer to innovate to solve these needs. Because 
transferring tacit knowledge entails learning-by-doing in a master-apprentice arrangement 
or learning-by-experiencing (Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1958), it 
requires labor, time and materials to transfer the knowledge from one agent to another (cf. 
von Hippel, 1994). In other words, when a manufacturer innovates for a user, it has to use 
its resources and capabilities to understand and transfer the user’s tacit knowledge, 
effectively raising its production costs. In contrast, when a user decides to innovate, the 
internal production costs related to understanding its own tacit knowledge are lower. That 
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is, since tacit knowledge is, by definition, personal (Polanyi, 1958), a user will inherently 
understand its own tacit needs better than a manufacturer.  
The fact that knowledge is tacit rather than explicit does not only affect the production 
costs of innovating but also the transaction costs—the other driver of the likelihood of a 
user innovating. As already indicated by Conner and Prahalad (1996), the transaction costs 
of exchanging tacit knowledge between two agents can be very high. If a manufacturer 
wants to innovate to solve a user’s tacit needs, more frequent interactions with the user are 
required, the more tacit the user’s knowledge is (Monteverde, 1995; Nonaka, 1994). 
Moreover, the receiver of the knowledge may have to invest in developing skills and 
knowledge that are specific to the knowledge, as transferring tacit knowledge requires 
learning-by-doing. In other words, some of the manufacturer’s resources—in particular, 
human resources—may have to be dedicated to the user’s idiosyncrasies and they are thus 
not easily redeployable to other users’ tacit knowledge. Effectively, in transactions between 
a user and a manufacturer to transfer tacit knowledge, human asset specificity is likely to be 
high. Based on the above, we therefore propose the following:  
Proposition 3: The higher (lower) the tacitness of user knowledge, the lower (higher) 
a user’s production and transaction costs are likely to be, and thus the more (less) 
likely it is that the user will innovate rather than a manufacturer. 
Newness of knowledge. We define newness of knowledge as the extent to which the 
knowledge required to innovate and satisfy a user’s needs differs from manufacturers’ 
existing stocks of knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). If 
user needs can be satisfied by using existing stocks of knowledge to make minor 
improvements to products, the degree of newness is small. This would be what has been 
referred to as an incremental innovation in the organizational sense or a competence-
enhancing innovation (Henderson, 1993; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). If needs require 
radically different knowledge from existing stocks, the degree is large. This would be what 
has been referred to as a radical innovation in the organizational sense or a competence-
destroying innovation (Henderson, 1993; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). When the degree 
of newness is high, the manufacturer’s stocks of knowledge and other capabilities are 
rendered obsolete (Tripsas, 1997; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Therefore, innovating in 
the face of a high degree of newness requires that the manufacturer makes investments in 
human resources and equipment that are specific to the new knowledge held by the user. 
That is, human and physical asset specificity increase. Of course, radical innovation means a 
high degree of uncertainty. And the experimentation, trial, error and correction that must 
take place in the face of a radical innovation call for a high frequency of interaction between 
actors. These are the conditions for high transaction costs.  
In addition, as economic actors are cognitively limited, they not only need to invest to 
acquire the new knowledge, they also need to go through the process of learning to 
understand and develop the knowledge. This learning process will further develop the 
knowledge or resource base but as learning requires investments in time and materials, it 
also increases the production costs of innovating to meet the user’s need. Moreover, in the 
face of a radical innovation, an incumbent’s capabilities are usually not only rendered 
obsolete but often become a handicap to the incumbent in its efforts to exploit the 
innovation (cf. Henderson and Clark, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). Thus, if the innovation that will satisfy a user’s needs is a radical innovation, 
incumbent manufacturers are likely to be hindered by their obsolete capabilities and their 
production costs of undertaking the innovation for the user. Thus, the production and 
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transaction costs of having an incumbent manufacturer innovate for a user in the face of a 
radical innovation should be higher than the production and internal coordination costs of 
the user innovating. We therefore propose: 
Proposition 4: The higher (lower) the degree of newness of the knowledge that 
underpins a user’s needs, the higher (lower) the production and transaction costs of 
having a manufacturer innovate, and thus the more (less) likely it is that a user will 
innovate rather than a manufacturer. 
3.3.3 Previous commitments and relationships 
Even if a user’s transaction costs of interacting with a manufacturer to innovate for its 
needs were low enough to outsource the innovation to the manufacturer, there can be 
historical antecedents that independently affect the relative production and transaction 
costs of innovating (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Hoetker, 2005). On the one hand, a 
manufacturer that is normally willing to innovate might not do so because prior 
commitments prevent it from investing in innovating for the user. On the other hand, there 
might be relationship-specific elements that affect the likelihood of a manufacturer or user 
innovating as earlier experiences between a user and manufacturer might lower the 
transaction costs in that particular relationship (Figure 1).  
Prior commitments. In the quick introduction of TCE that we gave earlier, we said that if a 
user wants to outsource an innovation to a manufacturer, both actors may have to enter 
some kind of a contract. A manufacturer may be willing to enter such a contract but may be 
prevented by prior contracts or other prior commitments (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999). 
For example, innovating for the user may require that the manufacturer uses plant capacity 
that is already dedicated to another client, or uses the skills of engineers who are already 
engaged in more important projects. If the manufacturer were to try to get out of such prior 
contracts or commitments legally, renegotiations and redrafting of contracts and associated 
holdups could add to the manufacturer’s transaction costs (which it might want to pass on 
to the user). This effectively increases the transaction costs of having the manufacturer 
innovate. If the manufacturer elects to go with inferior plants or engineers because it 
cannot get out of prior commitments, its production costs will increase. Thus, if a 
manufacturer has many prior commitments, the production and transaction costs of having 
it innovate are likely to be higher than the production and internal coordination costs of the 
user innovating.  
Proposition 5: The more (less) prior commitments that a manufacturer has, the 
higher (lower) the production and transaction costs of having a manufacturer 
innovate, and thus the more (less) likely it is that a user will innovate rather than a 
manufacturer. 
Previous user-manufacturer relationship. While prior commitments are one element of a 
manufacturer’s “history” that affects the transaction costs of innovating for a user (Argyres 
and Liebeskind, 1999), there are other, relationship-specific elements that affect the 
likelihood of a user innovating. In particular, a previous relationship between the user and 
manufacturer could decrease asset specificity because the manufacturer might already have 
made specific investments to accommodate the user’s (earlier) needs. Moreover, if the user 
and manufacturer have dealt with each other in earlier relationships, this would lower 
uncertainty for that specific relationship. A previous user-manufacturer relationship 
furthermore develops trust between the two parties (Gulati, 1995), which has been shown 
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to be an important control mechanism that decreases transaction costs (Dyer, 1997). More 
generally, relational governance can be associated with lower transaction costs as it 
overcomes the burden of more complex formal contracts (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Thus, a 
previous user-manufacturer relationship could effectively lower the transaction costs for 
the user of having the manufacturer innovation, most notably through the development of 
trust.  
Proposition 6: The more (less) that a user and manufacturer have engaged in a 
previous relationship, the lower (higher) the transaction costs of having the 
manufacturer innovate, and thus the less (more) likely it is that a user will innovate 
rather than a manufacturer. 
 
3.4 Summary and Discussion 
Our goal in this paper was to present a framework for exploring why users, rather than 
manufacturers, innovate. We argued that, since performing innovation activities internally 
by a user is tantamount to backward vertical integration, TCE and RBV can be used to 
explore the likelihood of a user innovating. Thus, using TCE and RBV to provide the causal 
logic, we argued that the more unique a user’s needs or difficult-to-imitate capabilities, the 
more likely the user is to innovate. We also argued that a user’s decision to innovate or 
outsource the innovation to a manufacturer is a function of whether the user’s knowledge, 
which is required for innovation, is tacit or new. Finally, we argued that an incumbent 
manufacturer’s prior commitments as well as previous user-manufacturer relationships also 
play major roles in determining whether a user will innovate or outsource the innovation 
process to a manufacturer.  
Effectively, we drew on TCE, RBV and the literature on management of technology to derive 
the relevant variables and causal logic of a theory of why users innovate. Our propositions 
suggest that neither TCE nor RBV alone can provide the full set of variables, and associated 
causal logic, that drive innovation by users. Both are required to fully explore the innovation 
boundary of the firm. An overview of our framework is presented in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
Our propositions have several implications, which we discuss below, together with the 
limitations of our framework and related future research opportunities. We also discuss 
how our theory and framework relate to previous explanations for why users innovate.  
3.4.1 Implications for innovation boundaries and competitive advantage 
Our integrative framework has important implications for research on boundaries of the 
firm as well as the sources of competitive advantage and value creation.  
Firm boundaries in the face of innovation. As argued by, for example, Wolter and Veloso 
(2008), there is still a lot that we need to know about firm boundaries during innovation. 
Our integrative framework and associated determinants of the likelihood of a user 
innovating provide more information about when one can expect a user to expand its 
boundaries, thereby potentially shrinking those of the manufacturer. The framework also 
sheds some light on Brusoni et al.’s (2001) argument that firms know more than they do—
that is, that a firm has both a “knowing” boundary and a “doing” boundary. Our framework 
suggests which variables can potentially influence when a user’s knowledge boundary is 
likely to become its innovation boundary. Similarly, our theory and framework add to the 
growing body of literature in the area of open innovation, which argues that firms are often 
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better off opening their (innovation) boundaries (Chesbrough, 2003; Dahlander and Gann, 
2010; Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
Product market position. Knowing why users innovate may also add to an understanding of 
why firms sometimes have a competitive advantage. Take, for example, the product market 
position (PMP) view of the firm whose primary tenet is that a firm’s competitive advantage 
comes from attaining and defending an advantageous position vis-à-vis suppliers, 
customers, rivals, potential new entrants and substitute products (Porter, 1991). If a firm’s 
advantage comes from its product market position vis-à-vis users, for example, then 
knowing that users are often a source of innovations tells such a firm that even users who 
have no bargaining power over manufacturers today, may erode the manufacturer’s 
competitive advantage through innovation tomorrow. Understanding under which 
conditions such users are likely to innovate, as we sort to explain in this paper, gives the 
firm even more information to better defend its product market position—a primary goal of 
firms in the PMP view of the firm.  
An integrative approach to value capture. Using an integrative TCE/RBV approach to 
explore the manufacturer-user boundary provides more useful information than using 
either perspective alone (cf. Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Mayer and Salomon, 2006; 
Silverman, 1999). For example, a manufacturer’s distinctive capabilities, such as a difficult-
to-imitate brand, play an important role in its ability to capture value during manufacturer-
user interactions. But so does the bargaining associated with the contracts between a 
manufacturer and users, especially if such contracts are associated with high asset 
specificity. Either TCE or RBV alone brings out only one of these factors, even though both 
are critical to value capture.  
3.4.2 Previous reasons for why users innovate 
As we stated at the beginning of this paper, three reasons have been suggested for why or 
when users innovate. How does our theory, which draws on both TCE and RBV, agree or 
disagree with these previous reasons? Besides having the relevant variables and causal 
logic, our theory has some similarities and differences with these previous reasons.  
Agency costs. Our propositions that manufacturers’ incentives to invest and prior 
committments affect the transaction costs of innovation are in line with von Hippel’s (2005) 
argument that agency costs (as a form of transaction costs) are an important driver of a 
user’s innovate-or-buy decision. Our theory is however more explicitly rooted in TCE and 
thereby more rigorously explains why these variables increase transaction costs and in turn 
the likelhood of a user innovating. Similarly, our argument that the deviation of a user’s 
need from the standard need drives the likelihood of a user innovating agrees with von 
Hippel’s (2005) explanation that the more unique a user’s needs, the more that the user is 
likely to innovate. Thus, interestingly, although we use different approaches and causal 
logics, we arrive at very similar propositions.  
Sticky information. Previous research found that users are more likely to innovate when 
user need information is sticky, whereas manufacturers are more likely to innovate when 
solution information is sticky (Ogawa, 1998). (Information is sticky if it is costly to acquire, 
transfer and use, and it is largely determined by the tacitness of the underpinning 
knowledge (von Hippel, 1994).) Although this approach and our framework arrive at what 
appears to be the same conclusion—that users whose underpinning needs information is 
sticky (tacit in our case) are more likely to innovate than manufacturers—there is a 
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difference. Because we draw on both RBV and TCE, and von Hippel (1994) and Ogawa 
(1998) (implicitly) draw only on RBV (i.e., cost of labor, time and materials), our results 
propose a stronger relationship between tacit knowledge and the likelihood of a user 
innovating since, according to Conner and Prahalad (1996), the transaction costs of 
exchanging tacit knowledge between two agents can be very high. By neglecting such high 
transaction costs, the sticky information approach is not likely to arrive at predictions that 
are as dependable as those from our integrative approach. 
Expected benefits. It has also been argued that the agent—manufacturer or user—who 
expects to benefit the most from innovating is the one that is most likely to innovate (von 
Hippel, 1988, 2005). This argument implicitly assumes that capabilities are easily available 
to anyone who wants them. Thus, the actor that expects to benefit the most, already has 
the capabilities needed or can acquire them. This assumption may be consistent with TCE, 
but not necessarily with RBV. Besides, the fact that a user expects to benefit the most says 
little or nothing about its production or transaction costs, the primary drivers of whether it 
can innovate to meet its needs rather than have a manufacturer innovate. Our integrative 
framework includes the drivers of both costs, while it also brings together most of the 
earlier explanations for why users innovate.  
3.5 Limitations and future research 
Like most models, our framework for exploring why users innovate has several limitations. 
We explore them, and make some suggestions about possible future research directions.  
3.5.1 Definition of innovation 
We defined innovation as the modification of an original product from a manufacturer or 
the development of a radically new one to meet a user’s needs. This is what in strategic 
management would be referred to as “invention” since innovation in strategic management 
entails both invention and commercialization. Defining innovation as invention plus 
commercialization opens up some interesting research questions. For example, what should 
the boundaries of a user vis-à-vis manufacturers be if the user-inventor decides to 
commercialize its invention, or if the manufacturers decides to enter into the new market 
niche created by the user-inventor (Baldwin, Hienerth, and von Hippel, 2006)? Would what 
drives user-entrepreneurs be very different from what drives any other user-innovator 
(Shah and Tripsas, 2007)? Answering such a question might also help us understand more 
about why some entrepreneurs identify different opportunities and why some are more 
successful than others (Leiblein, 2007; Shane, 2000). 
3.5.2 Beyond make or buy 
As in many other analyses of firms’ “make or buy” boundaries (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; 
Williamson, 1985), we focused on whether a user will innovate or outsource the innovation 
process to a manufacturer, leaving out intermediate governance mechanisms, such as joint 
ventures, venture capital investments or user-manufacturer alliances (e.g., Jeppesen and 
Frederiksen, 2006; von Hippel and Katz, 2002). Furthermore, there is increasing evidence 
that user-user alliances become a powerful source of innovation (e.g., Franke and Shah, 
2003; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). It would therefore be 
very informative to explore these other governance mechanisms in future research, for 
example, with respect to the relative production and transaction cost of innovating—also 
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within the emerging literature on co-creation, crowd-sourcing and innovation 
intermediaries (Bogers et al., 2010; Howells, 2006; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010; Poetz and 
Schreier, 2010; Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2003).  
3.5.3 Property rights issues 
Since our definition of innovation was limited to invention, with no consideration of 
commercialization, we did not have to be very concerned about the property rights of the 
manufacturer or the user. However, property rights may be informative for a TCE/RBV 
framework as Foss and Foss (2005) argue that resources can be seen as bundles of property 
rights, which, together with transaction costs, determine whether value can be extracted 
from the resource (cf. Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 
1993). Within the context of the innovation boundary between a manufacturer and user, 
this becomes even more important as users often freely reveal their innovations, while 
manufacturers generally have other incentives (Harhoff, Henkel, and von Hippel, 2003). 
However, which appropriability considerations need to be considered when a user’s needs 
are proprietary and communicating them to a manufacturer would be hazardous?  
Property right concerns may moreover arise when (incremental) user innovations depend 
on a manufacturer’s intellectual property. This is usually not a problem when a user 
innovates to meet its needs as a user, but can become a major problem if the user decides 
to commercialize the product and compete with the manufacturer (cf. Shah and Tripsas, 
2007). In such a case, the likelihood of a user innovating, or profiting from the innovation, 
might depend on the strength of the property rights, and on who owns the complementary 
assets (Gans and Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986). More generally, future research could explore 
the role that property rights play in the ability of users to innovate, and how this relates to 
our RBV/TCE framework (cf. Gooroochurn and Hanley, 2007).  
3.6 Conclusion 
For many firms, innovation usually signals the beginning or the end of their competitive 
advantages. Knowing that users can also be innovators gives scholars a chance to 
understand more about the origins and end of competitive advantage. Understanding why 
users innovate allows us to go even deeper into the root of competitive advantage to better 
understand what might reinforce or erode it. Our framework integrates TCE and RBV to 
provide the variables and causal logic that links them to the likelihood of a user innovating. 
Hopefully, more research will be done to broaden our understanding of the innovation 
boundaries of the firm and the origins of competitive advantage, as well as the benefits of 
an integrative TCE/RBV approach. 
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Chapter 4 
Full Vigour Forestry: Sustainable Forest Management from the 
Forest Owner’s Point of View 
 
Jim Birkemeier 
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4.1 Background 
Our family harvested timber for the first time in 1974.  I logged the best trees from 30 acres 
and our best bid for the logs was $1,400.  That total amount was very disappointing and 
didn’t even cover our costs.  After earning a forestry degree from the University of 
Wisconsin and working for several years as a consulting forester helping other landowners 
sell their timber in the traditional timber industry, I harvested some more of our family 
timber. The thought was to do it right this time, but we had the same disappointing result.  
Timber prices were simply too low to pay for good logging and earn a fair price to the 
grower for their time, effort, and investment.  I tried every part of the 
industrial/government forestry system as a professional forester and as a forest owner - for 
a decade - and finally quit in disgust.  There had to be a better way! 
 
I then relearned forestry with the guiding principle of ‘do just the opposite’ of what 
everyone else is doing in the timber industry.   It worked!!  Now I can earn $1,400 from a 
single small tree that is considered worthless in the timber market, and many thousands of 
dollars per tree for our better timber.  
 
As the landowner, timber grower, forest manager, logger, sawmiller, and woodworker, I 
learned the knowledge of the native-American Menominee Tribal Forests in NE Wisconsin 
and the traditional German Dauerwald.  The Menominee forest managers maximize the 
quality and quantity of timber grown while encouraging greater natural diversity.   They 
grow a healthy tree as long as it is vigorous and the risk of allowing the tree to stand until 
the next harvest cycle (in 13 years) is low.   There is no maximum size or age for a tree, and 
they just harvest part of the natural output of the forest.  The German Dauerwald 
emphasizes natural succession and regeneration, with the understanding to “watch 
nature”.   Harvesting techniques and woodworking tools and methods have been gleaned 
by studying the Scandinavians. 
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4.2 Timbergreen Farm 
The best of the best ideas from around the world have been sought out, modified, and 
personalized for maximum benefit to our family woodworking business. What we now do is: 
• Harvest the worst trees first – let the good trees grow as long as they are healthy 
and vigorous. 
• Encourage natural succession and natural regeneration.  Watch nature and learn!! 
• Take only part of the natural output of the forest, what nature can spare. 
• Never let market demand determine what trees are cut for short term profit. 
• Perform a small annual harvest for a steady income and minimal impact. 
• Pay a professional timber feller a good wage for excellent selective harvesting. 
• Use the smallest possible equipment to move the logs, carrying the weight when 
possible. 
• Use thin kerf sawmills to minimize waste – and are safer than bigger mills. 
• Use solar heated lumber kilns to produce excellent quality lumber.  Isolate collector 
from wood room. 
• Have a humidity controlled wood storage room to keep lumber at optimum 
moisture content. 
• Make high value finished wood products from low value logs, such as small, crooked, 
undesirable trees. 
• Use all wood waste for fuel, bedding, mulch, bonfires. 
• Sell what you have, find the best use for every piece of wood harvested. 
• Plan ahead to meet needs in the local economy first – then export extra wood. 
• Sell directly to customers in the local community, then sell your extra wood globally. 
• Happy customers sell more of your products when they show-off and tell their 
friends.  
• Each floor/product is a showpiece to new customers. Customers become volunteer 
sales staff. 
• Eliminate all the brokers, middlemen, shippers, wholesalers – keep all the money at 
home. 
• Selling finished products gives feedback to become a better forester, logger, 
woodworker. 
• Understanding the whole production system enables confidence and knowledge. 
• Sell each piece of wood for its highest value use.   Make Value not Volume. 
• Earn a high annual income to encourage protecting the forest for future production. 
• Use the value of natural solid wood products to support well-paying jobs for local 
people! 
• Use the simplest, smartest method for each step. 
• Do just the opposite of what the big timber industry would do. 
 
4.3 Added-value benefits 
The table below shows the range in values we obtain for hardwood timber and wood 
products in the USA, June 2011. 
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Added-value derived from wood processing (US$/board foot) 
 
Type of tree Timber 
volume 
in 
board 
feet       
Stumpage 
value  
Delivered 
to mill 
Kiln 
dried 
lumber 
Installed 
flooring 
Mega 
value 
products 
Small 
Diameter 
10 0.20 2 65 250 500 
Crooked 250 0 20 500 2,000 4,000 
Undesirable 250 5 20 400 2,500 5,000 
Average  300 60 120 1,200 3,000 6,000 
Good Tree 300 120 240 1,200 3,000 6,000 
Super Tree 400 2,400 ???? 2,400 5,000 10,000 
 
We choose to earn hundreds of dollars per tree for small diameter timber and thousands of 
dollars per tree for sawtimber sized trees by selling installed flooring and ‘Mega Value’ 
products.  We choose to sell our wood direct to customers and eliminate all the brokers, 
wholesalers, shippers etc., and keep all the money right here in the family business.  We do 
this to protect and manage our natural forest. 
 
Low value trees have a higher value-multiplied compared to high value trees. We actually 
earn just about the same money whether we process a tree with good commercial value or 
a ‘worthless’ tree.  All species have about the same high value in this system.  
 
With installed flooring, we can earn about $10/board foot for a large volume of wood. This 
is the threshold value where I believe a small woodworking business can operate profitably.  
“Mega Value” products are higher priced items that take more time and skill to produce.  
Furniture, cabinets, countertops, stairways, etc. can earn $20/bf or higher but typically use 
less volume of better quality wood.   
 
A recent development is the establishment of a local retail outlet for our timber products. 
This store sells a wide variety of wood related products and showcases our timber flooring. 
It has artistic products including our own laser cutting engraver.  Spring Green Timber 
Grower’s retail store makes a variety of wood art creations using a laser cutter/engraver 
that can earn up to $500/bf for jewelry, boxes, ornaments, and other small items that they 
export around the world. 
 
Earning is limited only by the imagination.  The potential is endless and growing.   
Woodworking is simple and practical on a small scale.  Woodworking is nothing new. 
 
4.4 Create Jobs Connecting the Forest to the Local Community 
Last time I talked with Marshall Pecore, forest manager at Menominee Tribal Enterprises in 
2000, he said they had one full time employee for every 400 acres of forest.  Since my 
harvest cycle can be on an annual basis, instead of every 13 years like at Menominee, our 
timber management can be much more productive and efficient.   Since we manufacture a 
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much higher percentage of our harvested wood to a higher value and practice direct 
marketing, we can make more money from every cut tree. 
Making and installing flooring in the customer’s home can support one full time employee 
for every 20-40 acres of forest at Timbergreen Farm. 
 
The Spring Green Timber Growers’ retail store can support one full time employee for every 
10 acres of forest. In similar fashion, a wood products business that uses urban trees can 
support one full time employee for every 50 trees that would otherwise go into the 
chipper/landfill each year. 
Forests should directly and primarily benefit the forest owner and the local community, 
providing regular income, jobs, wood products, fuel, wildlife, water, recreation etc.   Direct 
marketing of high value wood products in a local economy can make this feasible.  
4.5 Conclusion 
One very important lesson on processing low value trees into high value products:  a 
landowner or timber grower-owned business can get the additional benefit of an improved 
value of their forest and land resource.  Without gaining the extra benefit of improving your 
forest, there is no incentive to process small, crooked, defective logs that are very expensive 
to carefully harvest.   A business strictly into making money woodworking can easily get 
better quality logs at cheaper prices from other landowners who do not value or manage 
their timber.   
 
Earning high value from traditionally low-value logs is essential to actually doing sustainable 
forest management – from the forest owner’s point of view.  It is extra rewarding to make 
high-value wood products from trees that big industry considers worthless, but it is also fun 
to process some large sound straight logs too.  Variety is good! 
 
 
Detailed information on all aspects of this introduction is available at:  
 
www.TimbergreenFarm.com   
www.TimberGrowers.Com   
www.FullValueForestry.com    
www.FullVigor.com 
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Disruptive innovation for sustained economic growth: Why New 
Zealand’s innovation system should be open, distributed and 
inclusive of innovative users 
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5.1 Introduction 
There is a large body of work on technology user innovation by researchers such as Eric von 
Hippel, Sonali Shah, Pamela Morrison and Nikolaus Franke. This paper is not intended to 
review this body of knowledge but rather to present a case for technology user innovation 
as a solution for accelerating disruptive innovation in New Zealand, by drawing on research 
insights primarily from two areas: mathematical modelling of urban social dynamics and 
mathematical simulation of innovation diffusion. 
 
5.2 Superlinear scaling, urbanisation and a question of sustainability 
Using extensive quantitative datasets from cities in the USA, China and Europe, Bettencourt 
et al. (2007, 2008) produced mathematical models that revealed interesting dynamics in 
social organisation in the urban environment.  
 
These authors found empirical evidence for the universality of how quantities of social 
organisation scale with urban population size. In other words, the way cities form (the 
processes of urbanisation) is very general. Cities world-over scale in the same way due to 
similar underlying social dynamics. Many diverse properties of cities like personal income, 
electricity consumption, GDP and R&D employment are power law functions of population 
size with scaling exponents, β. The power law equation is as follows: 
 
Y(t) = Y0N(t)β 
 
Y is a material resource or measure of social activity, e.g. GDP 
Y0 is a normalisation constant 
N is the population size 
The exponent, β, reflects general dynamic rules at play across the urban system 
 
Power laws are ubiquitous and have been described by numerous authors, be it by different 
names; the Pareto Principal, Zipf’s Law, the Mathew Effect, Cumulative advantage and 
Double Jeopardy. They describe certain distributions of quantities that are top heavy with 
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long tails, i.e. systems where large observations are few and small observations are many. 
Graphically, the power law distribution has a curve much like an exponential curve but with 
a far sharper knee-bend at the point where small quantities rapidly transition to large 
quantities. When plotted on log-log plots, power law distribution curves transform into 
straight lines (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Four quantities with power law distributions. (a) Walking speed vs. 
population for cities around the world: The pace of urban life increases with city 
size. (b) Heart rate vs. the size (mass) of organisms. The pace of biological life 
decreases with organism size. Source: Bettencourt et al. (2007). (c) Metropolitan 
inventors vs. population [331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the US in 
2000]. (b) Metropolitan inventors and patents (331 MSAs in the US in 2000). 
Source: Bettencourt et al. (2004). 
 
Bettencourt et al. (2007, 2008) found that the exponent, β, falls into three distinct classes 
(Table 1) for quantities in the urban environment: Quantities reflecting wealth creation and 
innovation have β ≈ 1.2 (i.e. >1), quantities reflecting human needs have β ≈ 1, whereas 
those accounting for infrastructure display β ≈ 0.8 (i.e. <1). 
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Table 1: Three categories of power law exponent, β 
 
Exponent Implication Applicability 
β > 1 (superlinear) Disproportionality; 
increasing returns with 
population size 
Social currencies 
(information, wealth, 
innovation) 
β = 1 (linear) Proportionality Individual human needs 
(housing, household water 
consumption) 
β < 1 (sublinear) Disproportionality; 
economies of scale with 
population size 
Infrastructure (petrol 
stations, road surface, 
electrical cable) 
 
What is remarkable is the urban quantities that scale superlinearly (β >1). These quantities 
reflect unique social characteristics with no equivalent in biology (quantities in biology scale 
according to quarter-powers (β <1) with organism size. The larger you are the more efficient 
you are: a blue whale is just a blown-up elephant which is a blown up mouse). Social 
organisation, barring quantities relating to infrastructure and individual human need, scale 
in such a way that as a city grows, disproportionately increasing returns are achieved from 
knowledge spillovers driving innovation, productivity and wealth creation and in turn urban 
agglomeration. 
 
Patenting activity, total number of inventors, R&D establishments, private R&D 
employment, R&D employment and supercreative employment have all been found to scale 
superlinearly with population size in cities (Bettencourt et al. 2004, 2007, 2008). Larger 
metropolitan areas have disproportionately more of these quantities. 
 
Cites have long been known to be society’s predominant engines of innovation and wealth 
creation, yet they are also its main source of crime, pollution, and disease. The latter 
quantities too have been found to scale superlinearly with population size (Bettencourt et 
al. 2007). Bettencourt et al. use this universal power law function to derive growth 
equations that constrain population growth by the availability of resources and their rates 
of consumption. They illustrate empirically the unsustainability of urbanised social 
organisation which demonstrate boom and bust dynamics unlike the plateauing of 
population density around a carry capacity as is the case in biology (Figure 2). Urbanised 
social organisation’s faster than exponential growth amid finite resources triggers a 
transition phase that leads to stagnation followed by collapse (Figure 2c and 2d). 
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Figure 2: Regimes of urban growth. (a) Growth driven by sublinear scaling 
eventually converges to the carrying capacity N∞. (b) Growth driven by linear 
scaling is exponential. (c) Growth driven by superlinear scaling diverges within a 
finite time tc (dashed vertical line). (d) Collapse characterizes superlinear dynamics 
when resources are scarce. Source: Bettencourt et al. (2007). 
 
The United Nations World Urbanization Prospects 2009 Revision estimated the world’s 
urban population to surpass the world’s rural population around 2008 (Figure 3). For the 
first time in the history of our species, there are more people living in cities than outside 
them. By 2030 the urban population is predicted to increase by more than 30%. In light of 
the way urban quantities scale as discussed above, this rural-urban shift poses some serious 
concern to the sustainability of social organisation.  
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Figure 3: Projections of urban growth by region. Source: Jiang et al. 2008 
 
5.3 The need for accelerated innovation 
Bettencourt et al. (2007) demonstrate that the stagnation and collapse of society can be 
avoided by responding innovatively to the crisis to ensure that the predominant dynamic of 
the city remains in the ‘‘wealth and knowledge creation’’ phase where β >1. Innovation is 
key to both superlinear growth and avoiding decline. As stagnation sets in, society must 
initiate a new cycle of innovation by resetting the initial conditions for renewed growth. 
This process can be continually repeated leading to multiple growth cycles, thereby pushing 
potential collapse into the future (Figure 4). However, the solution to respond innovatively 
has an unfortunate consequence. The mathematical model developed by Bettencourt et al. 
(2007, 2008) predicts that the time between cycles necessarily decreases as population 
grows. 
  
42 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Successive cycles of superlinear innovation reset the singularity and 
postpone instability and subsequent collapse. Schematic representation: vertical 
dashed lines indicate the sequence of potential singularities. Source: Bettencourt 
et al. (2007). 
 
Historically, society has sustained itself by generating major waves of innovation. 
Kondratieff (1984) was the first to document long sinusoidal cycles of economic growth and 
decline, sometimes referred to as Kondratieff long waves. These have been largely 
dismissed by contemporary economists based on certain characteristics of these waves as 
Kondratieff described them: in particular the fact that they were of approximately equal 
duration (50-60 years). A specific modification of the theory of Kondratieff cycles was 
developed by Šmihula (2009) most importantly in that each new wave is shorter than the 
previous one (Table 2). Šmihula (2010) proposed that the most recent wave ended with the 
2008 global economic crisis. He maintained that these cycles depend directly on principal 
technological revolutions, unlike shorter economic cycles (inventory investment, building). 
 
Table 2: Waves of technological innovation of the modern age. Source: Šmihula (2010) 
 
 
This cyclical behaviour has been observed in human population data. Cycles of greater than 
exponential growth followed by a slowing population growth rate have been shown (Cohen 
1995), along with commensurate changes in technology (Kremer 1993) and the shortening 
of successive cycle duration (Bettencourt et al. 2007). The accelerating cycle times of 
technological innovation has also been demonstrated (Kurzweil 2005). 
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The important fact to note about these cycles is that they are driven by technological 
innovation. Šmihula (2009) describes these waves as having an innovation phase involving 
technological revolution followed by an application phase in which the number of 
revolutionary innovations falls and attention focuses on exploiting and extending existing 
innovations. Similarly, Tushman et al. (1997) describes a series of technological 
substitutions, each involving a cycle starting with an “era of ferment” 
(discontinuous/disruptive innovation) followed by an “era of incremental change” 
 
Bettencourt et al. (2008) state that growth under increasing returns to scale requires coping 
with acceleration and major adaptation that comes at more frequent intervals as the 
system grows. We have less time than before (20-25 yr according to Šmihula, 2009) to 
generate the next technological revolution to avoid the stagnation and collapse of human 
society. Innovation systems of today need to be evolved to ensure that they meet the 
innovation acceleration and major adaptation requirements of the future. 
 
5.4 Accelerating disruptive innovation by engaging user inventors 
The next technological revolution needs to be started with a period of technological 
ferment, i.e. a period of major disruptive innovation. At this point it is worth turning our 
attention briefly to this type of innovation and how it is achieved. 
5.4.1 Disruptive Innovation 
Disruptive (discontinuous) innovation is often synonymised with radical (breakthrough) 
innovation in the literature. It is important to remind ourselves that disruptive innovation 
can be either radical or incremental (particularly when technologies converge; Hacklin 
2004), but neither defines it. It is the subsequent process of innovation diffusion that 
determines if that innovation becomes disruptive. Christensen and Raynor (2003) describe 
it as an innovation that disrupts an existing market. It has less to do with the technology and 
more to do with the business model and strategy. The technology merely enables the 
diffusion. Further to that, Utterback (2004) states, “Clearly technology is not the key in and 
of itself. Market conditions are an equally powerful influence”. The phenomenon of 
disruptive innovation was originally noticed by Schumpeter (1975) who called it creative 
destruction. He described it as a type of competition that disciplines before it attacks: that it 
is felt and feared by established business even before it exists in the market. 
 
Anecdotally, a recent example of disruptive innovation is the Apple iPhone. It is the 
textbook example, where this and other similar products (Android) created a new category, 
the smart phone, through the convergence of technologies.  
 
With respect to the technology, Christensen describes how a technology becomes 
disruptive when it more precisely serves the needs of a base of over-served users (Figure 5). 
Majority of features on mobile phones prior to the iPhone’s existence were hardly ever 
used by owners of those phones, but users still paid for them at a premium. The iPhone met 
the fundamental needs of these users, such as communication (voice, text and social 
networks), ergonomic and aesthetic design and fully functional web browsing. All the 
additional features could be chosen by the user for an additional cost. The iPhone better 
served the over-served users (the technology enabled the diffusion), Apple adopted the 
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right business model and strategy, but according to Schumpeter (1975) and Utterback 
(2004), there had to be the right market conditions for the product to diffuse. 
 
 
Figure 5: Distruptive innovation process as described by C. Christensen (Source: Wikimedia 
Commons). Innovation that goes on to be disruptive initially meets the low and medium quality use 
needs in a new way. Arrows signify performance trajectories of different quality products over time. 
 
With respect to innovation diffusion, Apple encouraged a community of mobile application 
developers (lead users of their technology) among its “tribe” (global network of Apple 
aficionados) to create software for the phone. Their emphasis was on redesigning, 
simplifying and customising the user experience. In a study1 of brand strength of mobile 
phone handsets just five months after the iPhone’s launch in the USA (June 29, 2007), the 
iPhone’s “Power in the Mind”2 among consumers was as strong as that of Nokia (Figure 6). 
Nokia had 39% market share in Q3 2007. Most of the survey respondents (91%) were not 
users of the iPhone at the time, consequently the iPhone had no “Power in the Market”3
 
. 
This result was astonishing for a market generally characterised by strong customer-brand 
relationships. The iPhone was so new to the market and had generally not been used, yet a 
large proportion of the market was already attitudinally attached to the product. There is 
already a large body of literature confirming the impact of attitude on general behaviour 
(Baron & Byrne 1997, Eagly & Chaiken 1993) and purchase behaviour (Hofmeyr & Rice 
2000). 
In February 2011 the CEO of Nokia sent out a company memo explaining how the firm was 
losing the battle against its rivals (citing iPhone and Android in particular) and standing on 
what he described as “a burning platform”. He also said “Apple demonstrated that if 
                                                     
1 Brand Powerhouse Study conducted by Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS) during November 2007; n=500; data collection = CAWI 
2 “Power in the Mind” is a validated and proprietary market research tool owned by TNS. It is a measure of attitudinal 
attachment based on brand satisfaction ratings which are compared across brands and turned into a share score 
3 “Power in the Market” is a validated, proprietary market research tool owned by TNS. It is a survey-derived measure of 
the market share a brand would get if market forces were the only factors at play.  It is calculated using the difference 
between the PiM score and a survey derived measure of ‘share of usage’ 
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designed well, consumers would buy a high-priced phone with a great experience and 
developers would build applications. They changed the game, and today, Apple owns the 
high-end range...We have some brilliant sources of innovation inside Nokia, but we are not 
bringing it to market fast enough” (Ogden, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Power in the Mind2 vs. Power in the Market3 for mobile phone brands in 
the USA (2007). Bubble size (radius) indicates brand penetration (usage). Source: 
TNS Brand Power House Survey (2007)1. 
 
Openly innovating (co-creating) with technology user inventors paid off for Apple, but not 
all innovation is this disruptive. A passionate network of Apple tribesmen and women were 
party to the iPhone’s success. 
 
Word-of-mouth marketers have hotly debated the topic of social influence and arrived at 
the influential hypothesis which is widely practised by businesses today as part of marketing 
and innovation strategies. The idea is that there are certain individuals or organisations in a 
network that hold disproportionately more levels of influence than others (Watts 2007). 
This hypothesis, which has become conventional wisdom, is the basis for the TV-Industrial1
 
 
complex whereby potential adopters of technology are bombarded with one-way 
communication via mass media, celebrity endorsement, product placement etc. The online 
social media environment challenge that and turned innovation adoption into more of a 
two-way communication of peer-to-peer product referrals and reviews.  
Watts & Sheridan Dodds (2007), using mathematical simulation, found that under most 
conditions of network structure, large cascades of influence are driven not by influentials 
                                                     
1 The TV-Industrial complex, talked about by Seth Godin, describes the model of marketing communications of old (before 
the online revolution) in which ideas were spread primarily through ads placed on TV. Buying ads got you more 
distribution, sold more products, made you more of a profit with which you could buy more ads. The TV exposure 
sometimes preceded the conception of a product. The underlying philosophy is that a great invention is worth nothing if 
no one knows about it. Ideas that spread, win. It is not the invention that matters, it is the packaging and distribution 
(Godin 2008). 
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but by a critical mass of easily influenced individuals. Very well-connected (influential) 
nodes in a social network were important but the influential hypothesis needed clearer 
specification. Cascade size and frequency depend on the availability and connectedness of 
easily influenced people (Watts 2007). Rogers (1995) states that diffusion is a very social 
process depending on the experience and referrals of previous adopters. Interpersonal 
networks and near-peers become increasingly important at the persuasion stage (step 2 of 
his 5-stage innovation-decision process) when an innovation is evaluated.  
5.4.2 Technology user innovation 
A manufacturer-centric innovation development system has dominated commerce for 
hundreds of years. In this system users have needs that are identified by manufacturers 
who design products and services to meet those needs. There is a growing body of empirical 
work, however, showing that users are the first to develop many and perhaps most new 
industrial and consumer products (von Hippel 2005, Franke and Shah 2003). This user-
centric innovation development system is becoming increasingly prevalent as information 
and communication technology radically and rapidly empowers more users to innovate and 
combine and coordinate their innovation efforts. Research on user-centric innovation 
systems also shows that user-generated innovations diffuse widely. 
 
There are a number of advantages to innovating with technology users. In the context of 
disruptive innovation, two of these advantages are most important: 
1) Interpersonal connections between technology users are fundamentally different 
than connections in commercial networks: they are characterised by relatively 
unrestricted sharing of knowledge for public good rather than obstructing 
knowledge exchange for personal gain. This encourages innovation diffusion. 
2) Technology user inventors can provide a critical mass of easily influenced people 
(since they are eager to adopt and adapt a particular technology), particularly when 
they innovate as communities. Alternatively, they can detect when and where such 
a critical mass of people exists in a market place that is waiting to be better served 
by a product or service. 
 
These and other advantages to technology user innovation are discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
With respect to interpersonal connections, users often “freely reveal” what they have 
developed. The information becomes a public good. The efficiency of a social system 
increases with information sharing since it avoids re-invention by other users and, hence, 
wasted effort (von Hippel 2005). This means that innovation diffusion in user networks is 
less impeded than in commercial networks. The latter are exclusive as a result of 
competitive pressure, constraining information exchange through mechanisms like 
intellectual property protection and closed-innovation systems. Ebersberger et al. (2005) 
found empirical evidence in an analysis of a database of major Finnish innovation that 
competitive pressure reduced the level of novelty and complexity in innovations. 
 
Watts (2002) provides empirical evidence for the notion that user innovation networks are 
better at yielding disruptive innovation. The author mathematically simulated innovation 
diffusion in a highly interconnected social network and found that a network node with an 
average number of connections (a technology user as opposed to a well-established 
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manufacturing firm) is most often what triggers large, rare innovation cascades (analogous 
to block-buster successes). 
 
With respect to critical mass, users tend to innovate in communities where they combine 
and leverage their effort (von Hippel 2005, Franke and Shah 2003). Their activity reaches a 
point at which manufacturers notice the commercial potential of the user inventions and go 
on to mass produce them and market them to a wider user base (Franke and Shah 2003).  
 
Studies of innovating users (both individuals and firms) show them to have the 
characteristics of “lead users” (von Hippel 2005). It has been found that the higher the 
intensity of lead user characteristics displayed by an innovator, the greater the commercial 
attractiveness of the innovation that that lead user develops (Figure 7) (Franke & von Hippel 
2003). In addition to this, a number of studies have shown that many of the innovations 
reported by lead users have actually been commercialized by manufacturers (von Hippel 
2005). Lead users are more attuned to specific niche market requirements. They are ahead 
of the majority of users in their populations with respect to an important market trend. 
Furthermore, users sometimes become manufacturers, setting up a firm to produce their 
innovative product(s) for sale, but do not themselves abandon their user roles (von Hippel 
2005). They remain sensitive to niche market trends and design products for these, whereas 
manufacturers design for a homogenised population of users. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Intensity of “lead user” characteristics by innovation’s 
attractiveness to the general marketplace. Ordinary Least Squares 
regression specificaitons: Adj. R2 = 0.281, p=0.002, n=30 (Data source: 
Franke & von Hippel 2003)  
 
User innovation also benefits from a particular type of learning: Doing, Using and 
Interacting learning (DUI-learning). Chen and Guo (2010) found that the combination of 
DUI-learning and STI-learning (Science, Technology and Innovation learning – largely the 
domain of research organisations), rather than an emphasis of either one or the other, 
increased the likelihood of innovation. It also affected new products development speed, 
originality, development sustainability, and the ratio of new product sales. The importance 
of STI and DUI has been reported by others (Berg Jensen et al. 2007). Research 
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organisations that weigh more heavily on STI learning would consequently benefit greatly in 
collaboration with technology user inventors. 
 
A further advantage of user innovation relates to the effect of intrinsic motivation on 
innovation-related activities. It has been found that if activities are rewarding in and of 
itself, individuals will participate even if there is no financial or other reward (Franke & Shah 
2003). User inventors value the process of innovation and derive enjoyment in learning and 
problem-solving. This type of intrinsic motivation is difficult to cultivate within an 
organisation. A majority of users are also largely once-off inventors (von Hippel 2005), i.e. 
user innovation does not rely on certain individuals being motivated to continually innovate 
in a specific area. 
 
User inventors are also key to accelerating innovation in that they: 
1) Add value to radical innovation by increasing its complexity and resolving 
technological and market uncertainty early in the life of a radical technology 
(Ebersberger et al. 2005) 
2) Speed up the innovation process by reducing time-to-market (shown by numerous 
authors) 
3) Add scale by offering additional capabilities to innovating firms pursuing complex 
innovation which are not organisationally complex (Ebersberger et al. 2005),  
4) Distributing the cost and risk of innovation. Numerous authors have shown that 
innovations follow power law distributions with many poor to average performing 
innovations and few block-buster successes. Few companies have the scale to 
tolerate the high failure to success ratio of innovation activity, which is why most 
companies focus on market-led incremental innovations to minimise the risk of 
failure.  
 
5.5 Turning our attention to the New Zealand innovation system 
There are three good reasons for New Zealand to accelerate its rate of disruptive 
innovation: 
1) To generate the next technological revolution that will pull NZ out of a recession by 
stimulating an era of technological ferment 
2) To perpetuate a virtuous circle whereby increasing innovation will increase NZ’s 
prosperity which will in turn further increase innovation disproportionately 
3) To “punch above its weight” when compared with its international peers. 
 
New Zealand’s innovation system has received some heightened attention over the last 
year. The country’s innovation performance was reviewed by the OECD and many 
stakeholders lament the countries “woeful” performance in comparison with other OECD 
countries (OECD 2010). There have been noteworthy changes made to the system like a 
financial boost to the Vote RS&T budget (MoRST 2010b), as well as the establishment of a 
new Ministry of Science and Innovation. There has been discussion on improving this 
performance by taking action to launch new innovation tools (e.g. the proposed National 
Network of Commercialisation Centres) and revolutionise unproductive parts of the system 
(e.g. funding allocation).  
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By including technology user innovation in the national innovation system and adequately 
supporting it, the following benefits can be achieved: 
1. More sources of innovation can be amassed rapidly and cost effectively 
2. Innovations are market-led and more likely to be commercialised 
3. Innovations have a greater chance of finding niche markets that are already 
conditioned to diffuse them. 
 
The advantage that technology user innovation brings to an innovation system through 
distributing innovation activity and increasing its scale is particularly relevant in the New 
Zealand context. Large firms have a cost spreading advantage over larger outputs arising 
from economies of scale (Kuen-Hung, 2005). Smaller firms lack this advantage.  In New 
Zealand, 97.2% of firms employ 19 or fewer people (Table 3). It is not surprising then that 
only 8% of firms undertook or funded R&D in 2009 with the likelihood of engaging in R&D 
increasing with firm size (Figure 8)(MED 2010). For New Zealand to accelerate its innovation 
performance, co-creating with technology users seems inevitable as this can spread the 
costs and risks associated with innovation for small to medium sized enterprises.  
 
Table 3: Number and proportion of enterprises by size in New Zealand (February 2009). 
Source: MED (2010) 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Engagement in R&D by employee size group (August 2008-2009). Source: MED 
2010. 
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The national innovation strategy (MoRST 2010a) recognises the importance of users, stating 
that “The Government has focused on ways to make the science and innovation system 
more responsive to the needs and capabilities of users”. However, it is unclear whether this 
statement refers to end-user/consumers or user inventors. The strategy also recognises the 
need for enhanced knowledge exchange through moving “existing knowledge and 
technology out from the laboratories into business, government and the general 
community” using a “range of mechanisms to promote the flow of research outputs to 
users”. 
 
The national innovation system is for the most part entrenched in supporting the Crown 
Research Institutions, Universities, Polytechnics and other research organisations. It has 
recently begun to focus on backing business research among select firms. It has also funded 
innovation activity through government departments assisted by economic development 
agencies and small business incubators and is developing various centres of excellence in 
technology transfer. These structures are open to an extent in that they encourage 
interaction between public and private sector primarily through contract research, licensing 
deals, funding and capability development. A more recent evolution of the system is to 
focus support on entrepreneurs.  
 
Currently, a gap in the system appears to be adequate mechanisms of support for 
technology user innovation. Technology user inventors may or may not be entrepreneurs. 
They may also invent on their own or as part of a community of user inventors. There also 
appears to be a gap in the development of open innovation capability and culture in firms 
and research organisations. It is probably fair to say that the implementation of open 
innovation practices is the domain of businesses to use as an optional strategy. The national 
innovation strategy (MoRST 2010a) also seems to be biased towards facilitating technology 
transfer out of research organisations, i.e. in a unidirectional manner from research 
organisation to firm to technology user. Commercially valuable knowledge flows need to 
happen in the opposite direction for successful commercialisation to result. 
 
The economic development strategy that appears to be favoured by government currently 
is that of internationalisation. Boven et al. (2010) state, “If New Zealand can become more 
prosperous by developing an innovation driven economy with high value differentiated 
exports, then it will attract more talent and capital, establishing a virtuous cycle”. Similarly, 
Porter (1989) recommended that New Zealand target its innovation to exploit niche export 
markets. This paper has discussed how technology user innovation is an appropriate model 
to commercialise products and services for niche markets. However, in line with New 
Zealand’s strategic goal of internationalisation, this would likely necessitate international 
user innovation networks.  
 
Considering that some of New Zealand’s top export markets will experience greater rates of 
urban growth over the next 10 years than New Zealand will experience, it becomes clear 
that New Zealand needs to accelerate its innovation performance (Table 5). These export 
markets will have far greater innovation requirements than local New Zealand markets and 
the performance of their innovation systems will increase disproportionately to that of New 
Zealand. With this in mind, New Zealand needs to develop a more distributed and 
competitive innovation ecosystem than its local requirements would otherwise dictate. 
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Consequently, technology user innovation begins to look like an imperative rather than an 
option in order for New Zealand to “punch above its weight”. 
 
Table 5: Urban growth projections for New Zeland and its major export markets. Source: 
UN Urbanisation Prospects, The Revision 2009 
 
Market Urban growth (2010-2015) Urban growth (2015-2020) 
China 2.29% 1.97% 
USA 1.23% 1.1% 
AUS 1.17% 1.08% 
New Zealand 0.92% 0.87% 
UK 0.72% 0.73% 
Korea 0.61% 0.42% 
 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
This paper makes two principal recommendations for future development of New Zealand’s 
innovation system: 
1) Continue to garner an empirical understanding of the social dynamics underpinning 
innovation activity. This will identify critical components of the system to enhance 
and allow realistic goal setting. Mathematical modelling and simulation has much to 
offer in this regard. 
2) New Zealand can punch above its weight. Despite its small population size it is highly 
urbanised with a culture and history of inventiveness distributed throughout the 
population. The national innovation system can capitalise on this resource by 
ensuring that it is as open and inclusive as possible of (communities of) technology 
user inventors. This will provide additional scale and knowledge flows that will 
accelerate the system’s performance and increase the likelihood of generating 
waves of disruptive innovation. 
 
To conclude, von Hippel (2005) makes an important point: “if the information needed to 
innovate in important ways is widely distributed, the traditional pattern of concentrating 
innovation-support resources on a few individuals is hugely inefficient”. 
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Chapter 6 
Experience gained from inventing human heart valve prosthesis 
 
Bhaskara Rao Suddapalli 
Assarain International Group 
Muscat 
Oman 
 
Kanimoli Ramaiah 
Vice-President 
Client Services Support Division 
Malaysian Biotechnology Corporation 
Kuala Lumpur 
 
 
India is besieged by population explosion and abject poverty and has been a 
victim of huge health care costs, especially on imported cardio-vascular 
devices. Driven by the experiences faced by poorer sections, a team of 
scientists comprising of medical professionals, biomedical scientists, 
veterinarians and other support groups, of which I was part, took a call from 
the Government of India to invent a cost-effective heart valve prosthesis, 
incorporating totally indigenous materials. After 16 years of valuable time and 
exchequer money, our team successfully patented and commercialised the 
product. During this process, we gained experiences which we can share at this 
conference. 
 
The team started with making an assessment of the need for a product, the 
market viability, including the opinion of the end user consumers as well the 
medical fraternity. On satisfying ourselves the need for such cheaper versions 
of mitral and aortic heart valve prosthesis existed, we embarked on a 
sequence of detailed steps. These included working and freezing prototypes, 
selecting the right materials to go into different component parts, coming out 
with sample pieces of the valves, completing a toxicological evaluation, 
conducting experimental animal trials, conducting clinical trials in human 
beings, and concluding with multi-centric trials. The outcome of these 
assessments ultimately resulted in a cost-effective, fully-functional artificial 
heart valve. 
 
The development took 15 years and the path was a mountain to conquer with 
many disappointments and with dangerous outcroppings of deception that we 
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had to overcome. To cite a few obstacles, there were: the protests from right-
wing animal activists groups on the use of animal models, the continued 
criticism in press from disgruntled groups supported/funded by multi-national 
medical devices suppliers, and opposition rule makers periodically questioning 
the government and grilling it on the floor of the parliament on the need to 
fund such an innovative research.  
 
At that time, incidentally, India became a signatory to the Trade-Related 
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) formulated by WTO, compelling us 
to apply for a patent. Forced by lack of knowledge on patent mandates, I took 
the lead to undergo a three-year course in Law (LL.B) enabling me become a 
patent attorney.  
 
We experienced self-doubts about the process of developing the technology 
and commercialising it because we perceived the medical professionals to 
have frozen mindsets and who preferred to use proven brands of imported 
medical devices. We thought that after traversing this mountain we would 
reach our goal - but we were mistaken. The multi-nationals who benefitted 
from promoting the regular valves, and had hitherto sold them at prohibitive 
prices, began to sell them cheaper than what our cost effective product was 
offered for. It was a real shock for us, as our sales slumped. Then suddenly an 
idea struck me that made us to go for political lobbying. We sought the prime 
minister's intervention, and he imposed a ban on imported medical devices by 
Government-funded hospitals if domestic products were available within the 
country. It gave us a reprieve and in just few years our product withstood the 
test of time and we established a good market. It is now a leader in the field of 
Indian cardio-vascular prosthesis. Ultimately our emotional strength made us 
conquer the challenges. 
 
In inventing this life-saving device, our team has developed considerable 
experience and we think that Michelangelo was right when he said: 
 
 "A man paints with his brains and not with his hands ". 
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Chapter 7 
New Cellulosic Fibres 
 
MirShahin Seyed Saleh 
New.cellulosic.fibers@gmail.com 
Tehran 
Iran 
 
7.1 Brief description 
My inventions is a method to utilize keratin or proteinous waste products from sheep 
farming, cattle farming or chicken farming industry and regenerate them into valuable 
white and fine fibers or papers. In addition, the processed protein can be copolymerized or 
chemically linked with cellulose to form a unique new polymer with valuable properties, 
and unlike synthetic polymers and plastics available in the market, is biodegradable and 
environmentally friendly. In the form of paper it saves trees from being felled for the paper 
making industry. This new method is a very lucrative invention because a new generation of 
protein fibers can be made exploiting raw materials from the wool farming industry. 
 
The polymer properties include: 
 Heat resistant 
 Bio degradable 
 High moisture absorption 
 Due to the processing of waste materials it is cheap to produce 
 An easy production process 
 Production process is free from environmentally polluting chemicals 
 Due to the strong proteinous tissues of the polymer it is useful for high performance 
fibres and papers  
 The processed and synthesized protein can optionally resemble wool or silk or 
collagen. 
 
7.2 Background and current state of the invention 
The invention was developed in mid 2002 with extensive research synthesizing a new type 
of protein fibre by modifying the chemistry of different proteins. After that I started to 
modify the chemistry of cellulose in order to improve its thermal properties and make 
cellulose heat resistant, resulting in six different types of cellulosic-based products and 
prototype fibers.  I first took these to Austria to produce, then to England, Spain and now in 
India.  Cellulosic fibers are currently under laboratory developments to be industrially 
produced in India, in the form of protein and cellulosic protein fibers and papers. This 
development awaits financial sponsors. Recent research has resulted in a new type of 
polymer which contains both cellulose and protein within the same fiber which has 
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unexplainable unique properties. My invention has been awarded a Gold medal and a 
special award of Double Gold from British Inventors Society in London 2007, and also 
received the award of Best Ecologic Invention in Barcelona, Spain in 2010.  
 
7.3 Reflections on my experience 
If I were to do my invention again, I would seek legal advice regarding patent application 
and protection. This was my major problem in Europe, especially in Austria where I 
proceeded without protection and it became a bitter experience. Invention is a very long 
time process and one might not succeed after a year or two. In my case, it took nine years 
to be successful with cellulosic fibers in India.  
 
I have traveled quite to a number of countries for my inventions but I have not seen any 
serious governmental organizations available to support inventors who have developed 
their inventions in their back yard laboratory or workshop. These inventors need help to 
develop and commercialize their inventions. What would be helpful is an organization or a 
panel of professionals to evaluate potential ideas and inventions and to support inventors 
financially and spiritually. The successful commercialization of inventions is essential to 
technology development and prosperity of life. We owe our present standard of living to 
inventors and inventions so these usually unknown and overstretched people should be 
strongly supported by the government to make a better future for their country.  
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Chapter 8 
International Comparisons of Models of Innovation Models: What 
is to be learned about the New Zealand Situation? 
 
Tiffany Rinne 
Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit 
Lincoln University 
New Zealand 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This paper focuses on cross-cultural comparisons of innovation identity for selected nations. 
Through comparison with other nations, one can come to better understand the uniqueness 
of New Zealand’s innovation situation. This work on innovation models may not be directly 
linked to user innovation but it is still relevant to the user innovation (TUI) situation in New 
Zealand. The comparison of innovation models across countries can tell us about what is 
distinctive about innovation in New Zealand, and it can provide ‘take home’ lessons for New 
Zealand innovation. These comparisons and lessons relate to innovation generally but, since 
TUI is part of our general innovation situation in New Zealand, they also inform our 
understanding of TUI in New Zealand.  
 
8.2 Methods 
A wide range of case-study countries were considered for study and we’ve chosen four in 
addition to New Zealand to discuss in this paper. We will look at Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark as well as Australia. Sweden, Finland and Denmark were chosen as these nations 
have been rated by Pro Inno Europe as being leaders in innovation and, thus, may offer 
unique insights into the types of innovation identities that are needed in order to lead in 
innovation. Australia was chosen for inclusion because it shares a similar cultural heritage 
with New Zealand, namely European, but has had significantly more success with respect to 
innovation. 
 
Qualtrics was used to survey respondents from the selected nations. Qualtrics was hired to 
solicit volunteers from each of these countries to fill out a survey consisting of 18 open-
ended questions about culture, national identity and innovation identity as well as 9 
demographic questions. Respondents were also asked a series of Likert-type questions but 
these questions were not used to formulate respondent models of innovation and are thus 
not discussed here. The survey can be found in Appendix 1. Qualtrics was asked to obtain at 
least 20 respondents from each of two different age groups-20 to 40 years old and >40 
years old. We asked the approximately equal numbers of men and women be obtained and 
that respondents be citizens of the nation. In the end, we often obtained from Qualtrics 
more survey responses than the initial 40 agreed upon, in many cases obtaining over 100 
usuable surveys.  It should be noted that Qualtrics was not always able to provide us with 
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the age distribution and gender distributions we asked for although each sample represents 
a wide range of ages and at least 20 males responded to each of the surveys. 
 
Table 1 shows the demographic breakdown of our sample. Surveys were translated prior to 
being loaded into Qualtrics and all respondents had the opportunity to take the survey in 
their native language if they so chose. It was estimated that the survey would take 
respondents approximately 30 minutes on average. 
 
Table 1- Demographic Information for Qualtrics Sample 
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Gender        
Male 36  41 21  24 44 54 20 
Female 72  60 50  14 46 110 20 
Age        
20-29 14 28 40 23 50 39 6 
30-39 37  25  25   10 30 29 15 
40-49 30  9  6  3  10  59 14 
>50 27  37  0  2 0 37 5 
Education        
University Degree 57  43  23  13  19 70 36 
Trade/Vocational/Technical 26 36 17  10 23 23 0 
Upper High School   
23  
 
21 
 28  12 20 59  
4 Lower High School 3 1 20 10 
Less than High School 2 1  0 2 8 2 0 
 
 
Text from the open-ended interview questions was analyzed via discourse analysis. Ideas 
relevant to six main areas of innovation identity were noted. The areas of innovation 
identity were: industries, beliefs about innovation, limits to innovation, reasons for success, 
prominent figures and prominent companies.  
8.3 Innovation Models 
The models presented below are largely self-explanatory. In order to avoid being repetitive, 
the discussion following each model will focus on the most important aspects of each model 
and any overarching conclusions about a nation’s national innovation identity that can be 
garnered from the model. 
 
By comparing New Zealand innovation identity with those of other nation’s lessons can be 
learned. I’ll highlight points of similarity and divergence between New Zealand and the 
nation’s covered in this report and any potential messages regarding New Zealand’s 
innovation landscape that might be garnered via comparison. 
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Figure 1: New Zealand Innovation Identity 
 
New Zealand’s model of innovation identity highlights the belief that New Zealanders are 
resourceful. This resourcefulness comes, in part, from the isolation of New Zealand. New 
Zealanders had to modify available resources to suit their own needs as getting new 
materials wasn’t always easy. New Zealand’s distance from other nations was seen as both 
a positive for innovation and a negative. In the past, being inventive was necessary for 
survival thereby breeding a culture of people willing to think outside the box. However, in 
the present day New Zealand’s geographic isolation is seen as a detriment to innovation. 
The small size of the country coupled with its distance from other trading nations is viewed 
as a hindrance to innovation success. The national market is too small and the international 
market is too far.  Economies of scale don’t work in New Zealand’s favour with the 
consumer base of the nation being to small to allow for the price of production to be 
minimized by increasing the scale of production. 
 
Respondents saw innovation as a way for the country to keep up in the world and also as 
something that links them to the outside world. With the advent of the internet and 
improved telecommunications, some of the isolation felt by New Zealanders was assuaged.  
 
Unlike many of the countries to be discussed in this chapter, respondents named few 
prominent figures who were either inventors or known for being innovative in some way. 
Ernest Rutherford, the man who split the atom, was the only person frequently named. The 
absence of high profile figures in science, technology and innovation is an interesting point 
to note given that respondents thought that New Zealanders were an inventive group of 
people. It suggests that many inventors may not make it to the commercialisation phase 
where their names would become known and that prominent scientists and technologists 
may not be getting the national recognition that they deserve. It is also important to note 
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that the category for prominent companies is blank in the New Zealand model meaning that 
no companies showed up as significant for New Zealand’s innovation identity. This is a sharp 
contrast to many of the countries we’ll be looking at later in the paper where several 
companies contribute to innovation identity. The absence of any companies in this category 
indicates the innovation landscape as measured by innovative companies is either small 
and/or not particularly visible in New Zealand.  If companies aren’t visible by the national 
community, it’s also likely that they aren’t visible by the international community. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Australian Innovation Identity 
 
Australia’s innovation identity is similar to New Zealand’s in many ways. Like New Zealand, 
innovation is seen as a way for Australia to keep up with the world and respondents 
believed Australians were historically quite resourceful. Further, geographic isolation is seen 
as both a plus and minus with respect to innovation. It helped drive Australian’s to be 
inventive but also serves to limit the nation’s current innovative potential.  
 
Unlike New Zealand respondents, Australian respondents name a number of innovative 
Australians as prominent figures for the nation. Names ranged from entrepreneurs to a host 
of medical scientists, thus, indicating a greater public awareness of those prominent in 
science and technology within Australia. It should be noted that only one organization, 
CSIRO (The Commonwealth Science and Industrial Research Organization), was named as a 
prominent Australian company known for innovation. CSIRO is a government funded 
organization promoting national innovation. The absence of any private companies in this 
category indicates the innovation landscape as measured by innovative companies is either 
small and/or not particularly visible in Australia. 
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Takeaway Points for New Zealand 
 
• With a similar innovation identity to New Zealand, New Zealand policy makers may 
want to consider how Australia manages its innovation policy. Currently, Australia 
could arguably be considered to have a slightly healthier innovation identity than 
New Zealand 
• Respondents saw CSIRO, a government sponsored organization similar to New 
Zealand’s Crown Research Institutes, as being representative of Australian 
innovation. CSIRO is a centralized organization focused on science and industrial 
research. Perhaps, it is this centralization that is giving the organization the visibility 
it has among Australian’s. In thinking about policy, New Zealand’s innovation 
landscape might be better served by consolidating its many diverse crown research 
institutes into fewer, larger organizations with higher visibility and thus prominence 
within the public sphere. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Danish Innovation Identity 
 
 
Like New Zealand and Australian respondents, Danish respondents saw innovation as a way 
for Denmark to keep up with the world.  
 
Similar to New Zealand, Danish respondents mentioned criticism of achievers as being a 
limit to innovation. They also mention that a cultural emphasis on group success as opposed 
to individual success may limit innovation but they also considered this as a feature that 
supports innovation. 
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Danish respondents saw the nation’s limited natural resources as playing a role in spurring 
national innovation. Respondents believed that Denmark had only their knowledge to sell. 
 
Respondents routinely mentioned three figures as being prominent Danish innovators and 
all three are arguably well-known internationally as significant figures in their respective 
fields. 
 
Danish respondents mentioned a number of Danish companies they saw as innovative. 
These companies ranged from a pharmaceutical firm (Novo Nordisk) to one that brews and 
sells beer (Carlsberg). The fact that respondents routinely mentioned several of these 
companies during their interview suggests that the companies have relatively high visibility 
within the national community and that the innovation landscape as measured by the 
prominence of innovative companies is healthy. It is important to note that a number of the 
companies mentioned by respondents are internationally known companies. 
 
Takeaway Points for New Zealand 
 
• Denmark has a reputation as an environmental nation and has capitalized on this 
reputation by developing renewable energy technology. A country which markets 
itself to tourists as clean, green and 100% Pure is well placed to be known for 
environmental-type technologies.  This could be an area where New Zealand really 
stands out in the international community and one that already fits with the 
international image the nation has. Although there are number of green technology 
companies in New Zealand, it can be argued that New Zealand is currently selling 
itself as green rather than as having the technology for being green. 
• Danish respondents mentioned ‘Jante’ or criticism of achievers as a limit to Danish 
innovation and this idea is similar to the tall poppy syndrome in New Zealand. Given 
that Denmark is considered more successful than New Zealand with respect to 
innovation (as measured on several innovation indices), policy makers may want to 
assess ways Denmark has worked to overcome issues of jante (if any). 
• Danish respondents believed Denmark offered a high caliber of education for its 
citizens. Education is not mentioned by New Zealand respondents as a reason for 
success and this might be an area where improvements could be made in New 
Zealand. Culturally, there is a certain amount of anti-intellectualism among New 
Zealanders. 
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Figure 4: Finnish Innovation Identity 
 
Finnish respondents saw innovation as a way for Finland to receive world recognition. The 
only limit to Finnish innovation was money. It was believed that innovation in Finland was 
spurred in part by the war reparations Finland was required to pay following World War II. 
Further, the long distance between towns was thought to have stimulate innovation, 
particularly in the communications sector where Finland is known to be an internationally 
dominant figure.  
 
Like New Zealand, Finnish respondents could routinely name only one figure, Arturi 
Virtanen, a chemistry laureate as a significant figure within Finland. Two companies were 
routinely named, Nokia and Linux, as being innovative. Although only two companies were 
named the companies, particularly Nokia, contribute significantly to Finnish GDP. Nokia has 
a significant market share in communications internationally. Other research by Rinne and 
Fairweather on Finnish cultural and national Identity revealed that Nokia is even considered 
to be a national symbol of Finland. 
 
Takeaway points for New Zealand 
 
• New Zealand and Finland share many features in common yet Finland has had 
significantly more success in the innovation realm than NZ. Innovation and 
education policies within Finland are known to be quite pioneering and given the 
similarities between the countries, policy-makers may want to look at how Finland 
has managed education and innovation as these policies may prove a good fit for 
New Zealand. Lacking a history of science, technological or innovation achievement 
need not be a detriment to current achievement as demonstrated by Finland. 
Similarly, being small is not an excuse for not achieving innovation success. 
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• A large, highly visible multinational like Nokia can serve as a cornerstone for a nation 
as they build their innovation landscape. Such a cornerstone can make the nation 
internationally recognizable as being innovative and can give the national 
community a symbol of their success in this arena. 
• Finnish respondents believed Finland offered a high calibre of education for its 
citizens. Education is not mentioned by New Zealand respondents as a reason for 
success and this might be an area where improvements could be made in New 
Zealand. Culturally, there is a certain amount of anti-intellectualism among New 
Zealanders. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Swedish Innovation Model 
 
Swedish respondents saw innovation as a way for Sweden to receive world recognition. The 
only limit to Swedish innovation was money. It was believed that neutrality and peace 
during the World Wars helped promote innovation within Sweden as well as Sweden’s 
northern location which limited food production and required Sweden to trade other goods.   
 
Swedish respondents could name a number of prominent figures involved with science and 
innovation. Figures ranged from the historical, Alfred Nobel, to the current, Ingvar Kamprad, 
the CEO of Ikea. Respondents also identified a number of Swedish companies they believed 
to be innovative—these ranged from the aforementioned Ikea, a furniture and home 
furnishing company to Volvo, an automotive company. In other research Ikea shows up as a 
national symbol for Sweden.  
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This model shows Sweden’s innovation identity to be well developed and diverse. Sweden is 
not innovative in one area but many.  
 
Takeaway Points for New Zealand 
• Sweden has a reputation as an environmental nation and has capitalized on this 
reputation by developing environmental technologies. A country which markets 
itself to tourists as clean, green and 100% Pure is well placed to be known for 
environmental-type technologies.  This could be an area where New Zealand really 
stands out in the international community and one that already fits with the 
international image the nation has.  
• Sweden has a significant amount of diversity with regard to innovative fields and 
companies that dominate in the nation. Having such a diverse portfolio is very 
healthy from an economic standpoint. Areas were New Zealand could shine include 
environmental/renewable energy technology, agricultural technology (this is already 
an area that is quite good in New Zealand although the visibility could be 
significantly improved), and ICT. New Zealanders already think ICT is important as it 
helps them connect to the world and relieves some of the isolation that comes with 
being situated so far from other nations so it makes sense that this might be an area 
where New Zealanders can be innovative. 
• Swedish respondents believed Sweden offered a high caliber of education for its 
citizens. Education is not mentioned by New Zealand respondents as a reason for 
success and this might be an area where improvements could be made in New 
Zealand. Culturally, there is a certain amount of anti-intellectualism among New 
Zealanders. 
 
8.4 Conclusions 
• Within New Zealand there is a lack of awareness of innovation. Prominent figures 
and companies aren’t known. One could argue that the people of a nation must first 
recognize the nation as innovative before the world is likely to give the nation any 
recognition in this regard. 
• Respondents from the top innovation performing countries mentioned the quality of 
the educational system as being key to their success. While the New Zealand 
education system performs highly in international comparisons and is likely on par 
with these top performing nations, pride in education and educational achievement 
could be greatly improved within New Zealand.  
• Within the prominent figures categories for all the countries analyzed, technology 
user inventors were infrequently mentioned.  
 
8.5 Future research 
Based on the findings from this report there are a number of areas for future research. 
 
• A large part of the New Zealand economy is centred around agriculture. Research on 
other countries that once had an agricultural focus but have diversified would be 
useful. A potential country of interest is Ireland. 
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• This study suggests that New Zealanders are unaware of the innovators in New 
Zealand. A comparative media study looking at how often and in what context, 
innovation is discussed in newspapers and on T.V. across multiple nations could 
prove enlightening. Perhaps the press in other nations do a better job of highlighting 
national innovation. Furthermore, as mentioned in the conclusion section, user 
inventors were infrequently mentioned as prominent figures for a nation. How user 
invention is characterized by the media and the volume with which it is discussed 
could prove enlightening. 
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Appendix 1: Open-Ended Questions for Qualtrics Survey 
 
Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit 
PO Box 84, Lincoln University 
Canterbury 8150, New Zealand 
Telephone 64 3 321-8291 
Facsimile 64 3 325-3847 
www.lincoln.ac.nz 
E-mail: John.Fairweather@lincoln.ac.nz 
 
 
Dear Respondents, 
  
 The study in which you are about to participate is part of a research 
programme at Lincoln University in New Zealand in which innovation is being studied across 
multiple nations.  The following interview is divided into four sections. The first three 
sections ask about culture, national identity and innovation, respectively. In the fourth 
section, a series of scales are given and you are asked to indicate either level of agreement 
with, or importance of, a given statement. None of the questions posed in any of the four 
sections have a right or wrong answer. We are merely seeking your opinion.   
 
We appreciate you taking time out of your schedule to aid us in our research. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Dr. John Fairweather and Dr. Tiffany Rinne. 
 
 
Instructions: 
 
1. You may respond in your own language or in English. 
2. Please complete this computer-based interview in one sitting and keep track of the 
time spent in completing the interview. At the end of the interview we ask you to 
record this time.  
3. We ask that you do not use additional resources (friends, the internet, reference 
books) to answer any of the questions. We are seeking information about your 
opinions and thoughts—things that are on the top of your mind. 
4. Please take care to answer each question completely. Some questions have multiple 
components. 
5. Please answer each question as comprehensively as possible, keeping in mind that 
the researcher analysing the interviews is not a citizen of your country and therefore 
will not necessarily be aware of the significances of certain events, people, or ideas. 
6. If you have any questions about the interview, please e-mail 
tiffanyrinne76@gmail.com for clarification. 
7. Upon completion of the interview, please e-mail the interview as an attachment to 
tiffanyrinne76@gmail.com .  
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Culture - A culture is a way of life of a group of people--the behaviours, beliefs, values, and 
symbols that they accept, generally without thinking about them, and that are passed along 
by communication and imitation from one generation to the next.  
1. Please name five popular people that you consider represent your country’s true 
values or ideals.  After each name please describe what values or ideals each person 
represents. 
2. Please name five important symbols used in your country’s culture, as a whole. 
What do each of these symbols represent? 
3. Please give five examples of important historical happenings that have influenced 
your country’s culture. Include a brief statement of the significance of each historical 
event for culture. 
4. What role does technology play in your country’s culture? Please explain why you 
think technology is significant or not significant.  
5. Who are important people in science and technology within your country? What are 
they known for?  
6. If you had to describe your country’s culture using five words or phrases to best 
characterize it what would they be? 
 
National Identity - National identity derives from the image citizens have of their country 
and the nation’s perceived or actual international image in world opinion.   
 
7. How would you characterize your country’s national identity? 
8. How do you think your country is identified internationally? 
9. What are the things you like most about living in your country?   Please name at 
least five positives about living in your country. 
10. What are the things you like least about living in your country? Please name at least 
five negatives about living in your country. 
11. What are achievements in science and technology that are important to your 
country’s national identity? Why are these achievements important? 
12. What kind of political influence do you feel your country has in the international 
community?  Is this an important factor in national identity? Why or why not? 
 
Innovation - A new idea, system, method, or device that is brought to market 
 
13. How important is innovation and technology to your country? Please explain why it 
is significant or not significant? 
14. Has your country’s history influenced your country’s innovation in any way? Please 
explain. 
15. How easy would it be for an individual with an invention to bring it to market? What 
impediments would they face? 
16. What are the main factors that would drive a person to invent something and bring 
it to market? 
17. Do you think other countries consider your country to be innovative? In what way? 
18. Please name the five countries that you consider to be the most innovative in the 
world. Taking each country in turn, why do you consider each of these nations to be 
innovative? 
 
Demographic Questions 
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19. Are you Male or Female? 
______Male 
______Female 
 
20. What is your date of birth? _________________ 
 
21. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
______Less than high school 
______Lower High school 
______Upper High School 
______Trade/Vocational/Technical  
______University  
  
22. For you alone, what is your approximate monthly income? (please include the 
currency)____________ 
  
23. What is your approximate household income? (please include the currency)-
___________________ 
  
24. What is your primary language/mother tongue?___________________ 
 
25. To which national culture do you most identify? _____________________ 
 
26. How long have you been living in the country where you now 
live?________________ 
 
9.   How long did it take you to complete this computer-based 
interview?___________________ 
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Chapter 9 
TUI and innovation policies in selected European, Asian and Pacific 
Rim countries 
 
Julian Williams  
 
Ministry of Science and Innovation 
Wellington 
New Zealand 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This paper is drawn entirely from the AERU Research Report No. 321 by Fairweather et al 
(2010) and the reader is referred to that paper for further detail and references contained 
herein. 
 
The overall objective of the comparative policy research presented in this paper is to 
enhance innovation policy in New Zealand. This can be achieved by comparing the 
innovation policies of New Zealand and other selected countries. The focus is on each 
country’s innovation policy profile and the broad settings of its enactment, that is, 
innovation governance.  
 
The main research objective is to compare innovation policy across selected European and 
Pacific Rim countries. The core issue is to assess how best to optimise innovation 
governance in New Zealand. The findings can be useful in informing policy to improve 
support for technology users’ innovation.  
 
To meet the above research objective it is necessary to profile the innovation policy system 
of each selected country and then make an assessment of each profile. In conducting this 
research, two approaches were developed by drawing on the expertise of innovation policy 
experts in Europe and in New Zealand. These experts established a framework that would 
provide a basis for making assessments of the innovation governance in the case study 
countries. 
 
9.2 Framework for analysis 
9.2.1 European Experts’ Approach 
 In the approach developed by the European experts, a framework was developed in order 
to: 
1. Provide a complete and balanced coverage of the wide realm of innovation policy 
2. Set the scene for a comparative overview of policies in a large number of countries 
3. Include innovation challenges. 
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The first component reflects the fact that it is necessary to provide a working framework in 
which the array of policies and instruments are covered systematically for all countries 
under review. 
 
By organizing the reviews around broad dimensions of policy systems, comparability can be 
enhanced despite the proliferation of country-specific policy initiatives and instruments. 
Accordingly, this element of the framework serves to focus attention on key policy 
directions and instruments, rather than striving to provide exhaustive and detailed 
descriptions of policy content. 
 
The third component addresses the need for garnering an understanding of each nation’s 
unique situation with respect to innovation and innovation policy. 
 
Table 1 below presents the framework devised the European policy experts and which 
responds to the above needs for comparative policy analysis. 
 
While there have been a number of metrics used to depict NIS characteristics (Global and 
European Innovation Scoreboards notably), there is no metric available to date to depict 
innovation policy systems. 
 
This approach to documenting innovation systems is novel in several ways. First, it makes a 
quantitative assessment, using a number of criteria, of the innovation system. This kind of 
assessment has not been at the forefront of policy analysis to date. Second, it has a wide 
scope and goes beyond European countries to include some from the Pacific Rim. Third, this 
approach features broad coverage of policy issues and attempts to cover the innovation 
policy system as a whole. This approach is limited in that it does not document innovation 
policy outcomes. 
9.2.2 New Zealand Expert’s Approach 
In the approach taken by a New Zealand policy expert, a framework was developed in order 
to highlight two main dimensions of innovation governance and policy challenges (based on 
the OECD Governance of Innovation Systems 2005 report and the OECD Innovation Strategy 
2010 report): 
 
1. General structural characteristics of the NIS 
2. Capabilities required for good governance. 
 
Within these two main dimensions, selected features outlined and described in available 
OECD reports were assessed via content analysis. The information for each NIS was 
gathered from Pro Inno reports, OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy, and the Venturous 
Australia report. This content analysis is summarised in the attached country information 
pages – one set for each nation – shown in Appendix 2 of the AERU Research Report No. 
321. Not all of the selected features are reported for all countries. The selected features of 
each of the main policy dimensions are shown in Table 2 below. 
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Table 1: Framework for NIS policy profile – European expert 
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Table 2: Framework for the profile of each NIS policy dimension - New Zealand expert 
 
  
 
 
In effect, assessing each country on these dimensions provides an evaluation in terms of an 
ideal arrangement of NIS governance characteristics. That is, in ideal terms, good NIS 
governance occurs when it is effectively set up and administered. This means it has a unified 
approach which is consistent with the plans for the country and is effectively put in place by 
virtue of being complementary with other policies. Further, there is good coordination by 
having the funding agency involved in funding policy, and having policies implemented as 
intended. Finally, there is strong involvement by both stakeholders and businesses. Note 
that having an NIS system effectively set up and running does not necessarily equate with 
being an innovation leader. That is, good NIS is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
innovation success. Factors beyond the NIS settings play an important role in the country’s 
level of innovation including the capabilities of various people and institutions involved in 
governance and the ability of the national innovation system to learn, adapt, evolve and 
interact. 
 
Nations were given a rank score based on the degree of presence of a particular feature of 
the innovation system. The score should be interpreted as a categorical label that helps us 
identify common features shared among countries as well as those features which make a 
country distinct. The rank scores range from 5 (most intensive) to 1 (least intensive). The 
rank scores are discussed for each of the features and are summarised in a table. Charts 
were then prepared to compare pairs of features for all countries in scatter plots. This was 
done in order to inform a discussion on similarities and differences in innovation systems. 
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Finally, the data were averaged and rank ordered to compare countries on these 
dimensions. 
9.2.3 Limitations of the Two Assessment Methods 
The two frameworks for assessing NIS policies are necessarily limited. The main limitation is 
that each assessment, while based on expert opinion, is still a personal assessment. It 
remains possible that other experts making these assessments would produce different 
scores, although we would like to think that even if such scores were different in detail they 
would still be similar in general. In effect, our experts have made qualitative judgements in 
forming their scores. Further, comparing European and Pacific Rim countries required using 
quite different data sources so it is possible that some the of the results are a reflection of 
data sources used rather than actual differences in results. Accordingly, we cannot argue for 
strong conclusions on the basis of the evidence presented and, at best, our conclusions are 
indicative only. 
 
However, the conclusions are still important because they provide the best available 
answers to our research questions. Until better measures of NIS policy are available then 
assessments such as those reported here are our only way of addressing the policy 
questions asked. 
9.2.4 Choice of case study countries  
A wide range of case-study countries were considered for study and selected for one or 
more of: 
1. similarity to New Zealand by virtue of being relatively small, open economies and at 
some distance from the major markets 
2. “quality of innovation policies” was used in the selection of a subset of exemplary 
case-study countries  
3. having parallels with New Zealand in regard to stage of development of innovation 
policy  
4. location in the Pacific Rim  
 
The nations (as shown in Table 3 below) were grouped by the level of development of their 
innovation system. The categories of developmental stage are: Leader, Follower, Moderate, 
and Moderate in Transition and were developed by PRO INNO. 
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Table 3: List of case study countries 
 
 
 
 
9.3 Comparative analyses of national innovation systems  
The tables provided in Appendix 1 of AERU Research Report No. 321 (2010) (National 
innovation policy system profile for each Country) and Appendix 2 of that report (Structural 
characteristics and capabilities for each country) were studied in order to identify patterns 
of similarity and difference in the national innovation system (NIS) across the case-study 
countries. In detail, every country has a distinctive innovation policy profile, but at the level 
of the dimensions we chose for analysis some similarities emerge and countries can be 
groups according to shared characteristics. 
9.3.1 European Experts’ assessment of NIS 
In this section attention is given to countries having challenges similar to New Zealand and 
to policy answers which may contain lessons for New Zealand. In effect, we employ a policy 
gap analysis which compares policy features in countries with a leading National Innovation 
System to other countries in Europe and the Pacific Rim. 
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NIS Challenges. Table 4 lists the NIS challenges for the European countries and reports their 
frequency across countries. The table also reports the number of challenges in common 
with New Zealand, data that will be considered later in this section.  
 
Table 4: Frequency of NIS challenges in Europe 
 
 
 
The three most often-mentioned categories of priority challenges among the case-study 
European countries, shown in bold, were: 
1. “Human Resources, for research” (in ten European countries) 
2. “Enlarging the base of (small, indigenous) firms involved in innovation” (in nine 
European countries) 
3. “New firms, Venture Capital, entrepreneurship” (in seven European countries). 
 
‘Human resources for research’ as the most frequent challenge indicates that many 
countries recognise good people as a vital part of the NIS. At the level of individual 
countries, the details of this challenge may differ. For example, in one country higher 
education in general is the HR challenge and in another country attracting top-research 
talents is the HR challenge. 
 
The second most reported challenge refers to an often-mentioned weakness of having only 
a small base of innovative and R&D intensive companies which calls for the need to increase 
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the number of innovating firms, especially among SMEs and indigenous firms.  
 
The third most reported challenge refers to creation and growth of new innovative firms 
and thus strongly complements the second NIS challenge. Thus, while human resources for 
research was apparent as a challenge in ten of the 15 European countries, this challenge is 
matched in importance by the challenge of increasing the stock of new firms either by 
spreading innovation among existing firms or by encouraging entirely new firms. 
 
Among the challenges reported for leading NIS countries (Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Switzerland), the two categories of challenges with high scores were ‘Enlarging the base of 
innovation’ and ‘User-, demand-driven, services-, non-tech innovation policy’.  
 
For the follower countries (Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, and Belgium) fewer challenges 
were apparent and the two categories of challenges with high scores were ‘Enlarging the 
base or internationalisation’ and ‘Human resources for research’.  
 
For the moderate NIS countries (Norway, Portugal, Italy, and Iceland), ‘human resources for 
research’, and ‘new firms, venture capital and entrepreneurship’ were the top challenges.  
 
Last, the moderate NIS in transition countries (Slovenia, Estonia, and Czech Republic) 
emphasise the largest number of challenges including ‘enlarging the base of innovation 
firms’, ‘fragmentation’, ‘gap between science and industry’, and the need for ‘more focus 
and prioritisation’. 
 
These challenges may relate to the presence of relatively large public research sectors 
(compared to business R&D) in these countries and the difficulty they face in selecting 
sectors, clusters or technological areas on which to focus. In the past, research sectors were 
expected to be largely independent with broad academic profiles. 
 
For New Zealand, the data show that its NIS challenges are distinctive in two main ways. 
First, it does not give priority to enlarging the base of firms involved in innovation. Second, 
unlike many of the case study countries, it does emphasise ‘user-, demand-driven, services, 
non-tech innovation policy’ which is a characteristic of Leading NIS countries in Europe.  
 
New Zealand is also distinctive in that it emphasises the challenges of ‘private R&D 
expenditure’ and ‘internationalisation of the system’ while most other case study countries 
do not. Two other New Zealand priorities ‘coherence, fragmentation policy support system’ 
and ‘gap between science-industry, public-private, transfer’ are shared with Moderate in 
Transition countries. 
 
Dimensions of Innovation Policy. A rating is given for seven policy dimensions across all 15 
European case study countries as well as for the European average. The dimension of 
‘science base, public research, technology organisations’ received the highest rating (3.7) of 
any dimension and suggests that the ‘linear-model’ is still apparent in many innovation 
systems. That is, funding of public research is seen to lead to R&D that will diffuse and be 
used by members of society.  
However, the dimension of ‘public-private and knowledge transfer’ partnerships was rated 
almost equally high at 3.5 and, in addition, many public research policy efforts are also 
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addressing or aiming for transformation of the public research sector. The lowest-ranked 
policy dimension was ‘innovation policy strategic relevance’. 
 
The averages for the Asian case-study countries show that the same two dimensions as for 
Europe are important, and, in particular, public research has the highest rating. Governance 
structure is second equal for Asia whereas in Europe it was third. New Zealand also 
emphasises public research but has governance structure as equally important. 
 
Overall, the comparative analysis of the ratings of the seven dimensions of NIS policy shows 
that across all countries, most of the emphasis is given to ‘governance structure’, ‘public 
research’, and ‘public-private partnerships’. Europe as a group is similar to Asia in that these 
three dimensions are the highest rated. New Zealand is similar in that it emphasises the first 
and third of these dimensions. Within Europe, the Innovation Leaders are distinctive in that 
they have high ratings for two of the top three but in addition, emphasise ‘policy 
intelligence’. 
 
Innovation followers emphasise ‘policy intelligence’ but also four other dimensions, 
apparently trying to catch up. Both leaders and followers have more dimensions with above 
average ratings.  
9.3.2 New Zealand Expert’s assessment of NIS 
In this paper we present two components of the New Zealand assessment of NIS. The first 
component includes background data on R&D expenditure relevant to NIS assessments. 
This then sets the scene for the ratings of the countries according the criteria described in 
the methods section (e.g., high-level framework, horizontal coherence etc.). 
 
Background data relevant to NIS assessments. Relevant background data include 
expenditures by government, higher education institutes and the private sector on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP. The aggregate of these is gross expenditure on R&D (GERD). GERD 
comprises: (i) higher education expenditure on R&D (HERD); (ii) business expenditure on 
R&D (BERD); and (iii) government expenditure on R&D (proxied by GOVERD – see below).  
 
This study investigates each nation’s relative weighting of these expressed as a proportion 
of the national economy. 
 
There are wide variations in the proportions of R&D expenditure, with Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Japan, Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland all having higher levels than the OECD 
average. In some cases this high level can be attributable to the presence of large multi-
national enterprises (MNEs), such as in Japan and Sweden. The four European countries in 
these top seven high expenditure countries are classified as Innovation Leaders among 
European countries. 
 
The four nations with the highest levels of BERD as % GDP are Finland, Japan, Korea and 
Sweden. 
 
In New Zealand, GOVERD (government performance on R&D) is primarily, but not entirely, 
performed by public research institutes. Using GOVERD as a proxy for the importance of 
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public research institutes, this analysis finds that it is clear that for most nations measured 
in these terms, public research institutes dominate over universities.  
 
For all nations BERD/GERD dominates as above. New Zealand is very low on BERD relative 
to other OECD nations. Other countries with low BERD expenditure include Australia, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Chile.  
 
Note that public institutional research (HERD and GERD) is important in different ways for 
different countries. In Ireland, the tertiary education sector is relatively undeveloped and 
the public institutional sector is very weak with heavy reliance on foreign R&D typically from 
the EU and the UK.  
 
In New Zealand, public research institutes have substituted for large R&D intensive firms 
and are a unique part of New Zealand innovation. Universities are very important for 
Switzerland which has a very low public institutional base but has a very strong private 
sector R&D base because large firms, rather than government policy, dominate the 
innovation system. Similarly, in Japan and Korea, business R&D dwarfs HERD and GERD. 
These observations suggest that in these countries, business plays a large role in shaping 
the innovation system. 
 
Figure 1 shows BERD as a percentage of GDP by HERD as a percentage of GDP. This chart 
shows a pattern of association between the two variables such that countries high on one 
variable are also generally higher on the other. There are a number of outliers.  
 
Interestingly the chart is helpful in distinguishing Japan and Korea which while high on BERD 
% GDP are much lower on HERD % GDP than might be suggested by the levels of other 
OECD nations. 
 
New Zealand scores low on both counts, along with Portugal, Italy, and Chile. This chart 
demonstrates that an important factor differentiating the innovation systems of nations is 
the level of BERD % GDP compared with the level of HERD % GDP. Often nations are 
compared only by the BERD % GDP but this has a number of shortcomings, notably that 
different industrial compositions of different countries will separately influence the level of 
BERD (Williams et al, 2008).  Potentially, the BERD/HERD ratio may be a measure that 
characterises the state of the NIS. Such a ratio for all nations may reflect a nexus between 
two intrinsic features of innovation systems underscored by the size of the economy that is 
common for all OECD nations – human capital for R&D, as measured in HERD and business 
capital for R&D, as measured in BERD. 
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Figure 1: BERD % GDP by HERD % GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
Dimensions of Innovation Policy. In this section we turn our attention to the structural 
division of labour/policy domain and the capabilities of the innovation system (see 
Appendix 2 in AERU (2010)) for country assessments). Table 5 shows the ratings for each 
country on eleven dimension of innovation policy. The table includes an additional column 
for the number of policy agencies in each country. 
 
High-level horizontal agency framework 
On this dimension, the European Innovation Leaders have scores ranging from two to five 
that is, there appears to be no relationship between high level of innovation and high-level 
horizontal agency framework. 
 
Framework conditions vary for different countries. New Zealand had a Growth and 
Innovation Framework (GIF) framework in place for some years but in recent years and 
currently in 2010, policy is guided by sets of priorities set by the Prime Minister for the 
entire nation and then within these there are specific sub-priorities, such as for economic 
growth, which strongly influences the current science and innovation agenda in New 
Zealand. 
 
Horizontal coherence 
On this dimension, the European Innovation Leaders have scores ranging from two to five 
that is, there appears to be no relationship between high level of innovation and horizontal 
coherence. 
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Note that 2010 reforms in NZ are not designed to radically change horizontal coherence so 
much as to improve vertical coherence and stakeholder involvement. 
 
Having a sophisticated or advanced NIS system does not assure horizontal coherence – it is 
still a problem for Norway. Horizontal coherence and NIS concepts may not necessarily 
imply competence to a run system or the appropriateness of the system. 
 
Delivery agency influence in priority setting 
On this dimension, the European Innovation Leaders have scores ranging from two to five 
that is, there appears to be no relationship between high level of innovation and delivery 
agency influence on priority setting.  
 
Table 5: Ratings (1-5) of each country on each of the 11 dimensions of innovation policy 
 
 
 
 
Vertical coherence 
On this dimension, three of the four European Innovation Leaders have scores of five that 
is, there appears to be a relationship between high level of innovation and vertical 
coherence.  
 
Switzerland has relatively strong vertical coherence by nature of its social consensus culture 
and rules of government. Denmark and Finland (Estonia still new) achieve high vertical 
coherence with quite different settings for delivery agency influence and this suggests 
something else is important. However, the scores seem to suggest that more vertical 
coherence is achieved with greater delivery agency influence on policy priorities.  
 
The implications for New Zealand are that the proposed establishment of a Ministry of 
Science and Innovation in 2010 to replace the existing Ministry of Research, Science and 
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Technology and the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology will help achieve an 
improved level of vertical coherence. 
 
Business involvement in policy 
Results for both stakeholder involvement in policy and business involvement in policy 
suggest that strong stakeholder involvement in priority setting is compatible with strong 
business involvement in setting priorities. The determinants of each of these influences are 
complex – including the degree of social consensus achievable, the dominance of particular 
business interests, the influence of foreign investment in R&D, etc. 
 
For New Zealand with relatively low investment in business R&D, the implication is that the 
involvement of traditional stakeholder groups in priority settings need not be compromised 
by raising business involvement. This suggests that large increases in BERD may be  
achievable through greater business involvement in priority setting without compromising 
the decision making power of stakeholder groups such as research providers and certain 
end-users groups. 
 
9.4 Discussion and Conclusions  
Results from both assessments of innovation policies have Denmark and Finland 
consistently as innovation leaders. If we take Denmark and Finland as good examples of 
effective innovation policy then we can consider their policy settings to be laudable goals. 
Both countries are similar to New Zealand in that they have small populations and see 
themselves as having to innovate well to compete in the world. There are therefore, 
reasonable grounds for considering that their innovation policies are relevant to New 
Zealand, subject to the need to adapt them to New Zealand conditions. 
9.4.1 Potential General Policy implications  
From the European experts’ assessments, selected results from comparing New Zealand 
with the European Innovation Leaders show that there is potential to improve NIS in New 
Zealand by giving attention to:  
 
• Innovation policy strategic intelligence: 
o strategic exercises, advisory bodies, foresights, evaluations, peer reviews, 
benchmarking, NIS studies 
o capacity building within authorities in charge of policy design and 
implementation. 
• Public private partnerships and knowledge transfer: 
o via competence centres and joint public-private organisation oriented 
towards innovation, clusters, networks and poles with businesses as main 
drivers 
o the provision of science parks and incubators 
o providing knowledge transfer incentives such as science-industry bridging 
organisations, university transfer offices, cooperative programmes, funding 
schemes, and research commercialisation schemes. 
• Private R&D innovation: 
o direct and indirect support for private R&D via subsidies, loans and tax 
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incentives 
o subsidies and vouchers, advisory services and management support for 
innovation 
o adaptation of curricula and training programmes to further innovation, and 
financial and non-financial support for human resources for innovation 
companies 
o demand stimulation policies, such as innovative public procurement and lead 
market initiatives. 
• Entrepreneurship and new firm creation: 
o spin offs and start up programmes including finance, infrastructure, advisory 
schemes, brokerage services, business plans, competitions to support new 
technology based firms (NTBFs) 
o entrepreneurship training such as courses and initiatives in basic or 
continuing education to enhance entrepreneurial spirit and facilitate 
innovation company formation 
o risk and venture capital to include guarantee mechanisms, co-funding of 
venture capital companies and business angel networks. 
 
From the New Zealand expert assessments, results from comparing New Zealand with the 
European Innovation Leaders show that there is potential to improve NIS in New Zealand 
by: 
• improving high-level horizontal agency framework, that is, the NIS provides a strong 
unifying approach that supports policy guided by government’s strategic plan for the 
nation 
• implementing a tangible commitment to horizontal coherence so that NIS policies 
are complementary. 
• establishing a clear national vision for innovation 
• implementing and developing the proposed changes in institutional arrangements to 
achieve: 
o improved vertical coherence so that NIS policies are implemented in the way 
they are intended, and 
o improved stakeholder and business involvement in policy making and priority 
setting. 
 
 
It is clear that different policy mixes will differ in the selection and weighting of the above 
policies.  
9.4.2 Potential Policy Implications for TUI Innovation 
For the TUI innovator, it appears that consumers who are users of technology have in some 
cases adapted the technology to create a new and improved product. This is a type of 
innovation described as open innovation. Being consumer driven, the type of innovation is 
small in scale and incremental and relies on interactions of technology users with 
manufacturers. 
 
Open innovation is also characterised by multinational enterprises searching out small 
pockets of innovation. This activity is beneficial to some innovators because it lowers the 
search costs is establishing foreign networks and markets.  
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Other researchers in this project (Lambert, 2010, Stephenson, 2010) have suggested ways 
to support TUI innovation that are consistent with the concept of supporting consumer-led 
open innovation. This is in the sense that TUI innovators may use their own ideas and that 
of subsequent consumers to improve and adapt their products. These include: 
• access to simple and user-friendly business-support systems 
• access to user-friendly business networks 
• access to foreign business networks. 
 
The findings of the comparative analysis of innovation systems have implications for the 
national innovation system generally. The findings of the TUI researchers (above) can 
potentially inform this wider policy. One potential suggestion is that the creation and 
development of easily accessible networks for diverse types of innovators and in the areas 
mentioned would be an important part of a national vision for innovation. 
 
In addition, it would be informative to consider the needs of TUI innovators when 
developing business support initiatives generally. TUI innovator represents something 
unique about the New Zealand setting. Potentially this can be the basis of a comparative 
advantage in some particular area of technology development. Such comparative 
advantages lower the risk of investment of both public and private sector investment in 
technology adaptation. 
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Chapter 10 
Principles that guide innovation: Predicting the Global Innovation 
Index score with dimensions of human values 
 
G. Daniel Steel 
10.1  Introduction 
It is, perhaps, a truism that there is value in innovation. This belief is the reason so many 
governments and private businesses encourage and, more critically, support invention and 
the marketing of those inventions. However, it is also likely true that there is value behind 
innovation. More accurately, one could say that there are values driving the innovation 
process. 
This paper examines the human values that, at a national level, may be associated with 
greater innovation. We start with a brief overview of definitions of human values, and then 
discuss two models that have multinational data available. The theoretical links between 
these models and innovation are presented, then we go on to suggest hypotheses that can 
be derived from these links and from the relevant empirical work to date. These hypotheses 
are next tested with extant data sets. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications 
of the findings of those tests. 
10.2 Definitions 
First, though, we begin with working definitions of the two topics of interest. The term 
‘values’ has been a point of confusion in the social sciences for some time. As others have 
pointed out (see, e.g., Cheng and Fleischmann, 2010; Rokeach, 1973), this is likely due to 
the many ways in which the concept is used across the many disciplines within social 
science. It may also be due to a conflation of what a value is with what a value 
hypothetically does; for example, Hutcheon’s (1972, p. 184) specification of values as 
“operating criteria for action”, Brathwaite and Blarney’s (1998, p. 364) “principles for 
action”, and Cheng and Fleischmann(2010)’s “guiding principles”. One other common 
feature of current and past definitions is an apparent unipolarity; most classic or well-cited 
definitions emphasise the positive aspect of value.  Thus, we have Kluckholn’s (1951, p. 395) 
“conception...of the desirable”,  or Hage and Dewar’s (1973, p. 280) “preferences about 
desired organizational outcomes”. 
In fact, a value is none of these. It is, quite simply, the worth of something. It is not the thing 
being evaluated. It is the place of that thing (in psychological terms, a thought object) on a 
continuum from negative to positive. The metric of that continuum will necessarily shift 
depending on how the worth is being assigned;  e.g., whether in financial, emotional, or 
utilitarian terms. The phrase ‘human values’ is, essentially, meaningless, except in the 
specific case where one is determining the worth of a person or persons.  
If we separate the value from what is being evaluated, then we arrive at the working 
definition used in this study. The current investigation examines the relative importance of 
various national level principles that guide behaviour. Thus, when we refer to values in this 
paper, we mean the rank order of, or scores assigned to, these principles. As we will see 
later, this is not how the authors of the two evaluation measures refer to values, but it is 
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logical outcome of the instruments they use to collect data. This leads to a small problem. 
Inasmuch as nearly all the extant literature in this area uses the term ‘values’ in an incorrect 
sense, we may unwittingly cause confusion if we suddenly start referring to ‘principles 
guiding human conduct’ when speaking about what is normally called human values. We 
will, therefore, use the colloquial, if somewhat incorrect, meaning of ‘values’ as it has been 
traditionally defined in the psychological literature. 
Fortunately, the term ‘innovation’ is somewhat easier to deal with, most likely because 
intensive study of topic by social scientists has only begun comparatively recently. There is, 
though, one point that needs clarification before a formal definition will be offered. There 
has been a tendency in the recent literature to reify innovation; i.e., to regard it as a thing. 
This is not the case. One cannot meaningfully speak of ‘an innovation’. Rather – and here 
we move to our definition – innovation is a process. Studies by members of our research 
group (see, e.g., Lambert and Fairweather, under review) have suggested that this process 
consists of a interlocking steps that begins with the spark of an novel idea, moves to 
invention (the manifestation of that idea), spreads from the inventor along a social network 
of support agents, and ends in the adoption of the idea by those other than the inventor.  
This latter phase can be widespread or very local, or even not at all (in which case the 
process has failed).  Like the principles referred to, above, the success of the process can be 
measured in a variety of metrics. Most usually, the measure of success is financial, but is 
can also be expressed in terms of social capital, environmental benefit, and others. 
10.3 Current relevant models 
Of the several classifications of principles (nominally, ‘values’) currently being used in 
research, there are two – Schwartz’s circumplex and Inglehart & Welzel’s two-dimensional 
model – that  that have received the greatest amount of theoretical attention and empirical 
support (Beckers, Seigers, and Kuntz, 2011). In addition, data collection based on these 
models has been conducted in several nations. Thus, these are the best suited to the study 
of national innovation.  
10.3.1 Schwartz’s hierarchical taxonomy  
Since 1992, Shalom Schwartz and his colleagues (Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 2007; Schwartz and 
Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz and Sagiv, 1999; Schwartz et al., 2001) have amassed a body of 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that the structure of human values tends to be largely 
invariant across cultures and nations. The hierarchical model that he forwards has three 
levels of values. The third level consists of 56 basic values. These make up the 10 value 
types of the second level, which, in turn, are subsumed by 4 value dimensions. These 
overarching dimensions can be thought of as two pairs of approximate opposites: 
conservation versus openness to change, and self-enhancement versus self-transcendance. 
Tradition and conformity are endorsed by those who hold place a high value on 
conservation. Openness to change is self-explanatory, as is self-enhancement. Self-
transcendance incorporates such value types as benevolence (a concern about the welfare 
of those proximate in one’s social network) and “universalism”, which is an “understanding, 
appreciation, tolerance, and protection  for the welfare of all people  and  for nature” 
(Schwartz, 1994, p. 22). 
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10.3.2 Inglehart & Welzel’s two-dimensional taxonomy 
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel’s (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) conceptualisation of 
values holds that there are two fundamental dimensions: Traditional/Religious versus 
Secular/Rational, and Survival versus Self-expression. Their key argument, explicated in 
earlier work (Inglehart, 1997; Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann, 2003), was that increasing 
socioeconomic development leads to increasing secularization, as people gain greater 
understanding of, and control over, their environment. Socioeconomic development also 
leads to increasing value placed on self-expression, as people are freed from the basic 
activities necessary to survival. 
This model of human values is relatively new and, therefore, has not received much in the 
way of empirical attention. However, testing of the model against a large, multi-year data 
set, drawn from the on-going World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/), 
has shown reasonable support for the existence of the two dimensions (Inglehart and 
Welzel, 2005, 2010).  
10.4 Values and Innovation: Theoretical connections and hypotheses 
Although there have been studies investigating the relationships between values and 
innovation, most of these have focused on the organisational culture in private companies 
(see, e.g., Hage and Dewar, 1973; Khazanchi, Lewis, and Boyer, 2006) rather than nations. 
These studies have also tended to focus on highly specific types of organisations, such as 
hospitals (Nathanson and Morlock, 1980; West and Anderson, 1992). In addition, few of 
these studies have used an a priori model of values, instead opting to attempt to tease out 
values from the sample under study. This has led to a plethora of disjointed findings that 
lack theoretical cohesiveness. 
Two studies that did examine the link between innovation and cultural values were 
reported by Shane (1992, 1993). He investigated the relationship between national 
innovation and Hofstede’s (1980) four-dimensions of culture (Power Distance, Masculinity, 
Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance) and. His research showed a reliable, positive 
association between national mean scores on Individualism and the number of patents 
issued in a nation. A negative relationship was found to exist between Power Distance and 
the number of patents (Shane, 1992). In a second study, a similar pattern of results was 
found when the number of trademarks issued was used as the proxy measure of innovation. 
This second study also suggested a negative relationship between this measure and 
Uncertainty Avoidance. A more recent study by Rinne et al. (in press) has also examined 
Hofstede’s values, but using a more comprehensive and complex measure of innovation 
(the Global Innovation Index; INSEAD, 2010].  This study found support for Shane’s (1992) 
results regarding Power Distance and Individualism but not the relationship between 
innovation and Uncertainty Avoidance reported in Shane (1993).  
The theoretical rationale for using Hofstede’s model in the three studies described 
immediately above rested on the observation that Individualism, as a cultural value, 
supported the pursuit and presentation of non-mainstream ideas, whereas Power Distance, 
with its emphasis on obedience to those in authority, was more likely to encourage novelty. 
Research just recently completed by Rinne and her colleagues has also shown a positive 
relationship between Hofstede’s  Individualism and national levels of creativity, which is a 
necessary precursor to the innovation process.  
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Empirical work by Luk and Bond (1993) and Olver and Mooradian (2003) has suggested an 
empirical connection between three of the “Big Five” personality traits and Schwartz’s 
values. Most pertinent to the current study, the personality trait of Openness to Experience 
has been shown to be predictive of endorsement of Openness to Change (Olver and 
Mooradian, 2003). Steel et al. (in press) have demonstrated a strong connection between 
the national mean scores on the personality trait of Openness to Experience and national 
scores on innovation. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that the Openness to Change 
value dimension would also be positively related to innovation, Conservation, on the other 
hand, would be inversely related to innovation because of its emphasis on stability and 
maintenance of the status quo. 
A similar argument can be made with respect to Inglehart and Welzel’s Traditional/Religious 
versus Secular/Rational dimensions. Those cultures that support the maintenance of 
traditional ways are less likely to welcome and be supportive of innovation. Further, 
subsistence cultures tend to place a greater emphasis on interdependence rather than 
independence, and are associated with slower growth and less innovation (Greenfield et al., 
2003). This interdependence/independence distinction is reflected in Inglehart and Welzel’s 
Survival versus Self-expression dimension. Thus, we would expect that higher scores on this 
dimension, which indicate greater self-expression, would be predictive of higher national 
innovation scores.  
These results, taken together, suggest a relationship exists between innovation and cultural 
values that encourage self-expression. The consistent finding regarding individualism also 
suggests that cultures that encourage individual ambition may also have higher scores on 
innovation measures. Conversely, cultures that place a higher value on conformity and 
tradition are less likely to be amenable to the novel ideas. This leads us to hypothesise the 
following relationships: 
H1: National levels of innovation will be positively related to national mean scores 
on Schwartz’s Openness to Change value dimension. 
H2:  National levels of innovation will be negatively related to national mean scores 
on Schwartz’s Conservative value dimension. 
H3: National levels of innovation will increase as scores move from Inglehart and 
Welzel’s Survival values to Self-expression values 
H4: National levels of innovation will increase as scores move from Inglehart and 
Welzel’s Traditional/Religious values to Secular/Rational values. 
10.5  Method 
Two data sets were assembled to test the hypotheses. For the first, scores for the Schwartz 
Value Survey (SVS) across 50 countries were drawn from a data set published by David 
Ralston and his colleagues (Ralston et al., in press). These were then matched by country 
with Innovation Input and Output scores from the Global Innovation Index (GCI) (INSEAD, 
2010). This aggregation yielded complete GCI and SVS scores on 47 countries.  One 
constraint upon this data set needs to be acknowledged. Ralston et al. (in press) describe 
their sample as consisting of respondents who were all “part of the business community of 
their country”.  This limits generalisation of the results. On the other hand, the fact that the 
respondents were actors in the business community means that they were more likely to be 
actively involved in decisions and behaviours that had an impact on innovation. 
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The second data matrix also used scores from the GCI, but this time these scores were 
matched by country to scores on the two Inglehart and Welzel dimensions 
(Traditional/Religious versus Secular/Rational (TRvSR), and Survival versus Self-expression 
(SvSe)). The data for these two value dimensions were downloaded from the World Values 
Survey website (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/) . The merging of these two data sets 
yielded complete data for 46 countries. 
10.6 Results 
Both data matrices were analysed using multiple linear regressions. In the first analysis, the 
raw score means for the two Schwartz value dimensions of interest (Openness to Change, 
and Conservation) served as predictor variables. The GII total score was the criterion 
variable. In the second analysis, the GII total was once again used as the criterion, but the 
Inglehart and Welzel dimensions of replaced the Schwartz value dimensions as predictors.  
The result of the first analysis was significant (adjusted R2= .244, F(2,44)=8.40, p=.001). 
Examination of the standardised beta weights showed that only one of the dimensions, 
Conservation, reliably predicted the GII score (beta=-.551, t = -3.78, p<.001). Openness to 
Change did not reach significance (beta=.06, t=.40, n.s.). The second multiple regression was 
also significant (adjusted R2= .244, F(2,44)=8.40, p=.001). In this instance, however, both 
predictor variables were reliably associated with the GII total (TRvSR: beta=.609, t=7.34, 
p<.001; SvSe: beta=.499, t=6.02, p<.001). 
 
10.7 Discussion 
10.7.1 Schwartz’s Value Dimensions 
There was only partial support for our hypotheses regarding the Schwartz value dimensions. 
The finding regarding Openness to Change was puzzling. Our earlier work on the personality 
trait of Openness to Experience showed a reasonably strong and positive relationship with 
the same innovation measure used in this study. There are three possible explanations for 
the apparent lack of a relationship between this value dimension and national innovation 
levels. The first has to do with the distinction between values and personality traits. The 
former captures one’s beliefs about what should be pursued; the latter is an indication of 
the disposition to behave in a particular way. Values are thought to be an antecedent of 
personality; expressed in one or more personality traits that, in turn, give rise to behaviour. 
Thus, a personality trait is closer to the actual behaviour than a value, and would arguably 
have greater, and more specific, predictive power.  
The second explanation resides more with the nature of the Openness to Change 
dimensions, itself. It is possible that openness is indicative of a more passive set of beliefs 
rather than active; i.e., while the dimension reflects a welcoming of change, it does not 
necessarily entail actively creating that change.  If this is true, then high scores on Openness 
to Change in a population would predict adoption of new ideas and inventions, but would 
not be related to creation of those ideas and inventions, nor to the process of bringing them 
to adoption. In blunt terms, such a population would be a good market for many new 
things, but would – other things being equal – have fewer to sell. 
Our last explanation for the Openness to Change finding has to do with the two levels on 
which the sample is based. As mentioned, the original Ralston et al. (in press) data set was 
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based on business people. It is quite possible, even likely, that this group does not, in 
important ways, represent the greater population of a country. Why this difference would 
manifest itself in the lack of relationship between openness to change and innovation is a 
matter for further research. Similarly, the countries that comprised our data set for this 
analysis were based on the data that were available to us; not, by any means, a perfectly 
representative sample of all nations in the world. A relationship between Openness to 
Change and national innovation levels may yet appear with larger data sets.  
The value dimension of Conservation, on the other hand, was clearly related to national 
levels of innovation, even in the relatively minimal data set used in this study. The 
relationship, as hypothesised, was inverse; as Conservation scores rose, innovation levels 
fell. This suggests that Conservation may act like a brake on the innovation process. 
However, this finding is correlational and, thus, we hesitate to make any firm directional 
statements. It may be, for instance, that rising innovation somehow affects the overall 
Conservation value of a nation. Younger generations, exposed to greater and greater 
changes in the world around them via global media and marketing, may place less value on 
‘the old ways’ and embrace alternatives. If so, then this suggests a way forward for those 
leaders of conservative nations who wish to increase innovation levels in their countries. 
This would need to be a longer-term, multi-generational plan, though, as it relies on 
changing cultural values. 
10.7.2 Inglehart and Welzel’s Value Dimensions 
Both hypotheses regarding Inglehart and Welzel’s value dimensions were supported. In light 
of the theoretical rationale presented earlier in this paper, this finding was not terribly 
surprising but it does lead to some interesting implications. The Traditional/Religious versus 
Secular/Rational dimension is, in several ways, similar to Schwartz’s Conservation 
dimension, and some of the same suggestions apply. Those nations who endorse traditional 
ways seem less likely to be open to innovation. Inglehart and Welzel’s dimension differs 
from Schwartz’s, though, because the other end of the dimension is not simply a lack of 
conservatism but, rather, an increased endorsement of independent thinking, based on 
observable events. Such a worldview is the bedrock of the scientific endeavour and 
creativity.  This set of values emphasises, in part, a willingness to engage in knowledge-
seeking and stands in opposition to unquestioning acceptance of received wisdom. This 
search for knowledge should, almost invariably, spawn novel thoughts and lead to greater 
innovation. Thus, unlike Conservation, this dimension not only carries with it a braking 
effect at one pole (traditionalism) but may also an acceleration aspect (secular rationalism) 
at the other.  
The notion that innovation is related to self-expression was also supported. It seems 
intuitive that nations in which self-expression has a high value would also be at the top of 
the innovation table, and the results bear out this intuition. It is worth considering why this 
might be the case. Quite simply, it may be a matter of probability. There are a greater 
number of individual opinions in any nation than there are group opinions. Thus, it is far 
more likely that there will be a greater incidence of novel ideas in a nation that places a 
higher value on self-expression, and, most importantly, that those ideas will be allowed to 
be presented.  
If this is true, then it is encouraging for nations that currently are at the Survival end of the 
values dimension. Innovation is not a matter of lack of talent but rather a lack of voice. 
Combined with a move away from authority to autonomy – that is to say, from a 
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Traditional/Religious stance to a Secular/Rational one – it seems probable that these 
nations will increase their innovation.  
One final note needs to be sounded, however.  Inglehart and Welzel’s theory of values relies 
on socioeconomic development. Thus, it is difficult to disentangle to what extent this 
development leads to innovation, and how much innovation leads to development, 
especially when considering economic growth. It may be that the theoretical line is actually 
a spiral, moving from  changes in autonomy and self-expression that result in increased 
innovation, which leads to economic development, which, in turn, then lead to further 
changes in autonomy and self-expression. If one is looking to increase the wealth of a 
nation, this would be a fortuitous path to be on. 
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Chapter 11 
SpringFree Trampoline - and Some Lessons Learned 
 
Keith Alexander 
11.1 Introduction 
This paper presents a roadmap outlining the processes and the path to market from first 
concept to early sales, crossing the so-called “valley of death”.  It uses the SpringFree 
Trampoline as a case study and identifies some of the known attributes of ideas that will 
have commercial value. 
11.2  4 Themes 
A range of skills is required to take a new product to market. These can be divided into four 
areas:  
 
1. Technology
2. 
  
3. 
Market 
4. 
Business 
 
Finance 
These are like the 4 legs of a chair: take one away and the business will fall over. In each 
area there will be people with the right skills and responsibilities: 
 
1. Technology
2. 
: Inventor, Scientist, Engineer, Designer, Product Manager, 
Manufacturing Manager. 
Market
3. 
: Customer, Entrepreneur, Business development manager, Marketing 
manager 
Business
4. 
: Directors, CEO, Financial controller, Accountant 
Finance
11.3 The Roadmap “Path to Market...” 
: Research fund provider, Pre-seed and Seed fund investors, Venture Capital 
Investors  
The roadmap is presented in the large figure below. It shows activities in the 4 theme areas 
on a timeline from left to right. At the left it starts with an idea that might be intellectual 
property (IP) of some worth. On the right, five to eight years later, it has just entered the 
market. Over this period it has been “productized”, which means it is now supported by a 
company with a name, a point of contact, a brand, a distribution system, a manufacturing 
facility, a warranty and support network. It has packaging, it has been tested, it complies 
with standards and it is promoted by a marketing program.  
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During this process there have been a range of activities in the four theme areas. The figure 
notes some of these as follows: 
 
1. Technology
2. 
: The product develops through a series of prototypes. A critically 
important task (boxed) is to ensure that the technology works properly and can be 
validated as useful to customers. Once this has been done, the product needs to be 
manufactured - a whole different focus for the technology experts. By the end, the 
technology focus has shifted again to quality control and managing warranty issues. 
Market:
3. 
 Early on there is an initial estimate of commercial potential. Subsequently a 
critically important task (boxed) is to validate a strong customer need for the 
product - at the price it can be sold. Subsequent activities include a market 
development and distribution plan. 
Business
4. 
: In the early stages a company might be formed simply to own the 
intellectual property. The organisation and personnel are likely to be a loose 
network. As things develop the arrangements become more formalised: The 
business needs to be set up on a robust basis, people need to be contracted, 
investor money has to be responsibly handled, agreements need to be signed. A 
manager is needed to make sure the agreed business plan and strategy are 
developed and followed, financial and delivery obligations are achieved and legal 
requirements are met. 
Finance
 
: In the early stages the inventor may fund development, but at some point 
more financial resources are needed. These might be government research funds at 
first, but once commercial processes begin financial support has to come from other 
sources. The critically important task is to keep acquiring financial resources at a rate 
that advances the project with the minimum of waste. Share of ownership is usually 
traded for the injection of each stage of investment finance.  Ultimately the business 
begins generating a return. 
It is important to note that the development process is a high risk venture, and at critical 
milestones there need to be carefully considered decisions as to whether to continue or 
not. Indicative decision points are shown in the figure.  
  
The figure also illustrates how the product value might change throughout the development 
process. This can be looked at from several different perspectives:  
 
• Investor-perceived risk  
• Investor-perceived value 
• Actual money spent on the development  
• Inventor ownership in terms of share 
• Inventor share value.  
 
A notable idea is that the perceived value of the company to a potential investor or buyer is 
less than the money spent throughout most of the development stage. Only at the point 
where the product enters the market and customers are buying it does the perceived value 
exceed the expenditure. It is suggested that the new company could be valued at three 
times the investment up to this point. 
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11.4 Trampoline Story as a Case Study 
The Springfree trampoline was developed from 1998 to 2004 
through a process roughly as described above:  
 
• The initial idea was to produce a safer trampoline – one 
that allowed children to have fun and extend their 
abilities without the physical risks from conventional 
trampolines that have been widely reported. 
• Three different prototypes were built, some as student projects at University of 
Canterbury.  
• Contact was made with a potential New Zealand commercial partner 
• The chosen design was then modified through 4 different development stages to 
meet market requirements 
• A search for an investor resulted in a Canadian entrepreneur showing interest. 
Eventually his team bought the rights from the University of Canterbury and the NZ 
commercial partner. 
• A new model was developed with North American customers in mind and presented 
at sports equipment shows in USA. 
• A robust intellectual property plan was implemented and over time this has resulted 
in 14 patents in seven different countries. 
• Manufacturing was trialled in New Zealand and China, and it became clear that for a 
reasonably priced product it would have to be manufactured in China; New Zealand 
manufacturers could not get the raw materials for the price that the finished 
product could be landed in NZ from China. 
• Key components were nonetheless manufactured in New Zealand – the pultruded 
fibreglass rods come from Gisborne, and plastic edge fittings are manufactured in 
Christchurch. 
• Production was set up in China in 2004 and sales began that year. 
• New models have been developed since then 
• Sales have grown to current levels of around 30,000 units annually. 
• The product is sold in Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand, UK and Europe. Small 
numbers go to other countries. 
• In 2010 it won the US Child Product of the Year 
 
11.5 So what is a Good Idea? Some Guidelines 
A good idea is not the same as a good business opportunity. What is needed at the outset is 
a good idea that is also a good business opportunity. How can we tell the difference?  
 
A reality check for the commercial potential of an idea is to evaluate it from the point of 
view of an investor, whose primary objective is to make money by investing in it for a period 
and then selling out for a capital gain. Such a person will not be easily deceived by the idea 
itself as his interest is only in whether it has the potential to succeed financially.  
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There is a considerable amount of information available to help investors to assess potential 
business ideas (Timmons and Spinelli, 2007). For the purposes of this paper one source of 
this information has been divided into the four theme areas above. These would be checked 
by an investor before funding a project. A comprehensive list is included as an appendix but 
the most significant in each area are: 
 
1. Technology
2. 
: The product must work and be able to be manufactured 
Market
3. 
: The product must be wanted by customers, at the price being asked 
Business
4. 
: The people running the business must have a track record, and ideally 
should  include the originator of the idea 
Finance/Economics
 
: There should be no doubt that the product will make more than 
12% profit after tax – preferably much more. 
For the trampoline some of the key features that appealed to the Canadian entrepreneur 
were: 
 
1. Technology: 
2. 
 The product worked, it was unique and patentable and it appeared it 
would have a long life in the market 
Market
3. 
: The product was demonstrably safer than the competitors; customers 
wanted safety and were prepared to pay for it. 
Business
4. 
: The start-up team included the inventor and the University: The inventor 
was available to assist, and the University could add value with research backing 
Finance/Economics
 
: Company finances are not available but clearly the 
entrepreneur believed the economics of the product would work for him, and the 
growth of his market share up to the present time indicates he was correct. 
11.6 Conclusion 
Taking a manufactured product to market takes years – like raising a child. It is a significant 
commitment and persistence is an important attribute. It is also a complicated endeavour. 
It takes a team of people with the appropriate range of skills. Good business ensures that 
everyone is winning; five to eight years is a long time to wait for a return. If anyone in the 
team is not winning they will not go the distance. And finally it all starts with the right good 
idea. 
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Appendix 
 
Listing of what an investor is looking for in a business.  These points can be used to assess 
the potential commercial value an original idea. They have been divided into the four theme 
areas. 
 
Highly Attractive 1. Technology Issues Not Attractive 
   
Technology Sales have begun Proof of concept only 
Technology Works reliably Fragile, tricky 
Manufacturability Easy  Hard; Quality issues 
Can it be copied? Too hard Easy to do 
Work in Progress Small  Large % of turnover 
Product Life Long Soon superseded 
Raw materials Stable, available Erratic, hard to get 
Delivery Easy to pack & ship Hard to ship 
Location Close to market Distant from market 
 
Highly Attractive 2. Market Issues Not Attractive 
   
Customer Need              Clearly Identified (I want 
one!) 
 Unfocused (Do I need 
this?) 
Customers Reachable Unreachable 
Customers  Receptive Other loyalties 
Payback to user < 1 yr 3 yr + 
Value added for user  High    Low (Just not worth it) 
Market Structure Emerging, new          Established 
Market size  Matches aspirations         Beneath /beyond 
resources 
Growth Rate 20% to 50% / an < 10 or >100% 
Market share possible > 20% in 5yrs < 5% ever 
Patent or Equivalent Has, or can get  No chance 
 Unique advantages       Has, or can get them None 
Fatal Flaws None  One (or more!) 
Fashion “Must have”  Good chance No chance 
 
Highly Attractive 3. Business & Team Not Attractive 
   
Business team Cohesive group   Solo player 
Business team Well qualified  Dubious 
Business team Proven performance  No history 
Business team Includes initiators (eg: 
Inventor)  
 Key staff absent 
Contacts & Networks Well connected No relationships 
Business strategies Competitive Timid 
Business strategies  Well thought out Unplanned 
Business Model Realistic Unrealistic  
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Highly Attractive 4. Economics & Finance Not Attractive 
   
Profits after Tax > 12% & durable (It makes 
money!) 
< 5% or fragile 
Breakeven Time Under 2 yrs Over 3 yrs 
Positive Cashflow Under 2 yrs Over 3 yrs 
ROI Potential 25%+ per year < 15%  per yr  
Special Value  High strategic value Only value is the business  
Financing needs Moderate, realistic Excessive or unfundable  
Exit Mechanism Clear, existing buyers Unclear, no buyers 
 
 
  
107 
 
 
Chapter 12 
Introduction to the New Zealand TUI Research Programme 
 
John Fairweather 
 
Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit 
Lincoln University 
 
12.1 Outline of the research programme 
Generally, the research programme focuses on the following: 
• Technology users as a source of innovation  
• Elucidating how socio-technical networks work to help or hinder innovation 
• Identifying the unique technology governance factors in New Zealand 
• Identifying the distinctive cultural qualities of New Zealand innovation 
• 3 years, NZ$ 1.8m, ends September this year 
• http://www.lincoln.ac.nz/tui. 
 
There are two main research objectives: 
1. User innovation and socio-technical networks in selected New Zealand sectors 
  
2. Cross-cultural comparisons of New Zealand innovation culture  
 
Approach and methods: 
• Science and Technology Studies approach 
• Case study interview data: formal case comparisons (fsQCA); analysis of actors, flows 
and success  
• Cultural modelling 
• Analysis of available survey data 
 
The farming, building and energy sectors were included.  
 
Key milestones and outcomes: 
• Determine the factors supporting or discouraging innovation 
• Determine the distinctive cultural, governance and social capital factors influencing 
innovation 
• Why?  In order to contribute to: 
• an enhanced innovation rate 
• improved innovation governance. 
 
Key end users: 
• Ministry of Science and Innovation 
• Ministry of Economic Development 
• Building Research Association of NZ  
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• Department of Building and Housing 
• Energy Efficiency Conservation Authority  
• The Federation of Maori Authorities  
• Fletchers Construction Company. 
 
Rationale for the research: 
• There is a need to improve NZ’s innovation ranking 
• Where do we stand in terms of innovation rating? 
 
 
 
Country  GII Total GII Rank 
United States     5.28 1 
Germany       4.99 2 
Sweden            4.84 3 
United Kingdom           4.82 4 
Singapore             4.81 5 
South Korea             4.73 6 
Switzerland           4.73 7 
Denmark        4.69 8 
Japan            4.65 9 
Netherlands               4.64 10 
New Zealand  3.97 27 
 
 
Country  III Total III Rank 
Singapore  2.45 1 
South Korea  2.26 2 
Switzerland           2.23 3 
Iceland           2.17 4 
Ireland             1.88 5 
Hong Kong             1.88 6 
Finland            1.87 7 
United States        1.80 8 
Japan           1.79 9 
Sweden          1.64 10 
New Zealand  0.77 26 
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Chapter 13 
Timberworks 
 
Ralph Lattimore 
Director 
Timberworks 
t: 03 540 3080 
m: 027 734 4854 
w: www.timberworksnz.com 
Nelson 
New Zealand 
 
13.1 Description of Invention 
Basically Timberworks continues to develop and adapt a range of steel connectors that can 
be hidden inside large timber joints to replace the traditional mortise and tenon joinery that 
has been used for centuries in post and beam construction. 
 
13.2 Background to the Invention 
Timberworks started with the aim of introducing traditional post and beam construction as 
an option for NZ Home builders.  It soon became apparent that while many potential clients 
loved the large exposed structural timbers, most didn’t have the budget for the hand 
crafted traditional mortise and tenon joinery.  Timberworks therefore started to look for 
ways to cut down the labour component of the construction and the most logical way is to 
simplify the joinery by using hidden steel connectors.  Timberworks has borrowed and 
adapted timber connector ideas used in similar applications with engineered timber or 
overseas companies and has also designed and engineered our own. 
 
13.3 Current state of invention development and future prospects 
Timberworks hidden steel connections now make up the majority of our products.  
Timberworks is in the process of pre-engineering a range of exposed timber trusses using 
the hidden steel connectors that it hopes will provide a solid bread and butter line for the 
business. 
 
Timberworks has struggled to find a bread and butter line to provide consistent cash flow to 
help the business develop.  Following a detailed analysis of the business by a marketing 
mentor from the Biz Mentoring scheme, he recommended that exposed timber trusses 
(which made up 50% of our business at the time) that were more affordable were the 
simplest most logical way to get a bread and butter line going.  There are a number of other 
ideas and opportunities that we are gently exploring as time and cashflow permit to make 
exposed timber structures more accessible for residential and light commercial clients.   
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13.4 Key relationships and networks 
Timberworks was started in Nelson by a builder, an engineer and their wives in 2004. The 
four partners were trained in the craft by Thistlewood, a leading Canadian post and beam 
company which graciously taught them the whole craft of Traditional post and beam 
construction.  Being a high value niche product the immediate challenges became apparent 
of how to reach our target market or make the product more affordable to a bigger section 
of the building market.  We have received tremendous support from the following 
organizations and businesses: Timber Design Society, University of Canterbury Civil 
Engineering Dept., Hunters Laminates – Nelson, Ensis – Rotorua, Tasman Consulting 
Engineers, Gavin Robertson engineer, Nelson Pine Industries – Andy Van Houtte, Biz 
mentoring scheme, Anthony Romano Consulting, plus a host of Nelson-based architects and 
builders including all the joiners and builders who have worked with Timberworks. 
 
13.5 Reflection on my experiences  
In hindsight, the biggest challenge for us is how not to burn out trying to manage the large 
number of roles and tasks that need carrying out until we get to a point where we can 
employ people to help out on the administration side.  The Biz mentoring scheme has been 
useful but is short term support only. One person I could have used is a mentor who 
believes in the overall vision of Timberworks and is happy to meet once a month to help it 
move forward simply and effectively over the long term.  If that mentor was also familiar 
with all the government assistance options available they could guide us towards R & D 
funding or other opportunities that as a small business we are too busy to research and 
explore. 
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Chapter 14 
The socio-technical networks of technology users in New Zealand 
 
Simon Lambert 
 
Environment Society and Design 
Lincoln University 
14.1 Introduction  
Our approach to Technology Users’ Innovation (TUI) builds on studies that analyse 
inventors/innovators within socio-technical networks (Grabher, Ibert, & Flohr, 2008; Ohly, 
Kase, & Skerlavaj, 2010; von Hippel, 1988). We argue that inventors selectively participate 
in the socio-technical networks relevant to their particular efforts at innovation. We further 
argue that such selective involvement in financial capital, government support, IP and so on 
can be measured, with membership scored according to criteria emerging from both theory 
and the substantive knowledge and understanding accumulated from our case studies. 
Examining the networks in which these innovative technology users operate, and how these 
networks influence the processes by which an inventor succeeds or fails, can provide much 
needed empirical evidence about innovation success and failure at a time when greater 
understanding of innovation is vital to economic development. 
 
Among the things that may indirectly influence innovation, we identify social capital as a 
vital piece of the innovation puzzle, certainly present in our TUI case studies but extending 
throughout the wider networks of government and private organisations (see also Firkin, 
2001; Landry, Amara, & Lamari, 2002; Rutten & Boekema, 2007). There are three 
components of social capital that have been described (Putnam, 2000; Svendsen & 
Sorensen, 2007) and that we have recognised in our TUI case studies. They are bonding 
capital, an ‘inward-looking’ trust and support that takes place within boundaries of 
exclusivity, such as family ties or ethnic communalism; bridging capital, the ‘outward-
looking’ networks that enable individuals and groups to exchange tangible and intangible 
assets with outsiders; and organisational capital, the structures and practices that simple 
enable ‘things to be done’. 
 
We also use a new approach to describing and understanding innovation. Fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) examines cases according to their memberships of 
sets defined by the researcher to identify the pathways by which a particular outcome, in 
this current research the success or failure of technology users’ innovation, takes place. 
Data collected through interviews with inventors and other key participants in innovation, 
complemented by internet and database searches, enables individual innovators to be 
scored according to their capital, government support, manufacturing engagement, 
intellectual property rights (IP) and other business activities. In particular, we use this 
approach to better discriminate between the two poles of success and failure by calibrating 
the sales, speed, and extent of an innovation.  
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14.2 Method 
FsQCA and its parent QCA were developed by Charles Ragin and others (Ragin, 2000; Ragin 
& Sonnett, 2004; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) to aid the investigation of causal complexity across 
multiple cases, especially studies involving a small or intermediate number of cases. These 
approaches allow the combination of qualitative and quantitative data and the assessment 
of a cases membership in all possible logical combinations of causal factors described by the 
presence, absence or (in fsQCA) partial membership of selected causal conditions. Results 
are presented as Boolean equations, allowing minimization to key commonalities leading to 
nominated outcomes. The extension of QCA to incorporate the concept of fuzzy sets allows 
for the degree of membership to vary, capturing two aspects of diversity we readily observe 
in the field: differences of kind and differences of degree.  
 
QCA approaches accept that causation will be configurational (i.e., more than one factor will 
be involved) and, as a consequence, more than one pathway to the outcome may exist. 
Variables are refined through successive analyses as results are referred back to cases to 
both utilise and challenge theory as empirical evidence is refined and ever greater 
familiarity with case studies is developed. Researchers must first specify the relevant study 
domain, beginning with the set of cases selected for investigation.  
 
Researchers then designate degrees of fuzziness relevant to the concepts being researched. 
Fuzzy-set scores do not reflect a simple ranking of cases relative to each other. A number of 
frameworks for the transformation of ‘crisp’ variables (where a variable is either present or 
absent) to fuzzy variables are offered in Ragin (2000). We utilise several types, including the 
dichotomous crisp set. Empirical evidence must be identified to allow the appropriate 
calibration of membership scores. Finally, this empirical evidence is translated into fuzzy 
scores. While software has simplified both QCA and fsQCA, the steps outlined above show 
that putting fsQCA in practice involves considerable effort on the part of the researcher.1
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The methodology and results are presented in detail in Lambert and Fairweather ( ). 
 
Previous studies utilize the possibilities of fuzzy-set QCA to better model the real-world 
experiences of innovators as they selectively participate in networks of innovation. These 
networks are a complex mix of socio-technical institutions that include markets, regulatory 
regimes, private firms, sectoral interests, and individual actions. Through familiarizing 
ourselves with both the theoretical understanding of innovation and empirical data from 
our case studies, we identified and framed five factors considered potentially causal in 
innovation success. In addition, we also refined the characterization of the outcomes of 
success or failure and also refined an understanding of success or failure as outcomes.  
 
14.3 Identification and Selection of Case Studies and Variables 
Data were drawn from extended interviews with over 55 inventors and innovators, leading 
to 43 final case studies set against a broader analysis of New Zealand’s innovation policies 
                                                     
1 Free software for QCA and fsQCA approaches is available from http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml. 
The Comparative methods for the Advancements of Systematic cross-case analysis and Small-n Studies website 
http://www.compasss.org/pages/welcome.html provides useful working papers and an extensive bibliographical 
database. 
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and practice. Their experiences were analysed for participation in innovation networks 
using fsQCA, supplemented by interviews with key participants, information held in 
databases, and media and sectoral reports. In the course of reviewing the literature, 
consulting with colleagues, case study participants, end-users, and through preliminary 
fieldwork, we identified five dimensions of socio-technical networks in which innovators 
actively sought participation to enable their innovations: 
 
• Funding (particularly private funding including that sourced from family); 
• Government support (primarily, but not exclusively, funding); 
• Intellectual property protection (comprising patents, trademarks, design, and 
copyright); 
• Manufacturing of the innovation; 
• Other business activities. 
14.3.1 Financial capital (Capital) 
The power of money to transform an idea into a prototype and an invention into an 
innovation is not disputed; as one interviewee said ‘Really, the only thing you need to 
innovate is money!’ What was more pertinent for our study was the calibrating of financial 
capital so that we could account for varying membership in the set of financed innovations. 
In our case studies the level of financial capital ranged from several hundred dollars to $1.6 
million. Many self-financed through family firms and farms, emphasizing the role of bonding 
social capital (Putnam, 2000).  
14.3.2 Government Support (Govt) 
The drive for innovation is a fundamental feature of contemporary political economics and 
some forms of state support for innovation appears universal. Government financial 
support for our case studies ranged from $5,000 to several hundred thousand dollars. 
Support was also secured through government programmes of business mentors, 
innovation incubators, as well tertiary students and government employees, sometimes on 
an informal basis. 
 
Several cases gained invaluable support from employees of government organisations and 
universities on an informal basis. This was described in terms similar to participation in a 
‘community of practice’ (see Fox, 2000; Wenger, 1998) in which individuals were personally 
committed to, for example, a more sustainable future and gave their time and skills to 
projects that satisfied these beliefs. There were disparate types of government support 
mentioned by our cases: financial, pastoral, professional advice and/or training, or 
facilitation. Even the smallest amount of government funding or support was often 
significant.  
 
14.3.3 Intellectual Property (IP) 
IP was a controversial topic for many inventors. The more experienced inventors were often 
strongly proactive in IP negotiations. While some cases were upset by negative experiences, 
primarily through bad advice, several cases undertook much of the work with what they 
thought was relative ease. Others ignored IP and one interviewee adhered to Creative 
Commons principles in making freely available material he published. In some cases IP 
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seemed to be an ancillary feature, attached to an innovation through advice and an 
acceptance that protecting IP was a part of being a serious innovator. In the energy sector 
most TUIs were engineers trained and experienced in a sector where securing and clarifying 
IP was standard practice. Those cases that dismissed or disparaged IP did not do so through 
any ignorance of its function; several owned profitable IP on earlier innovations. For some it 
was not prioritized when ‘speed to market’ was considered the key to success, and IP is, of 
course, no guarantee of exclusivity.  
14.3.4 Manufacturing 
The image of the single-minded, even eccentric, inventor toiling in a workshop resonates 
with many people in New Zealand, especially in the rural sector. Most case studies built 
their own prototypes and many built a considerable component of the final technological 
artifact. The inventor often retained a role in manufacturing but contracted out other 
aspects due to realities of expertise, scale or productivity. While there are cases of TUI 
success where most of the manufacturing was ‘in-house’ this was generally within a small 
firm owned by the innovator who thus has time and energy for other important innovation 
tasks.  
 
Several innovations were manufactured in China, with the inventors themselves forging and 
maintain these cross-border/cross-cultural relationships. One case arranged the necessary 
introductions and visits via the internet. Regular trips to China were taken by several TUI 
cases to discuss manufacturing issues. Quality was generally very good, an issue of special 
importance to TUI people given their strong trade backgrounds and appreciation of 
technical excellence.  
14.3.5 Business Activities 
Broader commercial networks were apparent at an early stage of our research, with several 
successful innovators having established other and prior businesses. For some innovators, 
other businesses provided an important income stream that could be used to finance 
experimental work. These activities expanded networks of potential support and useful 
information, not only within their specialized sector but across other sectors and into 
national and international regulatory contexts. Others expressed regret at not having 
developed business skills, seeing that as a significant restraint on their innovation efforts. 
 
One fundamental feature of supportive business networks spoken of in interviews was the 
awareness and sensitivity to unethical practices. Most cases had experienced what they 
perceived as incompetency or corruption. Many others volunteered instances of dishonesty 
in their sector, and while it was not possible to prove or disprove these claims, we are 
confident that societal trust and ethical business practices will facilitate the growth of the 
social capital that underpins TUIs. Overall, 29 of our case studies were engaged in more 
than one business activity, comprising two thirds of all cases studies. 
14.3.6 The Outcome: Innovation Success or Failure 
Our case studies reflected a nuanced interpretation of their success or failure. All noted 
their inventions ‘worked’ by solving the problem that prompted the attempt. Yet when 
confronted with the difficulties of commercializing their invention, some conceded they 
were not very, or not yet, successful. For our study we have ascribed success according to 
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the degrees of spatial, temporal and hierarchical diffusion achieved by a case study, drawing 
on insights from diffusion studies.1
 
 Any innovation that was successfully exported was given 
full membership. This is in part justified on the grounds that New Zealand government 
innovation policy is primarily directed to achieving export success but also from the 
evidence of case studies actively seeking export success as a goal. Extensive national sales 
and distribution was scored 0.8; regional and/or limited national sales, 0.6. Innovations that 
had some limited national success but are no longer sold or manufactured were scored 0.4; 
those that only achieved limited local sales were scored 0.2. Innovations with no sales were 
clear ‘non-members’ and scored 0.  
We define success of an innovation according to the characteristics of its diffusion. It was 
not possible to judge an innovation on its technical ‘competency’, that is, how good a 
widget or process was compared to competitors. Not all inventors were motivated to 
succeed commercially; their role in our study is nevertheless very useful in understanding 
innovation by technology users. 
 
14.4 Results 
In the presentation of results that follow, configurations are written as a Boolean equation 
with membership or presence indicated by upper-case letters for the relevant network (e.g., 
‘MANU’ means the innovator undertakes a majority of the manufacturing); lower-case 
means the innovator is more out than in that particular network, (e.g., ‘ip’ means the 
innovator lacks IP protection). 
14.4.1 Pathways to success 
We now present results derived from the software, making use of QCA Boolean logic which 
allows terms to be automatically minimized by excluding so-called redundant factors, i.e., 
those logical configurations that do not have empirical examples in our research (Lambert & 
Fairweather, 2010). In this way we draw attention to the key configurations common to 
success (S) and failure (F).  
 
 CAPITAL*manu*IP  
 CAPITAL*BIZ*IP     →  S 
 
In plain language, success has two significant pathways: well financed, not undertaking 
significant manufacturing, and holding relevant IP; or well financed, engaged in other 
businesses, again with relevant IP.  
14.4.2 Pathways to failure 
Failure is primarily through lack of participation in all but manufacturing. It should be noted 
that this configuration describes the archetypal Kiwi ‘back shed’ inventor: good at making, 
and then ‘tinkering’ with an invention, but giving disproportionate attention to this part of 
the process at the expense of other necessary aspects.  
                                                     
1 The diffusion of innovations has occupied a central position in a number of disciplines at various stages of their 
development, notably rural sociology, geography and medical sociology in the 1950s and 60s, and marketing in the 1980s 
and 90s (see Rogers, 2005).  
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 capital* govt*biz*ip*MANU  →  F 
 
However, two other significant pathways to failure exist: 
 
 CAPITAL*govt*BIZ*MANU*ip 
 capital*GOVT*BIZ*MANU*ip     → F 
 
These results are still important as they show that failure is not solely a case of the inventor 
isolating themselves in their workshop. Innovators who are participating strongly in some of 
the key networks, such as financial capital, government support, and other businesses, can 
still fail.  
 
14.5 Discussion: Social capital operating within socio-technical networks  
In interviews, our case studies spoke of important support originating with family farms and 
firms. This support included significant financial capital as well as moral support and 
ancillary skills such as administration, promotion and marketing. Venture capital and angel 
investors were not common among our case studies; the small-scale and often possessive 
and self-directed nature of the TUI cases we examine are not characteristics that appeal to 
venture capitalists (see Hellman & Puri, 2002). 
 
We found that many TUI cases arranged acceptable manufacturing in China and were happy 
with the technical quality and business relationships. While we did find examples of 
technically simple TUI products, such as molded plastics, being manufactured with ease by 
small specialist firms, for several of our cases, relying on Chinese manufacturing enabled 
costs to be kept significantly lower, contributing to their ultimate success. Pathways to 
innovation success in the farming sector include the presence of business activities. Instead 
of the classic image of a farming couple squirreling away in the backblocks of rural New 
Zealand, what we see in successful cases is a well-connected partnership accessing 
information, support, and capital, often through other business ventures. 
 
Our results show that successful TUI innovation requires that inventors manage effectively 
the wide range of factors surrounding them and their technology. While this may seem a 
truism, innovators give variable attention to these network connections, while conceding 
their family and peers have vital roles: small-scale innovation is supported by social capital. 
Thus while TUI innovation is often constrained by its micro-scale, it is enabled by its 
networks of family, collegiality, and trust, often with fellow technological travellers and 
especially where an innovation advances sustainability. Such social capital plays an 
important role in mediating the connections between the key factors of innovation, 
whether it is bonding and bridging through the inventors’ family, friends and peers, or wider 
organizational capital in the performances of other participants in New Zealand’s innovation 
system.  
 
14.6 Conclusions  
This paper has presented the results of a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 
technology users’ innovation and found a number of different pathways to their success 
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and failure. The most common pathways to success were to be well supported financially, 
with the inventor either engaged in other businesses or not undertaking significant 
manufacturing. Relevant IP protection emerges as a feature of an innovator’s research, 
networking and collaboration, and was seen by some as a mark of their achievement and 
professionalism. The most common feature of the failure of TUI cases was their lack of 
membership in the networks of finance, government, IP and other businesses, yet with 
strong membership in manufacturing, features which describe the iconic image of the ‘Kiwi’ 
back shed/’number 8 wire’ inventor. 
 
Technology users’ who innovate undergo continual struggles to participate effectively in 
relevant networks, even when these networks comprise people, organisations and 
resources dedicated to innovation. Success is the product of both individual inventive ability 
and the ability to manage, including selective participation in, the innovation network 
within which the invention evolves. While the inventor is the key node of this network – and 
could be said to ‘surround’ the invention - successful innovation requires the release of this 
often intensely personal technology to the benefit of others. The broader context of 
supporting TUI networks encompasses social capital, expressed as trust and ethical 
practices that nurture invention such that the negotiations towards its release as an 
innovation are more likely to occur.  
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15.1 Introduction  
Innovators who work alone or in small businesses may lack the internal supportive 
infrastructure, such as institution-based knowledge, skills and administration, which is 
available in larger innovation firms.  Their options are to try to work in isolation or to 
generate their own networks of individuals and organisations to assist with the innovation 
and commercialization process. The contribution of networks to the innovation process is 
well researched, but the literature focuses almost entirely on the experiences of major firms 
or relatively unique situations (e.g., industry clusters).  Additionally, networks are recorded 
and modeled in diverse ways in different studies, and this hampers the comparison of the 
contribution of networks across different sectors or scales. Hoang & Antoncic’s (2003) 
review of network-based research concludes with a call for “more qualitative, inductive 
research” in which researchers enter the entrepreneur’s social settings for firsthand 
observations of these contributions to innovation, from which theoretical insights might be 
drawn to stimulate further work (p. 183). This research is a response to this call and draws 
from in-depth interviews with innovators to develop a network model of actors and flows, 
which enables mapping and empirical comparison of the characteristics of networks for 
innovation. Different network characteristics are subsequently examined in relation to the 
degree of market success achieved by the innovation.  
 
The research is reported more fully in a paper by the same authors, currently under review.  
 
15.2  Methods 
The objective of this research was to characterize the networks of TUI innovators in the 
farming, energy and building sectors in New Zealand, and in particular to explore the 
contribution of network actors and flows to innovation success.  The study was thus based 
on innovator-centered, qualitative interviews, which were then inductively analyzed to 
identify patterns and clusters around the actors and flows concepts, rather than basing the 
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analysis on an existing theory of network content. Of the 34 cases, eleven were in the 
building sector, nine were in the energy sector, and 14 were in the farming sector.   
 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with each innovator or in a few cases 
with another key member in the firm.  Innovators were asked to select one innovation (if 
they had more than one) and describe the history of their innovation, beginning with the 
idea, through the development of the first prototype to the sellable product, the move into 
market production, and their future options.  Over this history innovators were asked to 
describe who they had interacted with (positively or negatively) in the process, and what 
that person or organization had provided.  The transcripts were then analyzed to identify all 
of the actors mentioned by the interviewee, and the contribution that the interviewee 
considered that the actor had made to assist the innovation (flows) at various stages from 
idea through to the present.  Actors who had been unhelpful were also recorded.  Actors 
and flows were recorded in relation to the stage at which they were mentioned, and 
recorded for each case study in a diagrammatic form (see Figures 1 and 2).    
 
 
 
Figure 1: Network diagram for farming innovation case study F10. Unhelpful actors are shown above, 
helpful actors and their flows are shown below the process row.  
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Figure 2: Network diagram for building innovation case study B2. Unhelpful actors are shown above the 
process row (central row), helpful actors and their flows are shown below (see Table 1 for flow types). 
 
Following the network mapping exercise, the number of actors and number and types of 
flows for each stage were consolidated into numerical tables suitable for analysis.  The 
results are presented below, using figures to illustrate the findings.  For the purposes of this 
paper, the results are presented with relatively little statistical analysis, as a straightforward 
presentation of empirical findings provides more than enough information for the purposes 
of characterizing the networks of TUIs.  
15.3 Actors and flows and their contribution to success in TUI networks  
15.3.1 Actors 
Altogether, some 681 helpful actors were named across the networks of the 34 case 
studies, an average of 20 actors per network.  The number of helpful actors per network 
ranged from zero to 37.  Unhelpful actors were less frequently mentioned, with 184 in total, 
an average of five per network.  The number of unhelpful actors ranged from zero to 16, 
with a strong majority having less than ten unhelpful actors (of these, six reported no 
unhelpful actors) (Figure 3).     
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Figure 3: Frequency distribution of the number of actors per network 
 
15.3.2 Flows 
Flows are the contributions to the development of the innovation made by actors, as 
identified by the interviewee.  Altogether, 1202 flows of various types were identified from 
the 34 interviews, all of which are reported as part of a helpful interaction with an actor.   
 
Looking at aggregated flows across the entire innovation process (Figure 4), almost half of 
the flows were made up of opportunity (24%) and concept support (22%).  The two next 
most common flows were knowledge and services and skills.  Affirmation and personal 
support and money flows were the next most commonly reported. Technology flows were 
the least commonly reported. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Percentage frequency of different flows across the innovation process. 
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The flows for each stage of the innovation process were spread relatively evenly across the 
first four stages, with over 20% at the Idea, Prototype, Sellable Product and Market 
Production stages.  Flows contributing to Future Options were notably lower at 10%.   
 
The network flows occur throughout the innovation process, but the dominant flow types 
change with the different stages (see Figure 5).  A cross-tabulation analysis showed a highly 
significant relationship between the types of flow and the stage of innovation (χ2 = 199, df = 
24, p < 0.001).  Although the most frequently reported flows were concept support and 
opportunity, at the Idea stage, knowledge and affirmation and personal support were more 
important, and at the Market Production stage, services and skills were more important.  
However, at the Future Options stage, the importance of opportunity overshadowed 
everything else.  Least evident was technology at all stages; also affirmation and personal 
support and money were of lesser importance at all stages except the Idea stage.   
 
 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of flows at different stages of the innovation process 
 
Looking at each type of flow in turn (Figure 6), the greatest proportion of the affirmation 
and personal support flow related to the Idea stage.  Concept support flows were greatest 
for the Prototype and Sellable Product stages.  The greatest proportion of reported 
knowledge flows related to the Idea stage.  Money flows appeared to be most important for 
the Idea and Market Production stages.  Unsurprisingly, most opportunity flows were 
reported in relation to the Future options stage, although they were mentioned at all other 
stages as well.  Services and skills were most frequently reported at the Market Production 
stage; and technology flows mostly related to the Prototype and Market Production stages.  
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Figure 6: Distribution of stage of the innovation process throughout the different flows 
 
15.4 Actors, flows and degrees of success 
Application of Lambert and Fairweather’s (2010) scoring system for innovation success 
resulted in the following array (Table 1).  The majority of innovators can be classed as 
successful based on their international, national or regional sales profiles.  Just under one 
third of innovators had limited or no sales, and are therefore were classed as unsuccessful. 
 
Table 1: TUI innovation success (adapted from Lambert & Fairweather 2010) 
 
  Success score Number of TUI case studies 
Successful exports 1.0 6 
Extensive national sales 0.8 10 
Regional / limited national 
sales 0.6 8 
Prior limited sales but no 
longer  0.4 1 
Local sales 0.2 7 
No sales 0 3 
 
 
The two least successful groups of TUIs (score 0 and 0.2) had notably fewer actors within 
their networks, while the more successful ones averaged between 20 and 25 actors.  The 
level of success is correlated with the number of helpful actors, and also with the total 
number of actors (helpful and unhelpful) (r2 = 0.12, p = 0.045 for both).  The correlation 
between the number of flows and innovation success is positive and statistically significant 
(r2 = 0.16, p = 0.019). The number of unhelpful actors was not correlated with success.    
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The data were reduced to whether or not flows were present or absent at each stage of the 
innovation, and 2×2 cross-tabulation techniques determined if a relationship existed 
between the number of successful cases and the presence of a particular flow at a 
particular stage in the innovation process.  These cross-tabulations took the form of the 
example shown in Table 2 which demonstrates that if a money flow is present at the Idea 
stage, then the innovation is more likely to be successful (Fisher’s Exact test = 4.859, p = 
0.035 - one sided). 
 
Table 2: Cross-tabulation between the presence of a money flow at the Idea stage and 
success (over level of 0.5).  
 
 Number of 
unsuccessful cases 
Number of  
successful cases 
Total number  
of cases 
Absence of money 
flow at Idea stage 
7 (50%) 7 (50%) 14 
Presence of money 
flow at Idea stage 
3 (15%) 17 (85%) 20 
Total 10 (29%) 24 (71%) 34 
 
 
     On the assumption that anything over 0.5 constitutes success (see Table 1), success is 
more likely if the following flows are present: 
• Money at the Idea stage; 
• Affirmation and personal support, concept support and services and skills at 
the Sellable Product stage; 
• Concept support, knowledge, money, opportunity, services and skills and 
technology at the Market Production stage; and 
• Opportunity at the Future Options stage. 
 
The cross-tabulations also reveal the importance of having both helpful and unhelpful 
actors present at both the Sellable Product and Market Production stages.  This contrasts 
with the finding that the number of unhelpful actors was not correlated with success.  The 
presence or absence of certain types of actor or flow at each stage in the innovation process 
may be just as important as the number of associated actors or flows. 
15.5  Discussion  
Networks clearly play an important role in the innovation process for small-scale technology 
innovation enterprises.  All of the TUIs had networks to some extent, and some of these 
were extensive, as illustrated by Figures 1 and 2.  These networks spread over the life of the 
innovation and contributed not only to the past and present life of the innovation but also 
to its future.  Networks are not only an important contributor to the TUI innovations in the 
eyes of the innovators, but the presence of actors and flows is positively correlated with 
success.  These findings confirm previous research mainly on larger enterprises, which has 
repeatedly confirmed the importance of collaboration, exchange and co-learning with 
individuals and organizations outside of the innovator’s own firm (Moulaert & Hamdouch 
2006b; Parida et al 2010).   
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The correlation between the number of helpful actors and degree of success was 
statistically significant and explained 9% of the variation between the variables. Similarly, 
the number of flows was correlated with degree of success, explaining 13% of variation. A 
surprising finding was that unhelpful actors also play an important positive role in the 
innovation process.  Unhelpful actors were generally far fewer than helpful ones, with an 
average of only five per network compared to 20 helpful actors.  Though the number of 
unhelpful actors was not related to success, the presence of unhelpful actors was positively 
correlated with success when they were present at the Sellable Product and Market 
Production stages.  Studies to date do not appear to have considered the role of 
unhelpfulness in networks, and future research could examine why success is associated 
with the presence of unhelpfulness, and at what threshold the proportion of unhelpful 
interactions becomes associated with less success. 
 
The actors and flows network analysis enabled a breakdown of just what advantages are 
offered to small-scale innovators through their networks. Although the network literature 
has paid a lot of attention to knowledge flows and the importance of money (investment, 
loans, angel funding, etc.) the analysis revealed that many other flows are equally 
important.  Affirmation and personal support, often from family and friends, was frequently 
mentioned as was support for the concept of the innovation, which might come from 
friends or potential purchasers.  The quality of such support is not easy to measure 
objectively or quantitatively but clearly pays a role in innovation.  Another relatively 
intangible flow from actors is opportunity, the opening up of a door to potential 
advancement of the innovation.  Knowledge was mentioned relatively frequently but not as 
often as opportunity and concept support.  The contributions of knowledge, service and 
skills, technology and money are generally well discussed in the literature (Pittaway et al 
2004; Ojasalo 2008).  However, the importance of the more intangible flows of personal 
support and affirmation, concept support and opportunity may be underestimated as they 
are not a focus of network literature to date. 
 
This work introduces a novel analysis of the innovation process, focusing on the role of 
network actors and the contributions they make to innovation success. The findings suggest 
that a greater focus on creating and maintaining networks could aid innovation success, at 
least for small technology-focused innovators.  Agencies and policies set up to assist 
innovators should promote the development of network competence amongst innovators, 
including making them aware of the contribution of networks to innovation success, and 
the need for a range of actors (both helpful and unhelpful) and a range of both tangible and 
intangible flows.   
 
Overall, the network analysis proved illuminating by building an understanding of the 
nature and role of networks in innovators’ lives.  The approach has potential for use in 
future research that characterizes and compares networks (actors and flows) in other 
sectors by examining the extent to which these networks correlate with innovation success. 
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Chapter 16 
The Rollawipa 
 
Brett Stanley 
RollaWipa@hotmail.com 
Wanaka 
 
16.1 Description 
The Rollawipa is a plastic hand-held tool that is used to easily remove the excess paint from 
a painter’s roller sleeve once they have finished painting. It can be viewed 
at www.rollawipa.com 
This has been an age-old problem because the amount of paint that is left on the sleeve can 
take a small life time to remove and litres of water is generally used and wasted down the 
drain along with the left over paint. I’m sure a lot of you can relate to this experience. By 
using the Rollawipa you wipe the paint back into the tray thus saving the paint for later use 
and saving precious water. 
Rollawipa works with any size sleeve and will not damage the pile of the sleeve. It works 
with water based, oil based, stains, glues, inks in fact any product that can be applied with a 
painters roller. With the paint saved, using a lot less water, turps or thinners and the speed 
at which this is achieved you will save time, money, product and of course the environment. 
So that's what Rollawipa does, a very simple idea that solves a common problem.  
16.2 Background 
The idea was born though necessity. I was at a painting job with a roller and normally when 
you are finished you would use a putty knife to scrape the roller free of paint. Luckily 
enough I did not have my putty knife handy (otherwise I would not be here today). I tried 
my finger, which was really messy as you could imagine before picking up an empty ice 
cream container and trying to drag this down the sleeve with limited success. However I did 
notice that it could be bent to the curve of the sleeve. With a bit of Kiwi ingenuity and held 
at the right angle - viola! The idea was born. This, as time would show, was indeed the easy 
part. 
From here it was a matter of firstly showing my lawyer who put me on to an IP lawyer and 
together we started down the interesting road of applying for Design Patents around the 
world. Rollawipa now has these Design Patents and Trademarks in NZ, AU, USA, China and 
the European community, at a cost of $80,000. You have to be aware that when you talk to 
a patent attorney they charge around $400.00 an hour so it pays to have a list of questions 
and talk fast. 
At the same time I was in discussions with a CHCH plastics manufacturer who gave me my 
first lesson in what you can and can't do with plastics. I had my wooden and plastic 
prototype which he put a lighter to, to burn, then smell what type of plastic was used, a 
bit odd I thought at the time, but this is a simple test to ascertain the makeup of the plastic. 
It turned out to be Polypropylene Co Polymer. Yes, they could manufacturer Rollawipas no 
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problem.  "You got a tool?" he said “What's a tool?' I said.” It turns out to be two big hunks 
of steel that are the mould. 
He then put me on to a CHCH tool maker, and once he had the specs and dimensions, went 
to work and produced our single cavity tool at a cost of $12,500 to which we added a hot 
runner bit to save someone from having to cut off the little bit of plastic left over after it 
comes out of the tool, another $2,400. 
I had spent close to $95,000 on this project to that point and still had not sold any 
Rollawipas and still had a long way to go. You see, I had never done anything like this before 
and at the time I had moved to Wanaka with my then wife to build our new home, set up 
and run my painting company, when she decided to have a stroke. She has recovered from 
this and now is happily living up north. That's another story. 
That was the only time I had doubts as to what I was doing. I remember standing in our 
unfinished house about to take Adele to hospital in Dunedin with a bill of $16,000 in one 
hand and the mortgage payment due in the other with $ 1,200 in the bank. A call to Mum 
sorted out the finances and Adele told me to "Get it together and carry on". That was six 
years ago. 
Right then, with the manufacturing team ready to go we banged out a few dozen to make 
sure they did work and to hit the pavement in search of a distributor willing to take 
Rollawipa on. Did I mention the idea was the easy part? 
It was an uphill battle to find a distributor, I mean you would think, as I strongly as I did, 
Rollawipa is such a great idea that buyers should be knocking down my door. We are going 
to help save the planet and make life easier for millions of painters and DIYers. How come 
no one else could see this? Well of course eventually one did, not for the same extreme 
reasons but they were on the same page at least. 
A web site was developed and a short video was produced again here in Christchurch at 
$12,000, this one component has paid for itself and next to the tool has been the best 
investment so far. At the same time we were working on the backing card and blister 
packaging, my sister in law helped with this part. There was heaps of other jobs like talking 
to accountants, setting up the company, business cards, promotional data etc... 
One of the things that was driving me was, once you start, there is no stopping unless 
someone buys the rights to Rollawipa, takes over the manufacturing, distribution and pays 
you a royalty. So it was the feeling of sheer horror that would have engulfed me if I was to 
see a similar product being sold like hot cakes from my local Mitre Ten. Thankfully I have 
passed that point and my local Mitre Ten is Selling Rollawipas. 
Rollawipa is currently being sold here in New Zealand and Australia with about 35,000 sold 
to date. 
16.3 Recent developments 
Six months ago I met up with a chap who is now the Chairman for Stanley Innovations Ltd. 
he has vast business experience in the business that I have found myself in. He is very 
disciplined, accurate, structured and saw potential in me and Rollawipa. Had I meet Gerry 
six years ago... 
We put a plan in place and are working our way though it successfully. Quite recently we 
attended The National Hardware Show held in Las Vegas. Wow, what a place Las Vegas is, it 
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really is Disneyland on steroids for adults. The show was a success for us in that it gave us 
an insight to the areas of Rollawipa we need to look at before we present to the American 
market. As well as that, we met up with some very good contacts who have shown an 
interest in Rollawipa and again see the potential. We are currently following these leads up. 
I can almost smell the royalties in the air, well maybe not, but I have learnt to 
keep emotions under control and wait till they have signed on the dotted line before 
breaking out the champagne. 
16.4 Key relationships 
One of the key relationships in the journey so far, without a doubt, would be my 
Christchurch-based manufacturer Plastech, they have always been there to answer the 
questions and put me in touch with the right people at the right time. Their attitude has 
always been "Yep we can do that". Then we sit down and figure out how. 
The other important person was Gerry. 
I did go though the business mentor scheme, which I recommend for any budding inventors 
but living in Wanaka made this a bit tricky. I have gone to several conferences on 
manufacturing and exporting hosted by Business NZ and the like. These are a great way to 
network, however I felt you needed to be producing 5 million dollars worth of export before 
anyone got really excited and before you could even attempt to apply for government 
funding. 
Don't get me wrong there is a lot of help and free advice out there. The trick is finding the 
right information that will get you started and really fast track you and your product. 
16.5 Reflections on my experiences 
What would have helped me in the early stages would have been like a conference for the 
newby with his or her gizmo to show off to a panel of people that have already gone down 
the path that you are about to. Something with the title of "So you've got a great invention, 
show us and we will provide the information that you need to get started or at the very 
least warn you of what is involved". This could even be a road trip that calls in on all the 
cities and towns once a year. Heck, I'll drive the bus! 
I have seen three great ideas that have been shelved because the inventor has just run out 
of steam, energy, support and money. They say for every ten great ideas, only two will 
make it to the market and do well. 
My advice for the new inventor would be "Don't talk with the people that say it can't be 
done, find and talk with the ones that say it can be done" and you will be half way there. 
You have to believe in yourself and your product and of course, it has to work. You have to 
be prepared to sell yourself and again your product, if this is not for you then find someone 
who can do this for you. After all, at some time your product needs to be sold and it pretty 
much starts right after the first prototype is finished. 
Knowing what I know now, with the people that I have meet and with the doors of 
opportunity that are opening, my life is definitely going off in a different direction and all 
because of 24 cents worth of plastic. 
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Chapter 17 
Cultural Limits to Innovation in New Zealand  
 
Tiffany Rinne 
 
Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit  
Lincoln University 
 
17.1 Introduction     
In a world that has moved swiftly to global trade, innovation rates have become one of the 
tools by which nations and businesses achieve success in the world.  In many cases 
countries, businesses and organizations have an ‘innovation imperative’ in which innovation 
is deemed necessary for both growth and survival. These imperatives are paralleled by 
government policies, which seek to encourage innovation in order to achieve economic and 
other goals (e.g. Oram 2001; OECD 2005). In contributing to knowledge about innovation, 
researchers have contended that culture is a significant factor influencing national rates of 
innovation (e.g. Nakata and Sivakumar 1996; Shane 1992; Shane 1993).   Understanding 
culture is, therefore, becoming increasingly important in efforts to support innovation. We 
utilized discourse analysis and cultural consensus analysis to build models of New Zealand 
culture, national identity and innovation identity in order to gain insights into the wider 
social context in which New Zealand innovation is situated. In this way New Zealand’s 
strengths and weaknesses with respect to innovation can be identified. 
Culture is hard to conceptualize and definitions abound.  For the purposes of this research, 
which uses methods from cognitive anthropology, we define culture  as ‘…a conceptual 
mode underlying human behavior’ (Goodenough 1957, quoted in Keesing 1972:300). It is a 
means by which people make sense of reality, that is, understand and organize objects, 
events and experiences. 
Discourse analysis and cultural consensus analysis were used to examine New Zealand 
national identities and innovation identities. National identity derives from the image New 
Zealanders have of their country and the perceived or actual international image of the 
nation in world opinion (Rusciano 2003). National identity is important to study in the 
context of innovation because this is one area where culture manifests itself and becomes 
globally visible.  In a global world, how a nation sells itself to and is perceived by the 
international community can have significant impact on the nation’s economy. We defined 
innovation identity as how New Zealanders recognize themselves as being innovative.  
 
17.2 Combining Cultural Models and Cultural Consensus Analysis 
Understanding culture and innovation requires a method that can record the dominant and 
shared characteristics of culture. We chose to use a combination of methods — cultural 
models and cultural consensus analysis — that would achieve this goal in a relatively 
straightforward and efficient way.  Cultural modeling is a qualitative method based on 
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discourse analysis while cultural consensus is a quantitative method.    The use of two 
different yet converging methods can aid in the development of ‘… a more complete and 
representative model than is possible through the use of only one approach’ (Garro 
1988:99).        
Cultural models are those presupposed, taken-for-granted models of knowledge and 
thought that are used in the course of everyday life to guide a person’s understanding of 
the world and their behaviour (D’Andrade 1984).   Cultural models systematically draw on 
personal discourse and allow researchers to get the insider’s perspective on participant 
knowledge, thought and word meaning.  
Cultural models are composed of linked and embedded schemata.   By first analyzing and 
then organizing the schemata identified via discourse analysis, cultural models of the world 
can be built (Strauss and Quinn 1997; Blount 2002).  According to Blount (2002:9): 
Once a text is created from discourse, one works ‘backwards,’ asking 
questions about how the text was created, in effect asking what the 
conceptualizations are upon which the text is based. The conceptualizations 
are the raw materials of the analysis. They reflect the agent’s underlying 
mental models, the framework with which the world is engaged. The 
reconstructed mental models of an individual constitute the cognitive 
architecture upon which the discourse is generated.  
In essence, the task of discourse analysis is to identify the key components of thought and 
serialize, embed and hierarchically organize them into a coherent model.   While models 
can be built based on findings from discourse analysis it is useful to obtain some 
measurement of the degree to which aspects of culture are shared. For this task we turned 
to consensus analysis. 
Cultural consensus analysis is a quantitative-based methodological tool. It asks three 
primary questions (Romney et al. 1986). First, consensus analysis asks if shared knowledge 
of a specific cultural domain exists within a group of informants. Second, consensus analysis 
assesses the relationship of each informant’s knowledge of the domain in question with the 
aggregate knowledge of that domain. Third, consensus analysis determines the ’culturally 
correct‘ answers to the survey questions without knowing or assuming the correct answers 
ahead of time. In other words, consensus analysis does not compare subject’s responses to 
survey items to an established answer key. Rather, the answer key, the content of ‘culture’, 
is estimated mathematically from the patterns of data.  Consensus analysis employs a kind 
of reliability testing, but on participants rather than on survey questions.  
Consensus analysis allows the researcher to operationalize findings by estimating the social 
distribution of knowledge, the culturally correct answers to the questions, and the average 
knowledge possessed by each member of the informant pool. Thus, consensus analysis can 
contribute to cultural modelling by measuring the degree of sharing of the cultural 
knowledge. In particular, it enables a researcher to determine if there is sufficient sharing in 
response to structured questions within and among groups to make it reasonable to infer 
that participants are drawing on a single cultural model (Romney et al. 1986).   
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17.3 Sampling and Procedure 
In order to use discourse analysis and cultural consensus analysis to construct models of 
culture, national identity and innovation identity we obtained a convenience sample of 
adult New Zealanders by approaching high schools in both Christchurch and Auckland and 
offering a payment of $450 NZD in exchange for soliciting adult volunteers and providing a 
venue. A convenience sample was adequate for our needs because beliefs about culture 
and national identity are domains of investigation that should be widely shared across the 
nation, the extent of which we measured using consensus analysis.  We chose schools from 
the largest cities by population on the North and South Islands of New Zealand—Auckland 
and Christchurch—as our research sites in order to account for possible cultural differences 
that might exist between the two islands. 
Schools were selected from the mid-tier income bracket (New Zealand Decile 4-7).    Contact 
with prospective schools was made by telephone and school representatives involved with 
fundraising were sought. The school representative was directed to source prospective 
participants, an equal number of men and women if possible, from people involved with the 
school or who lived in the local area. Table 1 shows the demographic and socioeconomic 
breakdown of our sample. Most participants were over 40 years of age and classified 
themselves as New Zealand Europeans. No ethic background was specified to schools for 
recruitment and our sample has only one Maori participant, one Indian and one Pacific 
Islander participant. Such a sample means that the results reflect the cultural viewpoint of 
New Zealand’s majority population, New Zealand Europeans, rather than showing variation 
by ethnicity.  As of the 2001 census, New Zealand Europeans comprised 69.8% of the 
population.  Future research can build on this initial contribution by exploring variations in 
cultural expression in New Zealand’s minority ethnic groups.  
In our research we obtained participant discourse using either computer-assisted self 
interviews (CASI) or face-to-face interviews (FTFI). Both CASI and FTFI were utilized because 
a secondary objective of our research was to assess the quality of data obtained via FTFI 
and CASI to see if they were similar.  Our findings, presented in (Fairweather and Rinne) et 
al. (under review) show that both methods of obtaining participant discourse produced 
identical cultural models. 
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Table 1: Participant Demographic and Socioeconomic Information 
 Christchurch Auckland 
 N = 20 N = 20 
Age   
20-29 ------- 3 
30-39 1 1 
40-49 13 10 
>50 6 6 
Education   
University Degree 5 10 
Some University 1 4 
Trade 3 3 
High school 11 3 
<High school -------- --------- 
Total Income   
<49,999 1 1 
50,000-99,999 9 9 
>100,000 6 8 
Ethnicity   
New Zealand 
European 
19 18 
Maori 0 1 
Pacific Islander 1 0 
Indian 0 1 
 
The qualitative interview portion of our research took on average one and half hours and 
was scheduled in advance at a designated time and place (namely onsite at the schools) and 
outside of normal daily activities. The researcher began each interview by clarifying its 
purpose and explaining that participants would be asked questions about three domains: 
culture, national identity and innovation within New Zealand. Participants were assured 
that there were no right or wrong answers to any of the questions and we asked that they 
speak freely about their beliefs and opinions.    
A total of 50 open-ended questions were asked. For each domain of interest we asked a 
breadth of questions.  For the domain of culture we asked about important cultural 
symbols, important figures representing true New Zealand ideals, historical happenings that 
have influenced culture, words one would use to describe New Zealand culture, colloquial 
sayings of cultural relevance, the importance of science and technology within New Zealand 
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culture etc. For the domain of national identity we asked about how participants believed 
New Zealand was identified internationally, how they would characterize national identity 
as a citizen of New Zealand, in what ways they believed New Zealand was better than other 
nations and also not as good,  achievements on the world stage that have influenced New 
Zealand national identity,  words they would use to describe national identity etc. For the 
domain of innovation we asked about how New Zealand’s history has influenced 
innovation, what characteristics of New Zealanders made them good at innovation, ways in 
which their workplace was innovative, where most innovation in New Zealand occurs, ease 
of bringing an invention to the market, factors which would drive a person to innovate,  to 
name significant sectors, companies and products which have been innovative etc. 
In order to analyze the discourse obtained during the interview process (either computer 
based or personal interviews), each interview text was imported into NVivo 7 and coded 
according to key words and phrases. It was then inductively analyzed for patterns, structure 
and linkages of schemata. The resulting cultural models demonstrate how our participants 
perceived New Zealand cultural, national and innovation identities. 
Following the open-ended questions, participants were asked to complete a series of Likert 
scales.  Cultural consensus analysis of Likert scale data was carried out using ANTHROPAC 
4.0 statistical software (Borgatti 1997; Romney et al. 1986) and the data obtained provided 
a quantitative base for the cultural models and allowed us to assess if there were grounds 
for a single cultural model.  The Likert  questions dealt with generalized aspects of culture 
and national identity.  Regarding culture, participants were asked ‘For New Zealanders as a 
whole, how important are each of the following items of New Zealand culture?’ Items 
included: religion, culinary traditions, music, dance, technology, outdoor activities 
(tramping, fishing etc.), playing sports, viewing national and international competitive 
sports, rural living, urban living, fashion, inventiveness, a common language, a shared set of 
values, environmentalism, ethnic identity, the arts (painting, literature etc.), architecture, 
and shared history.  These elements were chosen as they represent commonly studied 
aspects of culture within anthropology and reflect a range of cultural elements. For national 
identity, participants were asked ‘For New Zealanders as a whole, how important are each 
of the following items to New Zealand’s national identity?’ Items included: achievements in 
sports, the way democracy works, achievements in the arts, economic achievements, the 
armed forces, political influence on a world stage, scientific achievements, technological 
achievements, fair treatment of ethnic groups, contribution to world history, international 
peacekeeping efforts, environmental consciousness, the natural landscape, and unique 
cultural values.  These elements were chosen based on a review of the national identity 
literature. Each element represents a key way in which a nation can differentiate itself from 
others in the world. 
Our research goal was to obtain 20 participants from each of the two high schools, one in 
Christchurch and one in Auckland. Consensus analysis, unlike more conventional statistical 
methods, requires very small sample sizes to reach statistical significance.  These initial 
sample size goals were tentative estimations of a sample size thought necessary to achieve 
informational redundancy within the discourse analysis. Had information redundancy not 
been achieved with this sample size, further sampling would have been conducted.   
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17.4 Models of cultural, national and innovation identities 
The discourse and consensus analyses yielded models of New Zealand culture (Figure 1) and 
national identity (Figure 2) as well as a model of New Zealand innovation identity (Figure 3). 
These three models were used by the researchers to form a fourth model: cultural limits to 
innovation (Figure 4).   
At the base of participants’ view of their culture was the idea of New Zealand as 
multicultural  (Figure 1). Participants often mentioned the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi 
as a significant historical event for New Zealand with the treaty seen as linking Maori and 
Pakeha into an uneasy union.  Pakeha participants spoke of Maori/Pakeha disputes over 
land and needing to be politically correct in dealing with the Maori due to past injustices 
against the community. Although the relationship was characterized as uneasy, participants 
often mentioned Maori symbols, such as the koru and tiki, as being important symbols for 
New Zealand. The Maori were seen as very much a part of general New Zealand culture.   
 
Figure 1: New Zealand Cultural Identity 
 
In addition to this idea of an uneasy multicultural blend, participants saw themselves as a 
culture in which emphasis is given to lifestyle, sports, an outdoorsy orientation and pioneer 
values.  Regarding lifestyle, New Zealand was seen as a playground with beautiful scenery 
and place where everyone was treated equally.  Sports such as rugby and other outdoor 
activities like tramping and sailing were seen as particularly important to New Zealand 
culture. They were seen as community builders and a way for New Zealanders to get out 
and enjoy New Zealand’s beautiful landscapes.  With respect to the outdoor orientation, 
participants felt a close connection to the New Zealand landscape and felt it was important 
to get out in nature and do things like hike, sail etc.   
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Participants saw their culture as being inventive/innovative and this was linked to their days 
as a pioneer people. New Zealand is small and geographically isolated. Early pioneers were 
strong and had to make do with what they had available in order to survive and thrive. The 
small size and isolation of New Zealand is believed to have been responsible for the 
inventive/innovative nature of New Zealanders to the present day. For example, 
participants said: 
There’s a #8 wire mentality. People had to cope a long way from home. They lacked 
resources and infrastructure and had to find a way to do what they had to do. I’m 
sure that mentality is still hanging around. (Male, 51 years of age) 
So there are all those things that have come out because of necessity and there not 
being equipment and that’s created innovation and that all comes back from being 
so far removed from the rest of the world. (Female, 76 years of age) 
  
The results of cultural consensus analysis provided additional support for the findings from 
discourse analysis.  Cultural consensus analysis of the Likert exercise data indicates that 
outdoor activities, playing sports, viewing competitive sports, environmentalism and a 
shared set of values were very important for most New Zealanders.   
At the base of participants’ perceptions of New Zealand national identity was the image of 
New Zealand as a small, isolated island nation with a low population (Figure 2).  Being small, 
both in population and land area, as well as isolated, made sports, lifestyle and landscape all 
the more significant for the New Zealand participants. Sports were seen as a way to be 
present on the world stage. Participants believed that New Zealanders ‘punched above their 
weight’ in sport, and had a high level of achievement for such a small country.  
  
Figure 2: Model of New Zealand National Identity 
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Sports were considered an important source of national pride.  A representative comment 
is: 
Very significant as it shows us off to the world stage that we are so little but can 
compete against countries that have more money and players and sometimes we 
even beat them which gives New Zealanders a great sense of pride (Female, 32 years 
of age) 
The lifestyle afforded to those living in New Zealand and the landscape were also sources of 
significant pride for participants. The New Zealand lifestyle was believed to be relaxed and 
family-oriented. Participants appreciated the egalitarian nature of New Zealand society and 
felt that no one stood above another. Being isolated afforded participants a sense of safety. 
New Zealand was considered far removed from many of the world’s problems and a safe 
place to raise children. The close proximity of the ocean and mountains also contributed to 
the New Zealand lifestyle by serving as playground venues for ‘outdoorsy’ New Zealanders.  
They were seen as places for adventure. Participants appreciated New Zealand’s beautiful, 
clean and green landscapes and it was seen as one of the factors, which set New Zealand 
apart from other nations—made it unique.  Tourists came to see a landscape only New 
Zealand could offer. 
Although not as significant as sport, lifestyle and landscape/environment, participants also 
believed part of New Zealand national identity was New Zealand as social innovator and 
New Zealand as international participant. With respect to being a social innovator, 
participants were very proud of the nation’s no nuclear stance, previous prohibitions and 
overall level of cautiousness in dealing with genetically engineered food and crops, and the 
fact that New Zealand was the first nation in the world to grant women the right to vote. 
In addition to their role as a social innovator, New Zealanders were proud of the nation’s 
conduct within the international community. Participants often spoke of the nation’s 
peacekeeping roles abroad and although a small nation, participants felt pride that New 
Zealand was involved in the international community.   
The results of cultural consensus analysis provided additional support for the findings from 
discourse analysis.  Cultural consensus analysis of the Likert exercise data for national 
identity indicates that achievement in sports, natural landscapes, and environmental 
consciousness are the three top elements of national identity.   It should be noted that 
innovation and being inventive were not considered a significant component of New 
Zealand national identity as identified by participants in both the discourse analysis and on 
the likert scales.   
In terms of innovation identity, discourse analysis of interview texts showed that 
participants believed most Kiwi’s had a ‘Can do attitude’, could make something out of 
nothing (#8 Wire Mentality), and were good at ‘Thinking outside the square’ (Figure 3). 
Participants believed a majority of invention/innovation in New Zealand occurred in the 
backyard shed—a man tinkering in his spare time—as opposed to in businesses or at 
universities.  The ‘man in his shed’ image was viewed as a hold-over from the country’s 
pioneering days. The drive to invent or innovate is believed to be based not in monetary 
gain but rather in seeing a need and being able to do something about it. Regarding 
innovation within New Zealand, participants said: 
We’re down to earth with a can do attitude. Isolation of the immigrants who 
colonized New Zealand required a creative sense of living and self preservation. Our 
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fore fathers relied on innovation to survive in country many miles from any other 
civilisation. (Female, age undisclosed) 
I think the main factor driving someone to innovate is seeing a need.  Either a 
personal need or a business need. To see the possibility of it being innovative. 
(Female, 51 years of age) 
For me to invent something would be for the benefit of others and sometimes , in 
some people, that is more satisfying than the money.  (Male, 68 years of age) 
 
Figure 3: Model of New Zealand Innovation Identity 
 
17.5 Cultural limits to innovation 
Participants believed that pioneer values dominated within New Zealand. These values 
included ‘a can-do attitude,’ ‘egalitarianism,’ ‘#8 wire mentality’ (ability to make something 
out of nothing), practicality and strength.  Given the cultural belief that New Zealanders are 
indeed inventive, why then does New Zealand not do better internationally with respect to 
innovation? We believe the answer to this question lies, in part, with the national culture of 
New Zealand. We make two sets of observations about the results. The first relates to a 
simple comparison of the models of New Zealand culture and national identity, while the 
second builds on this comparison to derive a model of cultural limits to innovation.  
A comparison of the model of New Zealand culture and the model of New Zealand national 
identity shows that there is an absence of inventiveness and innovativeness in New 
Zealanders’ model of national identity except with respect to social innovation (e.g. 
women’s suffrage, nuclear-free etc.). Despite believing themselves to be inventive, as part 
of their pioneer value set, participants did not include invention or innovation (defined as a 
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new system, method or device that is brought to market) as a component of how they, as 
citizens, viewed their national identity. Inventiveness was seen as part of culture but not 
national identity. What is more relevant to national identity is sport, lifestyle and 
landscape/environment. Perhaps this is because many inventions do not make it 
successfully to market and are instead utilized only by the inventor for his/her own personal 
needs. New Zealand sport, lifestyle and landscape are seen as areas where New Zealand 
excels in the world (stands above others). Participants did not believe New Zealand excelled 
with respect to innovation. New Zealanders were inventive but products often did not reach 
the market and did not have wide recognition.    
By analysing models of New Zealand cultural, national and innovation identities, we were 
able to identify aspects of New Zealand culture that may limit innovation (Figure 4).  First, as 
part of New Zealander’s pioneer value set, there is widespread belief that people can make 
something useful out of anything but are also willing to make-do with less than the best. 
However, a make-do attitude need not be beneficial for innovation as it can lead to 
production of products to a subpar standard and can lead to the abandonment of 
innovation ideas if too many obstacles arise during the innovation process. As previously 
mentioned, inventors may be satisfied with using the invention only for their own needs. 
Second, egalitarianism and a general down-to-earth attitude are highly valued in New 
Zealand. The result has been a reaction known as the Tall Poppy Syndrome in which ‘tall 
poppies’ or those standing above the crowd are frowned upon or cut down. We believe this 
syndrome may be linked to a brain drain within New Zealand in which high academic or 
business achievers, those that are likely to be successful innovators, leave the country, in 
part, because they are underappreciated, thus, decreasing the pool of New Zealanders with 
the necessary skills to bring an innovation to its end stage. A third limit to innovation is New 
Zealand’s lifestyle orientation. New Zealanders tend to value time spent with their families 
and in leisure activities more than they value business success or money. Thus, they limit 
the time and money they are willing to devote to innovation activities.  Related to this is the 
idea that many innovators are not in it for the money. Money is a form of reward one 
receives when an innovation reaches the market. With the end goal not being a monetary 
reward, inventors may feel little drive to take their product to market, instead being 
satisfied to use it for their own purposes and perhaps distribute it to friends and 
neighbours.  
These cultural beliefs suggest that New Zealanders may be good at technology user 
innovation (modifying existing technology to suit one’s needs) and small-scale innovations 
(those that can be completed by a single person working alone with limited resources). 
However, aspects of New Zealand culture do not strongly nurture the process by which 
inventions become popular and commercially successful innovations. Further, it may be the 
case that these forms of invention go unrecognized on international innovation indices such 
as the GII,and III as they are hard to directly measure. For example, in reviewing the 
literature, we found no documentation of the prevalence of technology user innovation 
within New Zealand.   
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Figure 4: Model of Cultural Limits to Innovation 
 
17.6 Conclusion 
New Zealand’s innovation identity is rooted in the nation’s pioneering past and as such user 
innovation is deeply ingrained in New Zealand culture. Some of the same pioneer values 
that make New Zealand good at user innovation also serve to limit New Zealand’s larger 
innovation landscape.  By identifying these factors, they can be targeted for improvement. 
Nations, including New Zealand, have the potential to overcome cultural deficits to 
innovation through public policy (Fukuyama 1995).   The key is in identifying the deficit. 
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Chapter 18 
Comparisons, contrasts, and a case study: Innovation implications 
of New Zealand’s scores in  values and personality  
 
G. Daniel Steel 
18.1 Introduction 
In the last two decades, there has been a marked increase in the amount of multinational 
data freely available to researchers. This has allowed cross-national comparisons on a wide 
variety of topics (see, e.g., Rosling, 2009). Recently, some of these data sets have been used 
to investigate the various relationships between the national means of psychological traits 
and corresponding levels of innovation.  
While the results of these investigations are theoretically interesting, they have clear 
implications for national policies, as well. It is the purpose of this paper to show how these 
results translate into suggestions for those in a position to set and change policies. We do 
this using New Zealand as a case study, and comparing its national traits to those of other 
nations who score well on innovation measures. 
The theoretical links between innovation and the personality traits, values, and creativity 
measures to be discussed have been set out elsewhere (see Rinne et al., in press; Rinne et 
al., in preparation; Steel et al., in press). The paper will begin, therefore, with a brief review 
of  the most recent research into the links between these national measures of these 
characteristics and innovation scores. Next, a comparison of various countries’ scores to 
those of New Zealand will be conducted. This will lead to a set of recommendations for 
policy based on those comparisons.  
18.2 Recent empirical findings 
18.2.1 Innovation and personality 
The connection between personality and innovation has not been well researched beyond 
the level of the individual person. However, a recent study by Steel et al. (in press) reports 
findings that suggests that there is an association between national innovation and means 
scores on NEO-PI (R) Openness to Experience and Agreeableness. In that study, the 
innovation scores were drawn from the Global Innovation Index (GII; INSEAD, 2010) and the 
International Innovation Index (III; Andrew et al., 2009). The GII and III each have an input 
and output component. Openness to Experience was significantly related to both 
components in both indices, suggesting that this characteristic may influence not only the 
preparation for innovation but the outcomes, as well. Agreeableness, on the other hand, 
was only reliably related to the Innovation Input component. The authors interpreted these 
results to suggest that greater Openness to Experience in a population meant greater 
receptivity to new ideas and products: first, by those laying the groundwork to get the idea 
to market; and second, by those that comprise the market, itself. 
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Agreeableness had been expected to be associated with innovation primarily because much 
of the success in innovation, after the actual inventing is accomplished, rests on feelings of 
trust and willingness to cooperate amongst the actors in the innovation network. It was not 
surprising, then, that this personality trait was predictive of the scores on the input side of 
the innovation scores.  
18.2.2 Innovation and values 
The relationship between values and behaviour is a complex issue (Bardi and Schwartz, 
2003). However, at least at the individual level, it is generally understood that values 
underpin behaviour to greater and lesser extents. Less is certain about the relationship 
between national  or cultural values and the behavior of nations and cultural groups. 
Recently, research conducted by the TUI Technology User Innovation (TUI) Group, at Lincoln 
University, New Zealand, has been exploring this macro-level connection, using innovation 
as the focal behaviour.  
Two separate studies have been conducted. In the first, Rinne et al. (in press) have found 
that Hofstede’s dimensions of Power Distance and Individualism were both reliably 
associated with scores from the Global Innovation Index, although in opposite directions. 
Innovation scores decreased as Power Distance increased, whereas the same scores tended 
to increase as Individualism increased. This pattern was consistent across both innovation 
inputs and outputs.  In a follow-up study, Steel et al. (2011, June) found that Schwartz’s 
value dimension of Conservation was inversely related to the composite GII score, while 
Inglehart’s and Welzel’s two value dimensions (Traditional/Religious versus 
Secular/Rational, and Survival versus Self-expression)  were both associated with GII scores.  
Specifically, innovation scores increased as a nation’s cultural values tended towards the 
Secular/Rational and the Self-expression ends of the dimensions. 
Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that those cultures that prize individual 
autonomy and a ‘flat’ or horizontal power structure tend to be the most innovative. 
18.2.3 Values and creativity 
It is, perhaps, not altogether surprising that there have been several studies that have 
investigated the affiliation between creativity and innovation. Inventiveness is the inception 
of the innovation process, and inventiveness requires some spark of creativity. More than 
that, however, bringing a new idea to the marketplace often requires overcoming 
significant hurdles. Thinking in novel ways may be quite a help in such instances. 
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The research examining creativity and innovation has been almost entirely focused 
organisational levels. There have been both strong theoretical and empirical connections 
made (see, e.g., Alves et al, 2007; Amabile, 1988). However, as Rank, Pace, and Frese 
(2004), have noted in their review of creativity and innovation, the lack of research on 
cross-cultural values and creativity has created a substantive gap in the literature. This 
remains so. With this in mind, and given the links between values and innovation already 
established in her earlier research, Rinne and her colleagues have conducted a study 
looking at the connection between three of Hofstede’s cultural values dimensions – Power 
Distance, Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance – and creativity, as measured by two 
independent indices: the Global Creativity Index (GCI; Florida, 2007) and the Pro Inno 
Europe Design, Creativity, and Innovation Index (DCII; Hollanders and van Cruysen, 2009). 
The preliminary results have suggested that only Individualism had a significant relationship 
with either of the measures of creativity. This is in line with the findings by Rinne et al. (in 
press) and Steel et al. (2011) regarding values and innovation, particularly with respect to 
the positive correlation between Individualism and innovation, and self-expression and 
innovation. 
The brief summary of the results given above talk about the general case. It may prove 
useful to illustrate how these findings apply to a particular nation. Because much of the 
research has come from a New Zealand-based group of researchers, and because we are 
unabashedly self-interested, we felt it may be best to start with the country with which we 
are most familiar. Besides, as the authors of the 2010 Global Innovation Index stated, “The 
unique demographic and economic conditions and geographic location make New Zealand 
an interesting case study for understanding the processes which foster innovation” (p. 20).  
We agree. Thus, the following section provides a brief characterisation of New Zealand, and 
international comparisons to nations of similar size or cultural background, using the scores 
with which the TUI group has been working over the last two years.  
18.3 New Zealand:  Profile and Comparison 
New Zealand’s standing on the scores from the two major innovation indices (Global 
Innovation Index and the International Innovation Index), as well as various other national 
level variables, can be found in Table 1. These latter variables are limited to those that have 
been found to be related to innovation. The table gives ranks, where available, for these 
measures for Australia and Norway. We will return to these nations’ rankings after 
discussing New Zealand. 
As can be seen, New Zealand is fairly well placed in the innovation rankings. In 2010, the 
Global Innovation Index had the country ranked as 9th of 132 countries; similarly, though 
not quite as positively, the International Innovation Index pegged New Zealand at 26th of 
110 countries. It is clear that this success in innovation is no guarantee of grand wealth, 
however. New Zealand ranks only 29th on the list of GDP per capita, falling well behind 
other nations who have a lower rank in innovation scores (e.g.,  Norway, Ireland, and our 
neighbours, Australia). This should not be entirely surprising; the inputs into a nation’s 
wealth go far beyond its level of innovation. The “innovation equals wealth” is far too 
simplistic equation.  
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Still, innovation may make the difference between capitalising on raw resources and 
squandering them. An innovative nation will add value to the resource prior to shipping it 
off-shore, thus accumulating more wealth for the same level of resources as a lesser 
innovative nation. In light of this, we shall now move to a comparison of national 
characteristics.  
According to the ranking of the personality scores, New Zealand’s population has relatively 
high scores on Agreeableness; one that is also quite open to new and stimulating 
experience.  
Table 1: Ranks of scores on various measures for New Zealand, Australia, and Norway 
Variable Category Subcategory New 
Zealand 
Australia Norway 
GDP per capita 
(USD, 2006)1 
  25,179 37,434 66,964 
 
Innovation 
 
Global Innovation Index Overall 26 22 18 
  Inputs 30 24 10 
  Outputs 25 20 25 
Personality Openness  12 1 - 
 Agreeableness  13 12 - 
Cultural Values Power Distance2  66 54 60 
 Individualism2  7 2 15 
 Conservation3  47 32 - 
 Traditional/Religious 
vs. Secular/Rational4 
 28 18 3 
 Survival vs. Self-
expression4 
 5 7 2 
Creativity(n=47) Global Creativity Index  17 11 8 
  Talent 15 14 3 
  Technology 19 17 16 
  Tolerance 9 13 4 
  
Notes: 
1. from http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp_percap-economy-gdp-per-capita 
2. Hofstede cultural values 
3. Schwartz value dimension 
4. Inglehart and Welzel value dimensions 
 
Its cultural values scores are indicative of a nation that is exceptionally egalitarian, seeks 
and tolerates non-traditional views, and strongly encourages autonomy and self-expression. 
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With respect to creativity, New Zealand is just above the median for technology, crosses 
into the top 30% for talent, and is in the top 25% for scores on tolerance.  
One of the findings from social psychology is that you tend to learn more about what makes 
you distinct by comparing yourself with similar others; anything that is different sets you 
apart from your reference group. We can apply this in the case of countries, as well. It can 
be argued, and has in many a pub across Australia and New Zealand, that these two 
populations are very alike in many ways and quite distinct in others. When we compare the 
New Zealand scores in the table, above, to our trans-Tasman neighbours, Australia, we see 
that that country is, indeed, very similar to us in many respects. Where it differs radically 
from New Zealand, at least as far as these measures indicate, is in its mean level of 
Openness to Experience and in its creative talent. This latter aspect may, in part, be due to 
its size: all other things being equal, we would expect to see more talented people in a 
larger country. The greater score on openness, however, suggests a country that is more 
inclined to seek out new knowledge and stimulation. Combined with a larger talent pool, its 
moderately greater score on individualism, and its lower score on conservatism, this creates 
a population that, on average, would highly value individual initiative when pursuing 
novelty. In business, this would likely equate to greater support for risk-taking in new 
ventures. With sufficient capital to cover failed ventures, this may lead to greater wealth in 
the long run. Thus, one implication for New Zealand is that it may wish to consider fostering 
an increased acceptance of risk in order to increase their GDP.  
Norway also shows a substantially larger GDP than New Zealand, but ranks very similarly in 
innovation scores, and has approximately the same size population. Like Australia, though, 
where it differs most markedly from New Zealand is in its creative talent scores and, to a 
lesser extent, creative tolerance scores. Intriguingly, it is also much less traditional yet still 
strongly endorses self-expression and individualism. Once again, then, we see a 
combination of creativity and an individualistic cultural orientation associated with, in 
Norway’s case, a very large GDP. While the resource base differs between the two 
countries, it may be that moving a country toward a more secular/rational orientation leads 
to greater national wealth. For a fuller explanation of why this might be so, the reader is 
referred to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Steel et al. (2011). 
18.4 Policy Implications for New Zealand 
It is difficult to come up with suggestions for short-term or immediate policies for New 
Zealand. Much of what has come out of the comparison of profiles, above, has been based 
on cultural values, and, if one is bold (or perhaps foolish) enough to wish to change these, 
then it is inevitably a long-term project. This is not to say that a start could, or should, not 
be made. Policies that encourage a rationalist perspective, one that examines long-held 
knowledge for its veracity, would be indicated. As well, policies aimed at increasing the size 
and depth of a country’s  talent pool are also likely to be beneficial. In this latter endeavour, 
New Zealand is handicapped by its size, but it is an attractive country and may be able to 
build this pool through active international recruitment in the short-term, and an emphasis 
on technology training for the longer-term. 
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Chapter 19 
Novel sawing of eucalypt: a solution leading to a new forest 
industry? 
 
Dean Satchell 
 
Sustainable Forest Solutions 
dsatch@xtra.co.nz 
KeriKeri 
 
19.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, movement can be minimised by flatsawing, which aims to minimise the 
movement in the log and restrict movement in the board to bow, which can then be 
corrected in the stack. However, the log requires regular turning which is time-consuming, 
and flatsawn boards are not very desirable because they cup (distort), have high levels of 
movement in service and are prone to drying degrade.  Another technique is to cut flitches 
from the log and apply straightening cuts to the flitches before quartersawing the boards. 
This technique requires large logs, is slow and has a fairly low recovery rate. However, 
quartersawn boards are desirable because they move very little in service and have a 
speckly lustre and attractive appearance. 
 
My technique has been developed for sawing smaller-diameter high-movement hardwoods 
because  eucalypt is a common timber hardwood species grown in New Zealand and is 
traditionally difficult to saw and season. The timber, if sawn and seasoned well, is very 
valuable and fills a market niche in New Zealand where attractive, hard and strong timbers 
are desired. I'm a forester primarily, and want to see a successful industry develop around 
this species in New Zealand. 
 
19.2 Development 
Smaller diameter straight trees are common in woodlots, but there has been no market for 
these. My interest was aroused because of the attractive, high-value timber which has for 
some time been milled from larger diameter trees. I was convinced there would be a way to 
extract high quality timber from these more common smaller trees with a Woodmizer 
bandsaw mill. The focus was on the issues and how to resolve them efficiently using new 
ideas rather than adopting traditional techniques. 
 
Li Legler, a practical innovator and colleague of mine, provided input, insight and an 
alternative perspective. Together we achieved what I could not have achieved alone. 
Breakthroughs were an evolution of experience, trial and error, tuning and fine-tuning, 
rethinking then trying new ideas. Efficiency improvements were the goal all along and ideas 
were tried until these were all exhausted.  
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At that point being able to demonstrate the cost-efficiency of the technique along with 
product volumes was seen as critical to its uptake, so research funding was sought to be 
able to produce a peer-reviewed paper evaluating the economics of the technique along 
with eucalypt plantation forestry. A successful application to MAFs sustainable farming fund 
allowed this research to take place, with good results. The results were presented this year 
at a Future Forests Research meeting. 
 
19.3 Next steps 
Market development is the current priority. This will mean developing markets for the 
timber along with dissemination of knowledge on the technique, to enable production of a 
consistent, quality product. I see economies of scale and consistency of supply to be the 
main constraints in developing a hardwood plantation industry. MAF Sustainable Farming 
Fund have again come to the party and funded an initiative I am taking to address these 
concerns: Farm Forestry Timber: Local timber for local markets. This will be about 
connecting the links in the value chain and establishing markets for New Zealand grown 
specialty timbers. If we can create demand, supply will follow, but this will be a challenge as 
we need both. 
 
The NZ Farm Forestry Association have the most to gain from all this, and also have the 
most to lose. NZFFA have been behind me all the way, especially individuals who have 
provided skills, knowledge and support. NZFFA have also backed these initiatives financially 
because most of the specialty timber resource is owned by farm foresters. 
 
19.4 Reflections 
The whole experience has been a large strain on my personal resources, with much of the 
time I have spent on it voluntary. The goal is entirely altruistic with nothing to gain 
personally that others couldn't gain equally. On reflection I would not have done it any 
other way, and ideas are not something I should expect others to back until I have first 
backed them myself with my own resources. Opportunity and luck played their part and it 
all came together in a way which will hopefully allow further opportunities and success. 
Unfortunately I can see a lot more of my voluntary time and resources going into taking this 
forward! 
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Chapter 20 
iAgri 
 
John Lay 
Executive Chairman 
i.Agri Limited 
Leeston 
Wk +64 3 3243 977  
Cell 0274 8000 57 
Email  jlay@iagri.com 
www.iagri.com 
 
 
20.1 The Product 
Our company is i.Agri Limited. We are software engineers and our products in New Zealand 
are branded as LandMark. i.e., LandMark Farm, LandMark Money and LandMark Diary. The 
software is a High Tech tool for farmers incorporating the best farm management principals 
to maximize on-farm performance.  We also offer a Rural Administration Service and a free 
online Farm Management instructional series to all and sundry.  In recent times we have 
added Administr8 Rugby to our software suite and although not wanting to dilute our 
resources too much, have the intention of adding more strings to the bow. We have 
product in several southern hemisphere countries. 
 
20.2 The Idea 
It was 1992. Windows Version 1 had hit the market. Programmes prior to this time were 
mainly in DOS. Some were very smart but not always easy for the uninitiated to use. I was a 
practicing arable farmer and a Lincoln lecturer in Farm Management with a reasonably Hi-
Tec background. I was on sabbatical in America and later the UK when it occurred to me 
that the new graphical interface had much to offer the farming community. With pictures 
meaning more than words, the benefit was mainly in terms of ease of use and effectiveness.  
Observation and enquiry in both the USA and UK indicated a void, and an opportunity was 
recognized.  It was exciting, leading edge, gee-wiz stuff at the time. 
 
My thoughts were mainly altruistic but none-the-less the possibility of reward existed, 
particularly if my lofty but naïve vision of taking the concept to the world came to fruition.  
 
20.3 Incubation  
My programming skills were largely self-taught and limited but I was able to create a fragile 
prototype and demonstrate it to a large farming audience. Their approval of the concept 
was very encouraging but I soon realized that I didn’t have all the skills required to progress 
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the idea. I needed to find like-minded people who shared the vision and were prepared 
contribute their skills for nothing in the hope of future reward.  I eventually came across 
two such people from a recently defunct Lincoln University Kelloggs Farm Software unit. 
They became my partners in a fairly informal arrangement. For me, this meant sharing or 
diluting the potential rewards but a third of what I hoped would turn into a lot seemed 
preferable to 100% of nothing. The informal partnership arrangement resulted in difficulties 
at a later stage.    
 
20.4 Planning     
Months of planning and consultation with farmers took place before a line of code was 
written. We wanted the product to be useful, built from the ground up and not the top 
down. It had to be simple to use yet have clever, in-depth sophistication if it was to be 
useful. After about a year, the partnership eventually produced a marketable Version 1 
LandMark Farm in 1994. At the time, it was ground breaking. (We are now about to release 
version 6). We were aware of one other major player in the New Zealand market place who 
had purchased Lincoln University’s Kelloggs Unit client database but they hadn’t really got 
going in the graphics mode at the time. We were, and still are, focused, persistent and 
always mindful of the big picture.    
 
20.5 Restructuring & Financing the Business  
We had no idea how to price our product and in the end set a price, mainly by guesswork, 
which we thought would meet market expectations. It did, but it didn’t meet ours. It was 
too low. We were building up a client base, which committed us to providing expensive 
service and support. In addition, we needed to step up our marketing effort for without 
good marketing of the product, which we thought was as good as anything in the world, 
would, like so many great ideas, just gather dust on a shelf. Our income was not sufficient to 
cover outgoings and partners found themselves not only contributing time but also injecting 
cash to keep the wolf and the IRD from the door. The IT environment was advancing with 
enormous speed and sitting on one’s hands and doing nothing wasn’t an option. One 
partner wanted to move on so to keep going, the other two partners had to contemplate 
buying him out with the prospect of further investment in the company. We had to make a 
decision. Were we in or were we out? It was a big ask but we decided to go ahead. It took a 
lot of courage combined with a strong belief in what we were doing.  
 
Banks were prepared to lend to me as a secure individual but not to a partnership whose 
only asset was something they didn’t understand - Intellectual Property (IP). We 
desperately needed development funding but couldn’t find it. Because of this, we went 
through a lengthy period of stagnation and during this time we paid a price. Opportunities 
and market share were lost. We later formed a company, looked for, and eventually found, 
interested investors. For various reasons they fell by the way side. One was on the point of 
signing documents for a 51% shareholding in i.Agri for a seven figure sum but an 
unexpected share market crash saw him withdraw quickly. There was one exception, he 
came on board in 2001 and is still with us as a major shareholder and director in i.Agri along 
with myself and my wife. Without him, we would have failed. Like so many entrepreneurs, 
we were very product focused.  His business expertise and financial strength saw the 
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company buy out the other partner, undergo restructuring, change our modus operandi to 
subscription, smarten up our web marketing, set realistic prices for our products, adopt 
efficient administrative systems and format a succession plan.   
 
20.6 Today 
We are still a small company trying to do a ‘Bill Gates’ job with few people. We try not to 
spread ourselves too thinly but having said that, our products are adaptable and can easily 
be converted to serve different markets. i.e., Farming, Small businesses, Sports 
Administration, Retirement Homes, Golf Course Management etc. We receive requests for 
our products from around the world but as yet, have difficulty servicing those opportunities. 
That will change this year when we migrate our products into the ‘cloud’. In the New 
Zealand farming market we are number two but we have intentions of changing that. 
 
20.7 Reflections    
We now work in an intensely competitive and rapidly advancing field. If I had known in 1992 
the difficulties of getting an idea to market and staying in front, I probably would not have 
started. That’s the beauty of being an entrepreneur.  Like a lover in pursuit. The excitement 
of what may lie ahead can, and often does, override common sense.  Speaking generically, 
one should never destroy that drive as it focuses the mind and engenders persistence, but 
there comes a time when someone with armbands, shades and a calculator must joint the 
team and express the idea in a way that makes good business sense.  
 
Many start-up entrepreneurial businesses begin amongst friends and are informal. That can 
be a recipe for disaster. It would be my recommendation that a simple, easily accessible 
template to guide one along the entrepreneurial pathway be prepared. If such documents 
do exist, their availability needs to be free and their whereabouts widely known.    
 
In Shakespeare’s play, ‘Julius Caesar’, Brutus said, “There is a tide in the affairs of men, 
which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune”. He then went on to say “We must take the 
current when it serves or lose our venture”. A lack of funding at the right time is what 
prevents many good ideas,  and remember not all good ideas happen in Universities or 
Research institutions, ever reaching the market place or taking advantage of the 'current” 
when it serves.  
 
It is my opinion that government support would be useful, not by way of a subsidy or a gift 
but by underwriting a sympathetic short-term start-up loan. The objective of such loans 
would be to make funds available to the innovator as soon as possible, for bridging the gap 
between their maximum ability to contribute and that which is needed to get the product 
to market.  The loans should be managed, reviewed, monitored and, if necessary, 
foreclosed on behalf of the Government by a mobile, understanding, independent, 
commercially aware team of proven successful business entrepreneurs. Some approved 
projects may fail and the fund and the innovator may suffer loss although that loss should 
be minimised through careful oversight and monitoring by the entrepreneurial team. 
However, if the team is doing its job well, most approved projects should have a more than 
even chance of success, and the benefits of those successes should outweigh the cost of 
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failure. Projects that succeed and have benefited from the sympathetic fund should not 
only be expected to fulfil the terms of the loan, but should also be levied for a specified 
period of time beyond the loan repayment period. Once well established and underway, the 
entrepreneurial team’s aim in managing the fund on behalf of government should be to 
break even. This should be the yardstick against which their performance is monitored by 
Government whose authority would be exercised when appointing or reviewing 
membership of the entrepreneurial t team. 
  
Finally, by virtue of their appointment, members of the entrepreneurial management team 
will have a natural eye for a good idea and experience in marketing ideas. A team member 
therefore, should not be precluded from investing in an idea that has been approved by the 
team as a whole. Such an opportunity to support an innovator may well be their greatest 
reward for being members of the entrepreneurial team. In the event of this happening, 
their action should be approved by the team as a whole and their appointment reviewed by 
government.       
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Chapter 21 
Synthesis of New Zealand TUI research and policy implications: Is it 
time to support user invention in New Zealand? 
 
John Fairweather 
 
AERU 
Lincoln University 
 
Tiffany Rinne, Gary Steel, Simon Lambert 
Lincoln University 
Janet Stephenson 
CSAFE, University of Otago 
 
 
21.1 Introduction 
In New Zealand, as in many countries, innovation is an important topic, one which is seen as 
vital to economic success. Currently, many New Zealanders are concerned with our present 
level of innovation, and comparisons with Australia and other countries are taken to 
indicate that we need to boost our rate of innovation in order to catch up. Within the OECD, 
New Zealand’s GDP per capita is below the OECD average and in less than four decades New 
Zealand has slipped from the OECD upper decile to 23rd position out of 31 (OECD 2010). 
Such slippage is usually considered as caused, in whole or in part, by a failure to innovate. 
 
As a generalisation, government policy on innovation typically focuses on research 
investment going into universities and Crown Research Institutes. Inventions then flow from 
these investments and some are commercialised, thereby contributing to economic growth. 
Private R&D expenditure is also considered to be a source of inventions. Given much less 
attention is user innovation or technology users who innovate (TUI). This type of innovation 
occurs when someone using technology re-invents, develops or improves it. User invention 
occurs in New Zealand, already contributes to economic growth, remains poorly recognised, 
and has great potential to be better managed to increase its contribution to the New 
Zealand economy  
 
As part of its funding in the Sustainable Economies and Technologies portfolio, the 
Foundation for Research, Science and Technology has funded our TUI research programme 
for the last three years. Unfortunately, the social sciences are bearing the brunt of current 
research funding cutbacks, and funding for our research will not continue beyond this year.   
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This conference paper includes a brief account of the TUI research programme, then 
provides a summary of the key results in two parts: first for TUI and then for the context of 
TUI in New Zealand. We then condense the programme findings into a summary of the 
overall results and use these to develop policy indications.  Finally, we make policy 
recommendations and conclude with some strategic comparisons with Australia.  
21.2 Key features of the research programme 
Background 
An important element of the context for this study is the belief that the rate of innovation in 
New Zealand is lower than desirable. Data on our level of innovation can be gleaned from a 
number of international studies and we have found that the Global Innovation Index (GII) 
(Insead, 2009) and the International Innovation Index (III) (Andrew et al.  2009) are well 
developed sources that include a wide range of countries.  
Tables 1 and 2 show the scores for each innovation measure for the top ten countries and 
for New Zealand.   
 
Table 1: GII scores and ranks for top ten countries, and for New Zealand 
 
Country GII Total  GII Rank 
United States      5.28 1  
Germany        4.99  2 
Sweden             4.84  3 
United Kingdom            4.82  4 
Singapore              4.81  5 
South Korea              4.73  6 
Switzerland            4.73  7 
Denmark         4.69  8 
Japan             4.65  9 
Netherlands                4.64  10 
New Zealand 3.97 27 
 
Table 2: III scores and ranks for top ten countries, and for New Zealand  
 
Country III Total III Rank 
Singapore 2.45  1  
South Korea  2.26  2 
Switzerland           2.23  3 
Iceland            2.17  4 
Ireland              1.88  5 
Hong Kong              1.88  6 
Finland             1.87  7 
United States         1.80  8 
Japan            1.79  9 
Sweden           1.64  10 
New Zealand 0.77  26 
 
161 
 
 
According to the GII for 2008/09 and the III for 2009, New Zealand is not in the top ten 
countries with respect to innovation. Both indices rank New Zealand in the mid-20s with 
only modest innovation scores.  (There is some variability in the GII data: the 2009/10 
report has New Zealand ranked at ninth place.) We take these data to support the present 
belief that New Zealand has promising indications of innovation, but still needs to improve 
its level of innovation in order to assist economic development.  We further assume that 
this assessment of New Zealand innovation applies to both innovation generally, and to 
technology users’ innovation (TUI). Accordingly, in this paper we focus exclusively on user 
innovation and consider our research results and their implications for policy targeted at 
improving our performance in user innovation. We believe that such policy, by fostering 
user innovation, will contribute to overall innovation levels.  
 
Programme title 
Enhancing innovation and innovation governance: determining the conditions under which social 
networks enhance technology development, adoption and commercialisation. 
 
Research objectives 
The aim of Objective 1 was to increase our fundamental knowledge of technology users as a 
source of innovation, and how socio-technical networks work to help or hinder innovation. 
The results indicate the factors supporting or discouraging innovation. The main method 
was case study comparisons.   
 
The aim of Objective 2 was to increase our knowledge of the unique technology governance 
factors in NZ and the distinctive qualities of NZ innovation when compared with that of 
other countries. The results show the distinctive cultural, governance and social capital 
factors influencing innovation in New Zealand. The main methods were statistical analysis 
of international survey data, case study comparisons of social capital across selected 
countries, cultural modelling across selected countries, and case study comparison of 
innovation policy across selected countries.  
 
Intermediate outcome 
The overall programme goal was to ‘enhance innovation rates and enhance innovation 
governance’.  
 
The funding for this programme was directed at achieving practical benefits for the nation - 
outcomes are paramount. Accordingly, the research programme takes seriously this mission 
and most of our implications will relate to policy and the achievement of enhanced user 
innovation in New Zealand.  
 
21.3 Structure of the paper 
There are two themes to the overall findings. The first theme relates to TUI and to inventor 
networks. The second theme relates to the factors of culture, national identity and 
personality which influence TUI. This context of TUI in New Zealand is assessed via 
comparison with other countries.   The findings related to these two themes are assessed in 
terms of their potential effect on user innovation in New Zealand. Understanding these 
effects then allows us to identify factors supporting or discouraging TUI. At the end of this 
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paper, the findings related to both themes are integrated and used to present a summary 
diagram and also serve as the basis for the policy implications section.  
 
The necessity of presenting the main findings from the research programme means that 
much detail will be omitted. The focus here is on the key findings and working these into a 
broad brush picture of what they collectively indicate. A fuller presentation of most of these 
projects was done by our colleagues earlier in the conference. In this paper, the main 
elements of the research are introduced in a synopsized form which includes 
acknowledgement of the lead researcher, the methods utilized and the research findings.   
21.4 TUI results and the development of an improved model of TUI 
Case studies of TUI 
Simon Lambert, fsQCA of case studies of TUI. 
Results showed the key configurations to innovation success involve inventors who were:  
• Well financed, not undertaking significant manufacturing, with relevant IP; or, 
• Well financed, engaged in other businesses, again with relevant IP. 
 
The key configurations to innovation failure involve inventors who were: 
• Poorly financed, lacking government support, not engaging in other business activities, 
and lacking IP. 
• Well financed, lacking government support, engaged in other businesses, undertaking 
significant manufacturing, and lacking IP. 
 
Inventors need to manage networks of: 
• Capital 
• IP 
• Other business 
• Friends and family 
• And more... 
 
An important aspect of the fsQCA results is that while they did point to causally important 
combinations of factors associated with success, they also show that there were a number 
of combinations of factors associated with success. This finding cautions against simple 
conclusions about innovation success, and is consistent with the idea that innovation 
networks are complex and demanding to work within. 
 
Janet Stephenson, qualitative and quantitative analysis of TUI case study data. 
Innovation success was positively associated with: 
• Number of actors within TUI networks 
• Number of flows from those actors 
 
Important flows identified by innovators that seem to be under-represented in the 
literature include: 
• Affirmation & personal support 
• Concept support 
• Opportunities 
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A greater focus on network competence - creating and maintaining networks - could aid TUI 
innovation success. 
Linear technology development and critical responses 
Stephen Flowers has earlier in this conference reviewed the evolution of thinking about 
user innovation. Our work in New Zealand is based on a similar appreciation of this 
evolution and we see ourselves as working mainly in the Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) area. This section reviews some models of TUI and presents our model based on some 
of the core results from our research.  
 
The ‘linear’ or ‘technology-push’ model posited that investment in so-called fundamental 
science resulted in knowledge that would lead to technological innovation and therefore 
economic growth (Martin & Nightingale, 2000a). This interpretation of innovation tends to 
focus on formal macro-economic R&D activities, and relies on coarse input variables such as 
R&D spending, science and engineering doctorates and coarse output variables such as 
patents and bibliometric measures (Godin, 2003; Smith, 2005). Since the linear model is like 
a pipeline from R&D to uptake, the assumption is that enhancement of R&D inputs will lead 
to an increase of innovation outputs. 
 
Challenges to the linear model came with greater appreciation of the complexities of 
innovation. Since the 1970s, empirical evidence has shown the complexity of the 
relationship between science, technology and innovation indicating, for example, the 
importance of networks, including education, localised knowledge and the role of ‘tacit’ 
knowledge (Fagerberg, Mowery, & Nelson, 2005; Martin & Nightingale, 2000b). Dosi (1982) 
criticised the assumption that expenditure on R&D somehow results in the production of 
new goods and services needed by willing consumers. The technology-push model was 
further challenged by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) who presented empirical evidence that in 
fact many innovations did not originate with scientists but from other participants such as 
customers who made significant, even dominant, contributions. It could be argued that the 
critique of the linear model has culminated in the ‘consumer is king’ hypothesis, in which 
innovation is oriented towards, but not derived from, consumer needs, niftily reversing the 
uni-linear direction of technology-push to a ‘market-pull’ model. For instance, Von Hippel 
(1978) and Lee (1998) make a distinction between the Manufacturer Active Paradigm (MAP) 
and the Consumer Active Paradigm (CAP). Further, Mayhew (1999) refers to participatory 
design and Grunert et al. (2008) refers to user-oriented innovation. While this change in 
emphasis is an improvement on the linear model it is not appropriate or suitable to TUI, 
that is, innovation which stems from technology users and their interaction with 
technology.  
Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Technology Users’ Innovation (TUI) 
The theoretical approach we take comes from the constellation of social sciences that treat 
technology as inextricably social. From this broad church emerged critiques of the dominant 
technological determinism or ‘technology fix’ approaches in which humans are seen to 
respond, usually benignly, to new technologies. In the STS view, outcomes are a product of 
negotiability. Common to these STS approaches is a symmetrical treatment of the 
constituents of both technologies and societies, and a focus on how they are 
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interdependent, co-constructed or mutually shaping (Sismondo, 2004). In essence, social 
science approaches undermined the concept of a one-way flow of information, ideas and 
solutions from the laboratory through to the consumer market.   
 
We argue that recognising technology user innovation is fundamental to understanding 
innovation. There are a number of strands in the STS literature that point to the role of 
users in innovation. Braun (1998) notes the diversity of actors in technological design and 
implementation processes. Basu & Weil (1998) and Willoughby (1990) point to the positive 
role of those who experience and/or articulate and define health, environmental, or other 
value-laden effects of evolving technologies but who are not usually engaged in 
technological developments. Related ideas include ‘back propagation’ (Hicks and 
Pachamanova,  2007) and ‘reverse innovation’ (Foxall, 1989) where attention is given to 
user needs. Gamser (1988a, 1988b) illustrates TUI in developing countries, and the von 
Hippel approach emphasises ‘lead users’ in innovation and in the Customer Active Paradigm 
(von Hippel, 1976, 1988, 2005).  
 
Emerging models of TUI innovation networks 
An example of these technology user approaches is the model developed by Garud and 
Karnoe (2003: 279) of the ‘path creation’ process that occurs as humans interact with 
technology. They articulate a view of path creation which is dynamic, assuming reciprocal 
relations between economic, technology and institutional forces that constitute the 
technology artefacts and the actors involved. Entrepreneurs are seen as negotiating 
complex sociotechnical networks and attempting to actively shape emerging social 
practices, only some of which may result in a new pattern of relationships between 
artefacts and humans. Garud and Karnoe use the term ‘bricolage’ to describe the 
performance of these activities, connoting resourcefulness and improvisation by the actors 
involved. Figure 2 is a schematic abbreviation of the key elements and the relationships 
between them shown in the work of Garud and Karnoe (2003). Evaluation refers to testing 
or appraising of the new technology according to the path creation model. 
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Figure 1: Factors and relationships influencing a technological path 
 
Source: Garud and Karnoe, (2003: 279). 
 
 
What is apparent is that the network in which the innovation occurs has an influence on the 
artefact itself, its form and function. In line with this approach, Biemans (1991) constructed 
a model which emphasised the involvement of the manufacturer in the initial stages of the 
process of commercialising an innovation. He found that complex networks occurred when 
the innovation itself was technically complex, the manufacturer lacked complete 
knowledge, and/or there were unanticipated problems. Figure 3 below details Bieman’s 
account of product development (1991: 178). 
Figure 2: Example of a complex innovation network 
 
Source: Biemans (1991:178). 
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These emerging models are incomplete and both of the models above downplay the role of 
the innovating technology user as an entrepreneur. A more comprehensive model 
suggested by the TUI literature and our own findings includes a wide range of key actors 
located in a number of areas or places (consumers, finance, regulators, evaluation/testing, 
industry organisations, research, design, production, IP) all interacting with the technology 
but mediated by the technology user as innovator. Any one of these particular interactions 
may require the attention of the innovator whose direct and often personal attention may 
be required to solve any combination of problems. In simple cases, a few interactions will 
need attention. We acknowledge that there will be direct links between many of the key 
actors and the technology, varying as to stage of development, since it is possible for each 
actor to do this independently of the entrepreneur. However, in terms of driving the 
technology path it is the interactive links which will be most important. A model more 
appropriate to the TUI type situation could include a broad cast of key actors and highlights 
the potential complexity of the TUI network, which the entrepreneur has to mediate.  
 
Such a model would be comprehensive and our preliminary suggestion is illustrated in 
Figure 4. The interactions between the entrepreneur and other actors in the model cause 
indeterminacy in the path creation process.  
Figure 4: A suggested model of the TUI network (the TUI spider web) 
Technology
Consumers
Industry 
organisations
Regulators
Finance Society
Research/
Scientists
Evaluation
Design/Production
IP
Innovator - entrepreneur
 
 
 
 
This model, although tailored to fit the TUI case, affords equal status to each factor in the 
network and does not show which links may be particularly important in helping or 
hindering innovation. In our report on the socio-technical networks of technology users 
(Lambert and Fairweather, 2010) we drew from our fsQCA results to improve on the above 
model. Figure 5 identifies many actors in the innovation network including a number on the 
periphery of the diagram (research, design/evaluation/production, society, consumers, 
regulators, design, and industry organisations). These people may be located in a diffuse 
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manner, however, they are all interacting with the technology user who mediates between 
them and the technology. Closer to the centre of the model are the five key factors we have 
identified as being causally implicated in innovation success (capital, business, government, 
manufacturing and IP). In addition, the model includes the invention itself, the inventor, and 
family/peers. Note the lack of causal connections represented by arrows. This is deliberate 
and designed to reduce confusion as the model includes many interconnections.  
 
 
Figure 5: An empirically-derived model of the TUI network  
 
 
 
 
The model does not explicitly display all of the pathways to successful or unsuccessful innovation as 
shown by our fsQCA results. In large part this is due to the nature of the results themselves – there 
was no single pathway to success. So the figure works best by not showing precise pathways but by 
showing the generic nature of the network in which the inventor is located. This network has a 
number of key factors which intersect with the technology user, and the most frequent pathway to 
success involving interactions with some of these five factors (capital, government, business, 
manufacturing and IP).  
 
The main point of the model is that it shows successful innovation requires the inventor to actively 
manage a number of factors in the innovation network. Successful innovation is the product of both 
individual inventive ability and the ability to manage the factors – the innovation network – within 
which the invention is developed into an innovation. It would seem that innovation success is more 
likely when more of the key factors are given attention. As indicated by the pathways to failure, 
invention by itself is not enough.  
 
While the inventor is the key component of the TUI network — the inventor could be said to 
‘surround’ the invention — there are many interactions with other nodes. Successful innovation 
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requires the release of an often intensely personal technology so that others may benefit from it. 
The key challenge of TUI is to nurture the invention and negotiate for its release so that others want 
to purchase it. In some cases, new inventions are kept firmly locked within the personal network of 
the inventor, and insufficient attention is given to the connections needed to ensure commercial 
success. The model in Figure 5 includes a broad cast of key actors and highlights the potential 
complexity of the TUI network within which the innovator has to operate. Fundamentally it shows 
the contingency of the outcomes: while there are pathways to success which our case study 
research has identified, these pathways are multiple and contested.  
 
The model in Figure 5 prominently displays the family and peers of the inventor, acknowledging the 
vital role that these play in successful innovation. This family role is an example of bonding social 
capital. Of particular importance here is the role of the inventor’s spouse. It is well known in farming 
circles that farm ventures are generally a partnership between husband and wife. In our TUI farming 
cases, we saw this regularly, commonly with a husband as inventor and wife as ‘administrator’, and 
parallels occurred in the other sectors. Administration includes such diverse activities as publicity, 
website management, meeting with possible collaborators and supporters, and attending mentoring 
and other programmes. In separate analysis of the farming sector, pathways to innovation included 
the presence of business activities. Instead of the classic image of a farming couple squirreling away 
in the backblocks of rural New Zealand, what we see in successful cases is a well-connected 
partnership accessing information, support, and capital, often through other business ventures. In 
effect, the inventor’s social capital plays an important role in mediating the key connections 
between many of the factors shown in Figure 1, whether it is bonding and bridging through family, 
friends and peers, or wider organisational capital in the performances of other participants in New 
Zealand’s innovation system.  
 
To the above representation of TUI networks we can add some insights from the supplementary 
analysis of the case study data. While showing a specific result, Figure 6 gives a more detailed 
indication of the character of one innovation network, identifying helpful actors and nodes below 
the central line and unhelpful actors and nodes above the central line.  
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Figure 6: An example of network diagram for building innovation 
 
 
An important theme in these models is the indeterminacy of the outcomes and this derives 
from the interactions of a number of factors so that the degree of commercial success may 
reflect the merits of the innovation, the reactions of competitors and the interplay of other 
actors in the innovation network. Related to the issue of indeterminism is the scope of 
success. In the context of national economic growth or firm productivity, success is 
primarily measured by the commercial performance of an innovation, a criterion to the 
forefront of most debates. Alternatively, from a narrower perspective, resolution of a 
technology user’s initial problem may count as success and result in a technology primarily   
diffused within a relatively small community of fellow users. However, for any innovation, 
engagement with other actors may emerge and the recombination and transformation of 
existing actors may then unfold in different directions out of which one path may come to 
dominate. In addition to such endogenous forces for expansion, there may be pressures 
against successful innovation and the paradox of innovation is that it may provoke 
opposition. No less a commentator than Machiavelli said  “…the initiator has the enmity of 
all who would profit by the preservation of the old institutions, and merely lukewarm 
defenders in those who would gain by the new ones” (Machiavelli, 1992, p. 25). Laestadius 
(2003) showed in a number of case studies that the path to innovation success is fraught: 
the most promising technology will not necessarily be chosen in the end. Foxall (1989) 
illustrates the challenges to controlling the development of technology and its 
complementary assets, and discusses the options businesses can take to preserve their 
innovation advantages such as intellectual property (IP). Yet throughout it is obvious that 
institutions, habits and vested interests may all act to block innovation. 
 
The models of technology user innovation presented above have certain limitations but 
they do emphasise the networked nature of user inventors and the contingent or uncertain 
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nature of the outcomes. Even when it is the inventor’s intention to take the invention all 
the way to full commercial development, the complex nature of the network makes this 
goal a challenging one to achieve. It is the network which needs to be focused on in any 
attempt to understand TUI or to develop policy for TUI. Successful inventors manage the 
network well – they exhibit network competence – and in so doing they build up the social 
capital necessary to drive success. With a network and social capital focus, we can see the 
appropriate unit of analysis is the network rather than the inventor or the other individual 
actors or nodes in the network. Clearly, any research needs to include all these actors since 
they are at least the human ‘face’ of innovation. However, a broader focus provides a better 
basis to understand, manage and promote user innovation in New Zealand and elsewhere.   
21.5 The New Zealand context to TUI  
Where possible in the following summaries we compare New Zealand to Denmark and 
Finland. These two countries were found to be consistently high in rankings of national 
innovation policies (Fairweather et al. 2011) and are similar to New Zealand in population 
size. 
 
Hofstede’s cultural value dimensions and innovation 
Tiffany Rinne, statistical analysis of international survey data. 
Through extensive survey research, Hofstede identified four criteria that reliably 
differentiate between cultural values in diverse nations: individualism versus collectivism, 
large versus small power distance, strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance and masculine 
versus feminine values. Each country was scored on a scale of 0 to 100 for each dimension. 
Our research assessed the relationship between Hofstede's value dimensions and scores on 
the Global Innovation Index, the Global Creativity Index and Pro Inno's Design and Creativity 
Index. The results indicate that for cultural values, higher levels of innovation were 
associated with: 
• Low Power Distance (acceptance of unequal power distribution) 
• High Individualism (loose ties, strong self interest). 
 
High individualism was associated with high levels of creativity. 
 
New Zealand’s Power Distance is low (rated at 22) and is similar to Denmark (18) and lower 
than Finland (33), both strong innovation nations. New Zealand’s Individualism is high 
(rated at 79) and is higher than Denmark (74) and Finland (63). Therefore, there is potential 
for high levels of innovation. 
 
Personality traits and innovation 
Gary Steel, statistical analysis of international survey data. 
In analysing data on personality traits, innovation success was positively associated with: 
• Openness to experience (willingness to engage in novel experiences or ideas) 
• Agreeableness (trustworthiness, honesty, compliancy and modesty) 
 
New Zealand’s NEO-PI score for Openness to Experience is 50.7 (76th percentile); for 
Agreeableness, it is 50.7 (72nd percentile). These scores can be interpreted as high and 
favourable for innovation. For Denmark, the scores are 54 (100th percentile) and 52.6 (91st 
percentile). (No data are available for Finland). While the scores for New Zealand indicate a 
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strong and positive relationship with innovation, the percentiles suggest that there is still 
room for improvement.  
 
Comparisons of models of identity and innovation in New Zealand 
Tiffany Rinne, cultural modelling, detailed analysis of New Zealand data. 
• The NZ cultural model shows inventiveness as an important cultural trait 
• The NZ model of national identity excludes inventiveness 
 
New Zealand cultural values of ‘make do’, the tall poppy syndrome, and lifestyle may limit 
innovation. 
 
Country comparisons of models of identity and innovation 
Tiffany Rinne, cultural modelling, New Zealand and selected countries. 
• Compared to other countries, New Zealand  innovation is ‘to keep up’ while for Sweden 
and Finland innovation is ‘world leading’. 
• There is lack of awareness of innovation 
• There is lack of appreciation of educational achievement. 
 
Country comparisons of social capital and innovation 
Simon Lambert, fsQCA international survey data. 
In this study, bonding, bridging and organisational capital, economic freedom, and 
competitiveness were measured using available data from 44 countries. Fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis of these data showed that the following variables were 
found to be associated with innovation: 
• Bridging capital (expression of trust in others) 
• Economic freedom  
• Competitiveness. 
 
New Zealand data in comparison to other countries shows that it rates high on all three 
variables. New Zealand has a score of 0.9 for bridging capital, and was only exceeded by 
China (0.91), Finland (0.95), Norway (0.95) and Sweden (0.98). New Zealand has a score of 1 
for economic freedom along with Australia, Canada and Switzerland. New Zealand has a 
score of 0.81 for competitiveness, and this was exceeded by 12 other countries, including 
Canada (0.92), Finland (0.94), Germany (0.93), Netherlands (0.92), Sweden (0.95), 
Switzerland (0.96) and the U.S. (0.96). As in the other comparative research, New Zealand 
scores well on relevant variables indicating potential for high levels of innovation.  
 Overall results and policy indications 
Most of the above results from the research programme can be shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: User innovation situation in New Zealand (DN = Denmark, FN = Finland) 
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We can also draw on other research from the TUI programme which has a bearing on policy 
indications. In an international review of innovation centres (Fairweather, 2010), we found that 
the key functions of innovation centres are to: 
• Commercialise R&D 
• Help inventors 
• Promote innovation 
• Research (user) innovation. 
 
Of these four functions, only the first is well developed in New Zealand. 
In an international comparison of innovation policies in selected European and Asian countries, Australia 
and New Zealand (Fairweather et al., 2010) we found that while New Zealand included user innovation in 
its identification of challenges, there were no specific policies in place to address this source of innovation. 
Further, we found that the New Zealand national innovation system (NIS) could be refined to better match 
those of innovation leading countries, particularly those of Finland and Denmark. These two countries were 
consistently rated as innovation leaders. Both are similar to New Zealand in that they have small 
populations and see themselves as having to innovate well to compete in the world. In comparison to New 
Zealand, leading NIS countries were rated with above-average scores for vertical coherence (NIS policies 
implemented in the way intended), business involved in policy, and national vision for innovation. That is, 
on all three of these dimension of NIS, New Zealand had a lower than average score. Therefore, in order to 
improve New Zealand’s standing on these three dimensions, the policy suggestions below should 
contribute favourably to improving our performance on these dimensions. 
 
Before moving to policy recommendations, we show the main factors supporting or discouraging 
user innovation in New Zealand (Table 2). These factors indicate where policy must be directed, 
either to support positive features or to address negative features of TUI in New Zealand. 
 
Table 2: Factors supporting or discouraging TUI innovation including distinctive cultural, 
governance and social capital factors influencing innovation 
 
Supporting Discouraging 
Do have user inventors Difficult for TUIs to effectively manage 
networks 
Favourable Power Distance and  
individualism 
Unfavourable cultural traits (make do, tall 
poppy, lifestyle) 
Favourable Openness to experience and 
Agreeableness 
NIS policy not as advanced as innovation 
leaders (Finland, Denmark) 
Favourable cultural traits (invention is 
appreciated) 
Lack of innovation research  
Favourable bridging capital, economic 
freedom, competitiveness 
Lack of innovation promotion 
 Absence of innovation centres focusing on 
user innovation 
21.6 Policy recommendations 
The overall results from the TUI programme draw attention to two main sets of findings. First, user 
inventors are present and active in New Zealand and their current activity levels suggest that they 
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are well, although we need to qualify just how well they are doing. Second, in comparison to other 
countries, the context for user inventors is generally favourable in terms of cultural values, 
personality traits and social capital although, again, qualifiers are necessary. In what follows, we 
make policy recommendations. These are built on the key findings from the programme of 
research and are not a carefully reasoned policy analysis per se. An assumption made here rests 
on the following question: if New Zealanders believe they can take on the world in sports, then 
why not in innovation? 
21.6.1 User inventors 
TUIs do exist and some do prosper but our research draws attention not so much to the actual 
user inventor but to the innovation network in which they work and which they have to manage. 
The important finding is that those inventors who have more actors and flows do better. 
Moreover, network competence is paramount. It is the network which is critical both to inventors 
and to those seeking to promote user invention. Our results are consistent with the literature 
which shows that inventors have to become entrepreneurial in order to achieve innovation 
success, that is, extensive sales. There is widespread acceptance of this view that the ‘problem of 
innovation’ is getting inventors to move beyond their invention and become entrepreneurs. 
 
Further, the results show that support provided to TUIs is critical to success. Support includes the 
usual things like access to capital but also includes affirmation and encouragement, mentors, and 
critical comment on the concept of the invention itself. More broadly, support also includes 
provision of opportunities. These results suggest that while TUIs are independent and resourceful, 
they are not above seeking or getting assistance even if at times this not adequate. Further, these 
findings suggest that policy should target these critical elements of user invention rather than 
assuming that TUIs ‘harden up’ and manage their networks unaided. We are not suggesting that 
currently there is no support provided. Many of our TUI cases mentioned the value of mentors and 
others. The evidence we have suggests that we could do better in providing support and in 
facilitating inventors to help themselves.  
 
In recommending that innovation policy seek ways to encourage inventors to better manage 
networks, we are not suggesting that there are no resources in New Zealand currently devoted to 
doing this. Currently, there are many resources well equipped to assist inventors, including: 
 
• The Icehouse 
• Upstart Business Incubator 
• Evolver Design Innovation Programme 
• Viclink 
• Switch Innovation Centre, Lincoln University 
• www.Kiwiingenuity.net 
• The Auckland Inventors Club, including the Inventors Trust.  
 
Our belief is that all these can offer useful assistance to inventors. However, many of our TUI case 
studies did not link to these organisations. Further, many would appear to be unlikely to make 
contact with them because this requires already understanding that expert help is needed, and 
having sufficient confidence to make an approach. In addition, the assumption behind the 
provision of the services by the organisations listed above is that the problem of innovation can be 
solved by providing expert advice. While it is true that expert advice can play a vital role in 
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supporting effective innovation, there may still be a problem if inventors do not recognise the 
problem. Therefore ways must be found to address the problem of innovation by encouraging 
inventors to take advantage of expert advice. Merely having the expert advice will not by itself 
resolve the problem.  
 
Since we know that innovation occurs in a network and that network competence aids successful 
commercialisation of invention, then any way to improve networking and sharing experience of 
innovation would be valuable. To this end one of our main policy recommendations is that ways 
be found to facilitate inventors sharing experience and ideas, and in this networked age, one good 
way to do this is by establishing an invention website which features and facilitates sharing of 
ideas and experiences.  
 
In Table 3, we list the main policy goals indicated by our user inventor research results. The table 
sets out what needs to be achieved, suggests how each goal could be achieved, but leaves open 
the question of who might support the achievement of each process. These recommendations 
assume that is important to emphasise the focus on inventor networks. 
 
Table 3: What, how and who for TUI in New Zealand 
 
What How Who 
Increased availability of capital Assist inventors to access available 
capital 
Find new ways to provide needed 
capital 
 
Increase awareness among inventors of 
the importance of managing networks 
Inventors’ website 
Inventors’ Association 
 
Better sharing of experience, learning 
and communication among inventors 
Inventors’ website 
Inventors’ Association 
 
Assist TUIs to better manage network 
links 
Provide a links service 
Provide assistance to family members 
who manage many of the network 
connections and business 
administration. 
 
Increase awareness among inventors of 
the importance of entrepreneurship and 
business skills 
(Continue to) provide relevant courses 
Encourage inventors to attend 
entrepreneur/business courses 
 
 
21.6.2 Context of user invention 
Moving to the context of user innovation in New Zealand, our results show that the context is 
generally favourable, although perhaps a better characterisation is that it is not overtly 
unfavourable. Our results can be used to identify how the context influences TUI and this 
understanding can be used to inform policy.  
 
An important aspect of the cultural values research and personality traits research is that we have 
found that they are related to level of innovation. New Zealand scores on these variables are 
favourable – our rankings are similar to or better than countries that are acknowledged as 
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innovation leaders. This finding suggests that in the absence of a high rating for New Zealand 
innovation, something is missing. Well directed policy is needed to tap this potential. While policy 
may be directed to all sources of innovation, it would seem that our cultural values and 
personality traits are well suited to TUI, at least to the early stage of the invention process if not to 
the entrepreneurship stages. 
 
In terms of cultural values and personality traits, the findings were similar in that on four measures 
studied, New Zealanders had scores that were favourable for innovation. What is surprising is that 
our actual level of innovation does not seem to match these values and traits. If we assume that 
innovation generally could be enhanced by a greater presence of user innovation, then this finding 
suggests that policy aimed at user innovation should target the context of user innovation and 
attempt to encourage it, trying to meld or direct the values and traits that are supportive of it. At 
the least, the results suggest that such policy direction is likely to fall on fertile ground.  
 
Our model of New Zealand culture points to elements supportive of innovation and to elements 
that inhibit innovation. In comparison to other countries, our results suggest that we are not 
greatly confident about our innovation position in the world. Further, what we have are generally 
favourable attitudes but a lack of overt support and lack of appreciation of the important role user 
innovation can play in economic growth. The popular cultural view in New Zealand is that we 
innovate to keep up, not to lead the world. When kiwis talk about their culture, this talk does not 
include the presence of world-wide successful technology companies. The New Zealand innovation 
identity model did, however, include ‘the man in the shed’. Examples of world-leading, user 
innovation occur but they are not widely recognised and tend to be overshadowed by the large 
companies, such as Fonterra. Internationally successful companies are likely to be rewarding both 
for user inventors and for the nation.  
 
Having high scores in areas favourable to innovation is no guarantee that such scores will remain 
in place. Policies should be put in place that insures that independent thinking, creativity, 
openness, agreeableness and bridging capital (trust in others) are encouraged in Kiwi culture. 
Support for programmes that highlight these characteristics is one such policy that would be 
simple to undertake and would help to maintain these important elements of Kiwi identity. It 
would not do to find ourselves mounting a rearguard action in the future because we failed to 
encourage, in the general population, features that are clearly linked to inventiveness and 
innovation. Agreeableness, in particular, seems a trait that could easily be extinguished as a 
feature of national character. It, like creativity, is a disposition that is strongly affected by the 
pressure for performance; especially for performance under time pressure. There is no doubt that 
such pressure is abundant in modern society. Some of these policy goals may already be part of 
New Zealand current policy settings, in which case they endorse what is currently available.  
 
In Table 4, we list the main policy goals indicated by our results relating to context.  
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Table 3: What, how and who for TUI context in New Zealand 
 
What How Who 
Continue to support relevant Kiwi 
Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, 
Power Distance, Individualism, and 
creativity. 
E.g., general support for policies 
that encourage creativity 
 
Increased acknowledgement and 
appreciation of TUI, popularise and 
promote TUI 
National innovation competitions  
Innovators’ website 
T.V. show ‘New Zealand Inventor’ 
Promote media coverage of user 
innovation 
Museums, via dedicated museum 
or visiting exhibits  
 
Improving education to promote 
creativity and entrepreneurship skills in 
the younger generation 
Assist Young Inventors 
programmes in the school 
curriculum 
 
Minimised cultural deficits to innovation 
in the younger generation (i.e., tall 
poppy syndrome etc.) 
Changes to educational system  
Promote wider appreciation of TUI  
‘TUI investment better than capital 
gains’ 
Provide case study data comparing 
investment in land versus 
investment in user innovation 
 
Promote technology literacy  IP lawyers to have technology 
experience 
 
Promote user inventor research  New Zealand Innovation Research 
Centre (NZIRC) 
 
 
Key policy priorities 
While the above suggestions cover many areas for policy some of the priorities are: 
• NZ inventors’ website (needs continued funding) 
• Coordination, association 
• Provide better assistance 
• Promote invention and innovation 
• Establish a NZ Innovation Research (& Promotion?) Centre.  
 
Improving New Zealand’s NIS 
The policy suggestions made here can be assessed in terms of their contribution to vertical 
coherence, business involvement in policy, and national vision, criteria of NIS identified in our 
comparative study of innovation policies. The first of these relates more to the manner of 
implementing a policy rather than the substance of policy itself. Our suggestions do not address 
this issue. For business involvement in policy, if user inventors become better organised by 
forming an association then it would be possible, but not necessarily so, for this group of 
entrepreneurs to be involved in policy. Concerning national vision, our policy indications suggest 
that if user invention gains greater importance among policy makers at least the vision would 
better match the nature of invention in New Zealand and this better match may contribute to 
better vision.  
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21.7 Coda: comparisons to Australia 
Since we compare ourselves with Australia and believe that their economy is better than ours, and 
since we are culturally similar, we note the following data for the selected key variables: 
 
Comparison of New Zealand and Australia on selected variables 
 
 
The table shows that New Zealand and Australia are broadly similar although Australia has higher 
scores for the two innovation measures in 2009. In addition, Australia has less favourable Power 
Distance but more favourable Individualism. It has similar scores for personality traits and social 
capital. Again, if we accept that Australia’s level of innovation is better, we are faced with asking 
why New Zealand is not rated as highly when the other characteristics are similar. At the risk of 
oversimplifying an obviously complex issue as to what are all the reasons for Australia’s success, 
we note that, in terms of innovation policies, Australia does have: 
1. State-supported innovation websites 
2. An association of inventors 
3. An innovation research centre 
4. A TV programme popularising invention. 
 
The presence of these factors cannot be taken to cause high levels of innovation but they appear 
to be relevant in supporting innovation generally and user innovation in particular. Comparisons to 
Australia which enhance our understanding of the causes of the different innovation levels remain 
a topic for further research.  
 
In the meantime, put yourself in the position of an inventor who might be looking for help of some 
kind. They might use Google to do a search. What would such an inventor find in New Zealand 
compared to Australia? The results of such a search are presented below, first for New Zealand 
and then for Australia.   
 
  
General topic Index or score New Zealand  Australia 
Innovation GII (2009) 3.97 4.27 
 GII (2010) 4.60 4.28 
 III (2009) 0.77 1.02 
Cultural values Power Distance 22 36 
 Individualism 79 90 
Personality factors Openness to Experience 50.7 51.2 
 Agreeableness 50.7 50.7 
Social capital et al. Bridging capital 0.9 0.84 
 Economic freedom 1.0 1.0 
 Competitiveness 0.81 0.88 
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15. 23 Feb 2010 ... A new Dunedin business incubator aims to inventors a helping handWith 
funding drying up and investors hunkering down, times are tough for ... 
www.nzangel.co.nz/index.php/.../news.../236-upstart-to-help-inventors - Cached 
16. Den to help inventors progress | Otago Daily Times Online News ... 
17. 16 Feb 2010 ... "Kiwis are prolific inventors, and yet it seems that less than 1% of ... to seek 
opportunities to create new intellectual property around ... 
www.odt.co.nz › News › Business - Cached 
18. N.Zealand inventors unveil bionic legs for paraplegics (w/ Video) 
19. 16 Jul 2010 ... Two New Zealand inventors have produced what they claim are the world's 
first robotic legs to help paraplegics walk again. 
www.physorg.com/news198475298.html - Cached - Similar 
20. New Zealand inventors produce bionic legs for paraplegics - Health ... 
21. 17 Jul 2010 ... Two New Zealand inventors have produced what they claim are the world's 
first robotic legs to help paraplegics walk again. ... 
www.independent.co.uk › Life & Style › Health & Families. 
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1. New Inventors: Resources: Links 
2. A not for profit organisation that provides a range of practical services to help inventors 
Australia-wide including grant matching and other low cost ... 
www.abc.net.au/tv/newinventors/resources/links.htm - Cached - Similar 
3. Inventors Assistance Australia - Introduction Page 
4. Welcome to Inventors Assistance Australia, an organization in Perth, Western Australia 
focused on helping Inventors – from original idea – right through to ... 
iaawa.com/ - Cached 
5. Australian Inventors Society 
6. The Inventors Society does a wonderful job to help us inventors - greatly appreciated - thanks 
again." - Peter Hutchison ( Western Australia ) Inventor of ... 
www.inventoz.com/ - Cached - Similar 
7. Inventors HQ where inventors bring inventions and bright ideas ... 
8. Inventors HQ Australia Pty Ltd congratulates you for getting here! ... It is our objective to help 
you turn your bright idea into a new product and then ... 
www.inventorshq.com.au/ - Cached - Similar 
9. Welcome to the Inventors Association of Australia 
10. Inventors Association of Australia (FEDERAL) INC. | Inventors helping inventors for ... Help 
inventors to avoid some of the unnecessary costs and pitfalls ... 
www.australian-inventors.asn.au/ - Cached 
11. History of the Inventors Association of Australia 
12. Inventors Association of Australia (FEDERAL) INC. | Inventors helping ... 
www.australian-inventors.asn.au/.../history-of-the-inventors-association-of- australia.html - 
Cached 
13. Show more results from australian-inventors.asn.au 
14. Patents Online - Inventors Society Of Australia (NSW) 
15. 12 Jan 2005 ... THE INVENTORS ASSOCIATION exists to help bring the benefits of ... THE 
AUSTRALIAN INVENTORS HALL OF HONOUR PROJECT is a vision of the ... 
www.patentsonline.com.au/patent/piaansw.html - Cached - Similar 
16. Australian inventors and innovators need government support ... 
17. 12 Aug 2010 ... In 2009, inventor Don Morgan was a finalist in Anthill's Smart 100 competition. 
However, as he recounts in this passionate plea for change, ... 
anthillonline.com/the-treatment-of-innovation-is-a-national-disgrace-why-i- took-my-
invention-overseas/ - Australia - Cached - Similar 
18. Australian Inventions. Australian inventors have come up with simple solutions which are 
often appropriate in ... Around Australia they help business, research organisations and 
...www.whitehat.com.au › Australia - Cached - Similar 
19. Innovation & Technology Australia - Innovation Help for Inventors ... 
20. Innovation Express provides help for inventors in Sydney, Australia. 
www.innovation.org.au/innovation-express 
 
 
The first item above, the New Inventors, has on its home page a list of links that might be useful to 
inventors. This list includes organisations such as those relating to design, commercialisation, 
trade, research, inventor associations and societies, IP, etc. but in particular: 
 
1. AusInvent is the NSW Innovation Advisory Service, supported by the NSW Government. Book a 
free consultation to discuss your invention or innovation with the NSW Innovation Advisor. We 
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provide practical support and assistance to start-up companies, inventors, innovators and small to 
medium enterprises through all stages of commercialisation. Services are subsidised by the NSW 
government and include: 
• Free initial consultation 
• Technical and market reports 
• Seminars 
• Innovation resources 
• Links and referrals to other service providers 
 
2. Industry Development Centre (Hunter) Ltd (IDC) 
A not-for-profit organisation specialising in innovation services assisting Australia’s inventors and 
small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs). 
www.innovation.org.au 
3. INNOVIC 
A not-for-profit organisation that provides a range of practical services to help inventors Australia-
wide including grant matching and other low cost services. Also runs the annual Next Big Thing 
Award. Finalists exhibited at the Melbourne Museum, cash & prizes. 
 
As part of their main page, the New Inventors show these steps to invention: 
• Task 1: Eureka! 
• Task 2: Documenting your idea 
• Task 3: Seek and Ye Just Might Find 
• Task 4: To Patent, or not to Patent 
• Task 5: Das Kapital 
• Task 6: Prototype - once, twice, thrice 
• Task 7: Got a business plan? 
• Task 8: Getting your product on the shelves 
• Task 9: Revise and renew 
• Task 10: Keep inventing! 
 
What is obvious in comparing these two sets of search results is that the search for inventor help 
in Australia finds six of the top ten websites dedicated to providing help to inventors. Of the top 
ten New Zealand hits, none were dedicated websites aimed at helping inventors. Where help was 
mentioned it was by way of a media articles. While the Auckland Inventors’ Club was the first hit, 
this website does not have any explicit mention of help for inventors on its home page. 
Future research  
1. Assess the economic contribution of TUI to the New Zealand economy.  
2. Critically evaluate the education system in New Zealand to assess how it fosters creativity 
and entrepreneurship skills. 
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3. Identify the ways in which individual traits and characteristics interact with actors in the 
innovation network.  
4. Compare New Zealand and Australia to determine why Australia’s level of innovation is 
rated higher than New Zealand when it appears that other relevant characteristics are 
similar. 
5. Review and evaluate the Australian invention websites to assess their funding, structure, 
and effectiveness. 
6. Network competence appears to be linked to innovation success. One element of network 
competence is how inventors attempt to gain assistance while developing their invention. 
Further study of inventors, both commercially successful and unsuccessful, could examine 
these and other critical linkages.  
7. Examine the geographical location of user inventors to test if urban proximity facilitates 
innovation. 
8. Assess the prevalence of open or shared user innovation in New Zealand. 
9. Continue to examine international survey data for relevant attitudes and values related to 
levels of innovation. A number of new databases have become available recently which 
promise to deepen our understanding of country-level innovation ratings. 
10. A large part of the New Zealand economy is centred around agriculture. Research on other 
countries that once had an agricultural focus but have diversified would be useful. A 
potential country of interest is Ireland. 
11. Conduct a comparative media study looking at how often and in what context, innovation 
is discussed in newspapers and on T.V. across multiple nations in order to assess if the 
press in other nations do a better job of highlighting national innovation.  
 
21.8 Conclusion 
The increasing attention given to innovation has seen the linear model of technology push 
replaced by a more pronounced focus on the inventor and the social processes involved in any 
innovation. The literature is showing the emergence of network models of innovation and 
appreciation of the networks in which user inventors exist. We believe the results of the research 
programme contribute to this improved understanding of TUI and a better model, albeit with 
inherent indeterminacy in some of the detail, reflecting the varied and complex nature of TUI 
networks. More important than the precise workings of key factors in innovation networks is the 
appreciation that invention and innovation by technology users is best understood in network 
terms since this provides a valuable direction to any policy directions that may be developed. 
Network competence and social capital are useful concepts in this regard. Further, the new model 
has relevance to the understanding of networks and TUI in other settings, and can lead to better 
innovation policy by showing the importance of technology users in national innovation.  
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22.1 Importance of inventing 
There is a significant difference between INNOVATION and INVENTION yet in many government 
departments and business arenas they are freely interchanged. 
 
22.2 Danger of not adding value 
Innovation  will assist in reducing costs as improvements are made to processes within an 
organisation, but they cannot stave off continuing cost increases from raw materials, costs of living 
(wage increases), etc. Striving to achieve the last 3-5% of the total improvement available can in 
many cases cost more than the outcome benefits. 
 
The only way to add real value is to invent. Invention provides completely new forms of 
competitive advantage and a source of new profit generation. 
 
22.3 Intellectual property 
Intellectual Property (IP) is a very important asset. Patents can be traded and used as the basis for 
commercial contracts. They also give the inventor the protection that a competitor cannot make 
and sell a product exactly the same within the market. 
 
There are many dangers in establishing the IP and commercialising it. In Australia and New 
Zealand there are only two (2) people allowed to file patent applications – the Inventor or a 
qualified, practising Patent Attorney.  
 
Many inventors think that they can save money by filing their own patent, but it is like doing your 
own tax – its ok until you get audited. 
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In the United States of America it is the “First to invent”, but in Australia and New Zealand it if the 
“First to file”, therefore the inventor must keep the invention a secret until they have filed for a 
patent otherwise someone else can steal the idea. 
 
22.4 Why Inventors fail 
In many cases they simply run out of time. 
Once they have filed a patent application they have twelve months before the first deadline 
occurs. This deadline is absolute and cannot be missed by even one (1) day, if international 
protection is to be maintained. This is an expensive exercise and comes on top of prototype 
development and other costs associated with the commercialisation journey from idea to tangible 
product. 
 
The other major mistake made by inventors, both individual and SMEs is they underestimate the 
skills necessary to effectively commercialise an invention. These skills include – project 
management, financial control, design, marketing, production management, negotiation, patent 
attorney (if filed themselves) and if they go overseas for production - outsourcing skills. 
 
Frequently, inventors will manufacture products before they have any confirmed pathway into the 
market. We have had phone calls from inventors who have taken delivery of a container full of 
they product and suddenly realise what 10,000 units looks like. They do not have any distribution 
identified or arranged, and now realise the magnitude of the task facing them. 
 
22.5 Effective Commercialisation 
Effective commercialisation starts when selecting the appropriate IP to be filed. The international 
treaty deadlines of 12 months (PCT filing) and 30 months (National Phase) must be taken into 
account, along with the timeline for prototype development and commercialisation. 
 
The aim is to condense the development time as much as possible so that the product can be in 
the market well before the 30-month national phase deadline, and even before the 12-month 
deadline if the product is suitable.  
By achieving this, the product has time to start producing income that can be used to meet the 
expenses faced at the deadline times. 
 
From the decision to file for a patent through to market entry we have identified over 270 tasks 
that need to be considered. Inventors simply do not know how to effectively commercialise and it 
can cost them a lot of money, and more importantly, time trying to learn these skills and tasks.   
 
Invention Pathways is unique in that we actually hold the hand of the inventor from the initial 
selection of IP through to market entry. Our Invention Specific Commercialisation Program is 
tailored to each invention’s journey through the commercialisation process. 
In addition to our patent attorney network, we have industrial designers, graphic artists, China 
manufacturing, accountants and solicitors who input into the journey to market. 
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23.1 Introduction 
The words invention and innovation are often used invariably. Invention focuses on breakthrough 
or radical research whereas innovation focuses on improving the existing art. In other words, 
invention is defined as a focused application of the human mind to the world that yields an 
original creation with practical use. Innovation is defined as the practice of bringing inventions into 
widespread usage, through creative thinking, investment, and marketing.18
 
 It is generally believed 
that invention and innovation requires huge amount of investment. This may be true but not 
always. Invention and innovation does not always require huge capital investments. The 
promotion of innovation in developing countries is of utmost importance as it helps developing 
countries drive economic change. Policies that support technology development are known as 
“innovation policies”. The concept of innovation encompasses not only diffusion of technology but 
also organizing the innovations, which includes introduction of new management or marketing 
techniques, the adoption of new supply or logistic arrangements, and improved approaches to 
internal and external communications and positioning. The complexity in situations, diverse 
cultures, levels of development signifies that the innovation policy for developing countries is to 
be tailor made rather than one size fits all approach (Aubert, 2004) 
                                                     
18 Invention and Innovation for sustainable development. Report of a workshop sponsored by the Lemelson-MIT Program and LEAD 
International, London, November 2003 
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23.2 Innovations in developing countries 
The definitions for invention, innovation and commercialization are provided by the Office of 
Technology Assessment. It defines invention as the act of devising or fabricating a novel device, 
process or service. Innovation encompasses both the development and application of new 
product, process or service. Commercialization refers to the attempt to profit from innovation 
through the sale or use of products, processes or services.,19 The knowledge transfer in developing 
countries could be either developed indigenously or through any of the following: foreign 
partners, foreign suppliers and/or clients or the direct trade in technologies through licensing 
(Almeida and Fernandes, 2008). Further, technology adoption and adaptation should not only 
focus on existing technologies but also should adapt to local requirements. Hence, incremental 
inventions or innovations are important from a developing country’s point of view (Almeida and 
Fernandes, 2008) It is also found that there are more innovations in technology-based industries 
and a higher number of firms are engaged in technology innovation in developing countries 
compared to developed countries (Almeida and Fernandes, 2008) It is also argued that the concept 
of innovation systems is helpful both as an analytical tool and as a guide for policy making. 
Developing countries also should find solutions to their problems based on their innovation 
capabilities.20
 
  
23.3 Types of Innovation 
The development, encouragement and support of domestic technological capabilities are 
important in national industrial development strategy. Policy Makers in developing countries are 
confronted with challenges of bringing desired indigenous technological development21 and bring 
innovations.  Various types of innovations include22,23
a. Product Innovation: introduction of a good or service that is significantly improved with 
respect to its intended use.  
: 
b. Process innovation: implementation of a new and significantly improved production of 
delivery methods. Organizational Innovation: implementation of a new organizational 
method or way of doing business, innovated management systems or relationship with 
external customers.  
c. Marketing Innovation: marketing innovations can be in the form of significant changes in 
goods or service design, changes in packaging, product placement, product pricing, and 
product promotion. 
 
23.4 Innovation Framework in India and National Innovation Foundation  
Many experiments leading to innovations may improve productivity and generate employment. 
However, the inventor is solving a personal problem without necessarily understanding the 
                                                     
19 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Innovation and Commercialization of Emerging Technology, OTA-BP-ITC-165 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995 
20 Arocena R and Sutz J. Innovation Systems and Developing Countries. DRUID Working Paper No 02-05 
21 Innovation Promotion And Commercialization Of Inventions And Research Results. WIPO National Seminar On Innovation 
Promotion. Bridgetown, November 22 to 23, 1999. WIPO/INN/BRI/99/3 
22 Measuring Innovation in Developing Countries. Regional Workshop on Science & Technology Statistics 21 - 24 November 2005 
New Delhi, India 
23 http://www.praha.czso.cz/csu/2006edicniplan.nsf/engt/36003ADF25/$File/960506aa2.pdf 
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importance of the invention to society as a whole. Sometimes ideas and inventions get diffused 
through word of mouth but these ideas remain localized. Hence, potential growth and social 
development is constrained.24
a. Scouting and documentation 
 The National Innovation Foundation (NIF) in India was set up in 
2000 with the help of the Department of Science and Technology Government to scale up the idea 
of learning from grassroots innovators. The NIF has taken major steps to make India innovative by 
documenting, adding value, protecting the intellectual property rights of the contemporary 
unaided technological inventors, as well as building on people’s outstanding traditional 
knowledge. NIF’s mission is to make India become an inventive and creative society and a global 
leader in sustainable technologies without social and economic handicaps affecting evolution and 
diffusion of green grassroots innovations.7 NIF has 5 functions: 
b. Value addition and Research and Development 
c. Business Development and Micro venture fund 
d. Intellectual Property Protection 
e. Dissemination and Information Technology. 
 
Thus, the government of India took proactive steps in understanding the importance of grass root 
innovations and nurturing these innovations to benefit of society. NIF is entrusted with 
responsibility of building a national register of grassroot innovations and traditional knowledge. 
NIF has been successful in commercializing products across countries.7   
 
23.5 Grass root Innovations in India 
Developing countries have inventors, who, if proper support is provided, may make significant 
inventions that can become successful innovations. Due recognition and remuneration to 
inventors is a strong stimulating factor for inventors to come up with significant inventions. Apart 
from these factors, access to technology in the form of technology transfer can boost inventors to 
perform better (Zachariassen, 1977). It is also evident that in order to commercialize inventions in 
developing countries, inventors, having limited resources, need to get additional resources. In 
order to commercialize a technology, the inventor has to either license technology to someone or 
commercialize it on his or her own.25
 
 The latter is difficult to achieve in the developing world.  
The NIF in India is supporting these grass root inventors who cannot commercialize their products 
by providing them with necessary assistance. The NIF has partnered with Honey Bee Network, 
SRISTI (the Society for Research and Initiatives for Sustainable Technologies and Institutions) and 
GIAN (Grassroots Innovations Augmentation Network), two important Indian organisations. The 
NIF coordinates with various industry associations and incubators for support for grassroot 
inventors and also liaises with financial institutions for financial support. The NIF has also 
collaborated with SIDBI (Small Industries Development Bank of India) where INR 40 mn is provided 
as a MicroVenture Innovation Fund for inventions that have market potential and repayment of 
the loan is possible. The NIF also provides a list of various technologies that are available for 
licensing in various categories such as agriculture, consumer durables, electronic gadgets, 
machinery and equipments, environment management technology, Traditional Knowledge, and 
                                                     
24 http://www.nif.org.in/dwn_files/bihar/Bihar_%20Innovates.pdf 
25 From Invention to Innovation. US Department of Energy Inventions and Innovations Program. Accessed at 
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/gov_ip_reports/fromi2i.pdf 
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herbal formulations to name a few. It has also listed the innovations from various states carried 
out by grass root inventors.  
 
A few innovations supported by NIF are explained below.  
 
23.5.1 Earthern Kitchen Products26
One of the innovators have made routine kitchen products from clay. These products include a 
clay refrigerator, a clay water cooler, a non stick coated earthern pan, and clay food plate etc. The 
refrigerator does not require electricity and keeps food fresh too. This invention is based on the 
principle of evaporation. Water from the upper chambers drips down the side, and gets 
evaporated taking away heat from the inside, leaving the chambers cool. The top upper chamber 
is used to store water. A small lid made from clay is provided on top whereas in the lower 
chamber, two shelves are provided to store the food material. Vegetables, fruits, milk etc. can be 
stored for several days.  This is shown in Figure 1. 
   
 
 
Figure 1: Mitticool – The clay refrigerator 
 
23.5.2 Amphibious bicycle27
 Mohd Saidullah, an inventor from the state of Bihar, India, made an amphibious bicycle in 1970s 
to cross over from one place to another place during flood. This amphibious bicycle is a 
conventional bicycle to which four rectangular air floats are attached, which support the bicycle 
when moving in water, and fan blades are attached in a radial manner on the spokes of the rear 
wheel which enable it to run on both water and land. The blades are arranged in such a fashion 
that it can be driven in reverse direction also. This is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
                                                     
26 http://www.nif.org.in/dwn_files/Gujarat/PART-I%20Gujarat%20final.pdf pg 37 
27 http://www.nif.org.in/dwn_files/bihar/Bihar_%20Innovates.pdf. pg 16 
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Figure 2: Amphibious Bicycle 
 
23.6 Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise 
The micro, small and medium enterprises department (MSME) in India helps social and economic 
development and is considered a nursery of entrepreneurship. The MSME is responsible for 
assisting businesses which contributes eight per cent of the country’s GDP, 45 per cent of the 
manufactured output and 40 per cent of its exports. The MSMEs provide employment to about 60 
million persons through over 26 million enterprises producing over six thousand products. The 
ministry focuses on efforts for giving financial assistance for Entrepreneurship Development 
Training Programmes (EDPs), Skill Development Training Programmes (SDPs), Entrepreneurship-
cum-Skill Development Training Programmes (ESDPs) and Training of Trainers Programmes. The 
ministry provides capital subsidy for technology upgrading of micro and small enterprises.28
 
 Such 
facilitation of support by government to small sectors and innovators may help inventors develop 
innovations that are user friendly and have market potential. 
23.7 Role of Intellectual Property in generating innovation and policy 
formulation 
Intellectual Property is considered a cornerstone of economic policy and catalyst of development. 
It is important to recognize that Intellectual Property plays an important role in sustainable 
development in developing countries. Developing countries find it difficult to formulate national 
IPR policy compatible with their needs of development. Designing a proper intellectual property 
system helps technology development infrastructure and facilitates the technology transfer 
process. Strong relationships between an intellectual property regime and promotion of 
technological innovation at the macro level exists. Salami and Goodrazi (2009) The key to 
development of the knowledge economy resides in innovation of knowledge, while the intellectual 
property system, in terms of property, gives the owner of an innovation exclusive rights for a 
certain period, so that they might recover the high amount of input and gains of innovation, to 
drive economic development (Salami and Goodrazi, 2009). Innovation is one of the key factors of 
creating new industries and revitalizing existing ones in developing world. An innovation system is 
characterized by environmental systems and a favourable environment for invention and 
                                                     
28 Strategic Action Plan of Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium enterprises. Accessed at http://msme.gov.in/MSME-Strategic-
Action-Plan.pdf 
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innovation depends on the state of science and technology; the legislative, legal, fiscal and 
financial environment; the scientific and entrepreneurial culture; human resources and their level 
of knowledge and education (Tenenbaum, 1999)  
Intellectual property consists of the laws of trade secrets, copyright, patent, trademark, and 
related sets of doctrines which proscribe property rights over created and invented works.   These 
property rights are justified as rewards for the development and implementation for new works, 
in other words as rewards for invention.   A related justification for these rights is as rewards for 
innovation, meaning the dissemination through commercialization of new works.29
A utility model concept, which is not defined under any IPR law, is a generic term to describe 
subject-matter that hinges precariously between that which is protectable under patent law and 
that which is protectable under sui generis design law. An overview of some of the countries in 
Central Asia and Asia Pacific reveals that utility model law is a popular option in the Asian region. 
Utility models are especially good for relatively innovative developing countries seeking to 
advance technological capacity through local incremental innovation. It is also found that in Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan,, a combination of relatively weak IPR protection and the availability of 
second-tier patents like utility models and design patents encouraged technological learning. The 
utility model may be a good option for small and medium enterprises in developing countries due 
to prohibitive costs associated with patent system. The second tier patent regime is viewed as the 
ideal solution as it is a system geared towards the needs of SMEs, including in terms of cost 
(Suthersanen, 2006).  
  
 
23.8 Conclusion 
Great potential exist in developing countries with respect to supporting invention to achieve 
successful innovation. However, due to hurdles such as poor infrastructure, lack of government 
support, lack of finance, various cultures and perception towards innovations, many useful 
innovations are not commercialized. In addition, ignorance of intellectual property system in 
developing countries also hinders the process of innovation among researchers. Governments in 
developing countries should take proactive steps to support grass root innovators by providing 
them with necessary assistance in terms of finance, knowledge with respect to IPR system, 
formulation of policies encouraging local innovations that can be commercialized globally. 
 
                                                     
29 Ghosh S. Intellectual Property in the New Law & Development Project: Comments and Examples from India. Accessed at 
innovation.ucdavis.edu/events/bayh-dole-30-papers/bayh.../ghoshpaper 
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